Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case involved Asdrubal Quijada Marin and Juan Carlos Acosta Hurtado, two Venezuelan nationals who were apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in the Caribbean Sea. They were convicted after a bench trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, pursuant to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.On appeal, Marin and Acosta Hurtado challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the evidence should have been suppressed due to violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They also contended that their detention at sea for 48 days prior to indictment constituted unnecessary delay and outrageous government conduct.The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Marin and Acosta Hurtado under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act because Cameroon, the flag nation of the vessel, had consented to United States jurisdiction over the crew of the vessel. It also held that the Northland’s stop and search of the Zumaque Tracer did not violate the Fourth Amendment, so the District Court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation. The Court also held that the District Court did not err in denying Acosta Hurtado’s motion to dismiss based on unnecessary delay arguments. Lastly, the Court held that Acosta Hurtado's claim of outrageous government conduct was meritless. View "USA v. Hurtado" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the United States District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) denial of a church's petition for a religious exemption from the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth, Inc. petitioned the DEA for an exemption to the CSA so it could lawfully use and handle a sacramental tea known as ayahuasca, which contains a controlled substance, Dimethyltryptamine (DMT). The DEA denied the petition, concluding that the church had not met its burden under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to show that its members' beliefs were sincerely held and that its use of ayahuasca was part of a religious exercise. The DEA also found compelling governmental interests in maintaining public safety and preventing diversion of the tea into improper channels. The DEA's denial of the petition was deemed a final decision made under the CSA, thereby triggering the jurisdictional bar of 21 U.S.C. § 877. The court ruled that because the DEA's decision was made under the CSA, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial on the merits. The court also held that Soul Quest's additional constitutional, statutory, and procedural claims were "inescapably intertwined" with the DEA's final decision, making the CSA's jurisdictional bar applicable to those claims as well. View "Soul Quest Church of Mother Earth, Inc. v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

This case concerns a petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by a group of petitioners including a non-profit organization, a corporation that resells telecommunications services, and various individuals. They challenge the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 254, also known as the Telecommunications Act of 1996’s universal service requirements, arguing that it violates the nondelegation doctrine. They also argue that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency Congress put in charge of § 254, has impermissibly delegated authority over the universal service fund to a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), in violation of the private nondelegation doctrine.The court rejected these arguments, finding that § 254 provides an "intelligible principle" for the FCC to follow in its regulation of the universal service fund, and that the FCC maintains control and oversight of all actions by the private entity, USAC. Therefore, the court held that there were no unconstitutional delegations and denied the petition.In terms of the facts leading to the case, the FCC was created in 1934 to regulate interstate commerce in communication and was instructed by Congress in 1996 to establish and maintain a universal service fund. This fund was created with the goal of making communication services available to all the people of the United States, without discrimination. To manage this, the FCC relies on the USAC, a private entity, to determine the amount each contributor must provide to the fund. However, the petitioners argued that the actions taken by both the FCC and the USAC in creating the 4th Quarter 2022 Contribution Factor were unconstitutional. The court rejected these arguments and upheld the constitutionality of the FCC's and USAC's roles in managing the fund. View "Consumers' Research, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a defendant, Reginald McCoy, who was charged in 1990 with conspiracy to possess and possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2019, McCoy filed a motion to reduce his sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, which allows some defendants to have their sentences reevaluated under reduced statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses that were implemented after their sentences became final. He argued that he should be able to object to the drug-quantity finding made at his original sentencing as he did not have reason to do so at the time because he did not know that the statutory sentencing thresholds would be lowered in the future. However, the district court denied McCoy's motion, concluding that it lacked the authority to reduce the sentence because McCoy was already serving the lowest statutory penalty available to him under the Fair Sentencing Act, which was life imprisonment. The court also ruled that it would not have exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence even if McCoy was eligible due to the large quantity of crack cocaine attributable to him and his "ongoing and excessive disciplinary infractions" while incarcerated.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the First Step Act does not grant authority to relitigate a drug quantity finding made at the original sentencing. It also rejected McCoy's argument that the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act via the First Step Act violates due process. The court reasoned that it is impossible for courts to provide notice of a hypothetical future law whose passage is uncertain and whose operative text is uncertain. The court concluded that McCoy was not entitled to notice in 1991 of what the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act would provide decades later. View "USA v. McCoy" on Justia Law

After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Kendrick Eugene Duldulao and Medardo Queg Santos for the roles they played in a Florida “pill mill,” the Supreme Court vacated the court’s judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Ruan v. United States.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Duldulao’s conviction on count one of the second superseding indictment; affirmed Santos’s conviction on count one, vacated Santos’s convictions on counts seven, eight, and nine, vacated Santos’s sentence, remanded for resentencing, and remanded for a new trial on counts seven, eight, and nine. The court explained that in the context of sentencing errors, the Supreme Court has explained that “the risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” when the court is responsible for the error. The court explained it has repeatedly upheld jury instructions that misstated the mens rea requirement under Section 841. A jury then convicted Santos based in part on that misstatement. Santos received a prison sentence on these counts, and “the possibility of additional jail time . . . warrants serious consideration in a determination whether to exercise discretion under Rule 52(b).” Further, the court explained that the jury was reasonably able to find that the government had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Duldulao violated Section 841 on that occasion but had nevertheless knowingly joined a conspiracy to unlawfully distribute controlled substances in the abstract and on other occasions. View "USA v. Kendrick Eugene Duldulao, et al." on Justia Law

In late 2018 a grand jury in Mobile, Alabama, charged Defendant with possessing a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(j). The district court allowed him to be released on bond pending trial. Defendant then faked his own kidnapping. After trial, but before sentencing, the government filed a notice informing Defendant that it was going to seek a ten-year consecutive sentence pursuant to Section 3147. The district court ruled that there was no Apprendi problem because the jury found Defendant guilty of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of Section 922(n), and sentenced him to a prison term of 300 months. Defendant appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that a sentence imposed pursuant to Section 3147 can exceed the maximum term prescribed for the underlying offense(s) of conviction. But in such a circumstance, the issue of whether the person committed a felony offense while on pretrial release must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and its progeny. The court explained that the Apprendi error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant did not dispute at any point that he was on pretrial release at the time of the Section 922(n) offense, and his counsel recognized that this fact was undisputed at oral argument. The court explained that no reasonable jury could have convicted Defendant of the Section 922(n) offense without also finding that he committed this crime while on pretrial release. View "USA v. Marco Antonio Perez" on Justia Law

Appellant as next of kin and on behalf of a minor, J.T.A., and all similarly situated minors (“Appellants”), filed a class action lawsuit against the School Board of Volusia County, Florida for allegedly violating the minors’ rights to free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The Appellants appealed the district court’s order dismissing their amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the holding in Perez. The court explained that here, Appellants seek compensatory and punitive damages. The IDEA provides neither. Thus, applying Perez to this case, Appellants can proceed without attempting to exhaust administrative remedies that do not exist under the IDEA. Appellants unambiguously sought compensatory monetary damages under the ADA and not compensatory education under the IDEA. Consequently, in light of Perez, the Appellants should have been allowed to proceed with their claims regardless of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements. View "Kimberly Powell, et al. v. School Board of Volusia County, Florida" on Justia Law

This appeal presents the issue of whether Deputy John Allen and Sheriff Louis Roberts are entitled to qualified and state-agent immunity from Plaintiff’s complaint that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant based on a false affidavit. After Plaintiff drove a methamphetamine trafficker to an undercover drug sting, Allen obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge and arrested him. Florida charged Plaintiff with aiding and abetting drug trafficking and detained him for over six months before dismissing the charges. Plaintiff sued Allen and Roberts under federal and state law, alleging that Allen illegally arrested, detained, and prosecuted him and that Roberts was deliberately indifferent to and negligently caused Allen’s misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Allen’s warrant affidavit—excluding any false statements—supplied probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. The court explained that Plaintiff’s argument that Allen conspired to violate his constitutional rights fails. The court wrote that Plaintiff cannot identify an underlying constitutional violation. “A plaintiff may state a Section 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.” Accordingly, in the absence of a constitutional violation, Plaintiff cannot prove a derivative-conspiracy claim. View "Tyler Land v. Sheriff of Jackson County Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Governor DeSantis signed into law the Individual Freedom Act, also called the Stop W.O.K.E. Act. Seven professors and one student from public universities in Florida challenged the law in the district court as violative of their civil rights. Plaintiffs served subpoenas on fourteen non-party legislators—thirteen co-sponsors of the Act and one legislator who supported the bill during a Florida House of Representatives debate. The district court partially granted and partially denied the legislators’ motion. After the legislators appealed, the district court stayed the discovery order pending the resolution of this appeal. At issue on appeal is whether a common-law privilege shields state legislators from a discovery request made for the purpose of determining the legislators’ motives in passing a law.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that factual documents are within the scope of the privilege, which is unqualified in this kind of lawsuit. The court explained that according to Plaintiffs’ response to the Florida legislators’ motion to quash the subpoena, the plaintiffs served the subpoenas on the legislators to “determine whether there was a discriminatory motive behind the [Act].” By Plaintiffs’ own admission, the subpoenas’ purpose was to uncover the legislators’ motives in passing the law. “The privilege applies with full force against requests for information about the motives for legislative votes and legislative enactments.” So, the privilege applies with its usual force against the discovery of even the factual documents in the Florida legislators’ possession. Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it determined otherwise. View "Leroy Pernell, et al. v. Robert Alexander Andrade, et al." on Justia Law

Artists (collectively “plaintiffs”) appealed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Miami Beach on their First Amendment claim brought against the City under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The City contracted with the artists to create and curate a series of artworks that the City would own. The district court entered summary judgment after finding that the City’s removal of one piece of Plaintiffs’ artwork constituted government speech and was immune from First Amendment scrutiny.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs argued that “artistic expression” is the type of speech at issue here and concede that it “has sometimes been used to convey government speech.” However, they suggest that the history factor requires the majority of the historical use of a type of speech to have been by the government, as opposed to by private individuals. The court wrote that even assuming, as Plaintiffs contend, that artistic expression has historically been used for private speech more often than government speech, this does not negate the government’s own long historical use of artistic expression to convey messages. The history factor does not require the government to show that it historically commissioned more artwork than private individuals and institutions. The court concluded that just as “governments are not obliged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to permit the presence of a rebellious army’s battle flag in the pro-veterans parades that they fund and organize,” they are not obliged to display any particular artwork in the art exhibitions that they fund, organize, and promote. View "Jared McGriff, et al. v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law