Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court held that the Supreme Court of Georgia reasonably concluded that petitioner's attorneys were not deficient for failing to uncover mitigating evidence from petitioner's childhood. The court also held that the state court reasonably concluded that the attorneys' failure to hire an independent crime-scene expert to corroborate petitioner's account of the murders did not prejudice him. View "Morrow v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court held that the Supreme Court of Georgia reasonably concluded that petitioner's attorneys were not deficient for failing to uncover mitigating evidence from petitioner's childhood. The court also held that the state court reasonably concluded that the attorneys' failure to hire an independent crime-scene expert to corroborate petitioner's account of the murders did not prejudice him. View "Morrow v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

A jury awarded to the EEOC and an employee back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages after finding that the employer, Exel, discriminated against her because of her sex. The district court denied Exel's motion for a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law as to liability, but granted the motion as to the jury's punitive damages award. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the employee's evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that she suffered discrimination because of her sex. The court also held that, under prior precedent, the district court properly vacated the jury's punitive damages award. View "EEOC v. Exel, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted in 1986 of three counts of malice murder and set for execution on March 15, 2018, sought permission to file a second habeas petition and a stay of execution, seeking to present claims that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the state destroyed evidence in connection with a post-conviction DNA test of vaginal washings from one body and because he is actually innocent. The Muscogee County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s motion; the Georgia Supreme Court denied review. The Eleventh Circuit denied relief. The court declined to draw the adverse inference against the state that the DNA evidence exculpates the Petitioner. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state contaminated the sample in bad faith. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing demonstrated that the sample was contaminated with a specially used quality control sample, which was handled by another scientist who used shared the same lab area. Petitioner’s contamination claim is not based on an event that occurred during Petitioner’s prosecution for the murders. Petitioner’s claim that he is actually innocent of the murder, has been barred by the Supreme Court: Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding. View "In re: Carlton" on Justia Law

In 1995, Austin, with his two-year-old son in his car, was using a payphone when Welch approached and put a gun at Austin’s side. A struggle ensued. Welch escaped with Austin ’s car, which was recovered nearby (Austin’s money was gone); his son was found wandering the streets. Austin's gunshot wound resulted in his castration. Welch, on parole, later fired shots at a District Attorney Investigator, fled, and was arrested. His bag contained stolen firearms and jewelry. Welch confessed to shooting Austin. He was charged with conspiracy to commit carjacking, carjacking, using a firearm during a crime of violence, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of stolen firearms. Welch pleaded guilty without an agreement. Welch’s guidelines range was 188-235 months, reflecting a 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement, based on Alabama convictions for first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. The Eleventh Circuit rejected his pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), to consider a successive motion to vacate or correct his life sentence. The motion was based on a new, retroactive, rule of law: the Supreme Court's "Johnson" holding that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court applied the modified categorical approach to Alabama’s first-degree assault statute and examined Welch ’s indictments. The least of the acts criminalized by the statute includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, as required by ACCA’s elements clause. View "In Re: Welch" on Justia Law

In 1995, Austin, with his two-year-old son in his car, was using a payphone when Welch approached and put a gun at Austin’s side. A struggle ensued. Welch escaped with Austin ’s car, which was recovered nearby (Austin’s money was gone); his son was found wandering the streets. Austin's gunshot wound resulted in his castration. Welch, on parole, later fired shots at a District Attorney Investigator, fled, and was arrested. His bag contained stolen firearms and jewelry. Welch confessed to shooting Austin. He was charged with conspiracy to commit carjacking, carjacking, using a firearm during a crime of violence, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of stolen firearms. Welch pleaded guilty without an agreement. Welch’s guidelines range was 188-235 months, reflecting a 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement, based on Alabama convictions for first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. The Eleventh Circuit rejected his pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), to consider a successive motion to vacate or correct his life sentence. The motion was based on a new, retroactive, rule of law: the Supreme Court's "Johnson" holding that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court applied the modified categorical approach to Alabama’s first-degree assault statute and examined Welch ’s indictments. The least of the acts criminalized by the statute includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, as required by ACCA’s elements clause. View "In Re: Welch" on Justia Law

Vergara returned to Tampa, on a cruise ship from Cozumel, Mexico with three cell phones. Customs Officer Ragan searched his luggage and asked Vergara to turn a phone on and then looked through the phone for about five minutes. Ragan found a video of two topless female minors and called DHS investigators, who decided to have all three phones forensically examined. A forensic examination of two phones conducted that day revealed more than 100 images and videos, “the production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” The phones were not damaged. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), (b)(1) and 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2), Vergara unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court Vergara’s argument that the Supreme Court’s 2014 holding, Riley v. California, required the agents to obtain a warrant before conducting the forensic search. Vergara was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment followed by supervision for life. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The forensic searches occurred at the border, not as searches incident to arrest. Border searches never require a warrant or probable cause but, at most, require reasonable suspicion. Vergara has not argued that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a forensic search of his phones. View "United States v. Vergara" on Justia Law

Vergara returned to Tampa, on a cruise ship from Cozumel, Mexico with three cell phones. Customs Officer Ragan searched his luggage and asked Vergara to turn a phone on and then looked through the phone for about five minutes. Ragan found a video of two topless female minors and called DHS investigators, who decided to have all three phones forensically examined. A forensic examination of two phones conducted that day revealed more than 100 images and videos, “the production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” The phones were not damaged. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), (b)(1) and 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2), Vergara unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court Vergara’s argument that the Supreme Court’s 2014 holding, Riley v. California, required the agents to obtain a warrant before conducting the forensic search. Vergara was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment followed by supervision for life. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The forensic searches occurred at the border, not as searches incident to arrest. Border searches never require a warrant or probable cause but, at most, require reasonable suspicion. Vergara has not argued that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a forensic search of his phones. View "United States v. Vergara" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law claims on the basis of qualified immunity and official immunity. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against three officers after he was arrested for violating Georgia's mask statute during a protest in downtown Atlanta. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims where plaintiff failed to show that his arrest violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the arrest. The court also held that defendants were entitled to official immunity on the state law claims where there was no evidence that defendants acted with actual malice or an actual intent to injure plaintiff. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Gates v. Khokar" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action brought by the estate of Ananias Shaw, who was shot and killed by a police officer. Shaw was coming towards the officer with a hatchet when the officer shot him. The court held that a reasonable officer could have concluded, as the officer here did, that the law did not require him to wait until the hatchet was being swung toward him before firing in self-defense. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the excessive force claim. Furthermore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the false arrest claim and the officer was entitled to state agent immunity on all of the state law claims. View "Shaw v. City of Selma" on Justia Law