Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted and convicted of tampering with a witness. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense in three respects: (1) the alleged threat of physical force only related to a criminal investigation, not an “official proceeding”; (2) the evidence failed to establish that he intended to prevent his girlfriend from testifying in an official proceeding; and (3) the evidence failed to establish that he was the person who threatened his girlfriend.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it was not persuaded by any of Defendant’s arguments. The court wrote that Defendant’s girlfriend was preparing to testify as a witness in an upcoming grand jury proceedings and possible trial against her crack supplier. The evidence in the record can reasonably support the conclusion that Defendant threatened his girlfriend in relation to those upcoming proceedings and that Defendant possessed the requisite intent to obstruct an official proceeding. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Defendant was the caller who threatened his girlfriend. View "USA v. William Raymond Beach" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He made three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion by striking a juror for cause because of her religious beliefs, (2) the district court plainly erred by allowing law enforcement officers to identify Defendant in surveillance footage, and (3) his convictions for using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence should be vacated because aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the attempted Hobbs Act is not a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The court explained that the Supreme Court distinguished between the completed offense and an attempt to complete that offense. To obtain a conviction for completed Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove “that the defendant engaged in the ‘unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.’” By contrast, to obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government need only show that the defendant intended to complete the offense and performed a “substantial step” toward that end. The court wrote Taylor did not disturb the court’s holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting a completed Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). View "USA v. Tyvonne Wiley" on Justia Law

During a domestic dispute, Plaintiff shot his unarmed twenty-two-year-old son, killing him. He was arrested and prosecuted for murder but was acquitted after a jury trial. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the City of Apopka, Florida and some of its police officers. He asserted a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim that he was arrested without probable cause, a Florida state law claim for false arrest based on the same contention, and a Section 1983 claim that the officers’ search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial that based on the failure to give a municipal liability jury instruction that he requested. On remand, the district court followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. It determined that there was actual probable cause to support Plaintiff’s arrest and that even in light of Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff contended, among other things, that he was arrested without probable cause.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Plaintiff’s requested instruction because the issue of custom or practice liability was not, as the court pointed out, properly before the jury. The court explained that the district court, as it was required to do, followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate when it determined that the issue of custom or practice municipal liability was not properly before the jury. View "Timothy Davis, Sr. v. City of Apopka" on Justia Law

Defendant, who has long struggled with serious mental-health issues—has a pattern of threatening judges. This case arises out of a threat that he recently made against a federal magistrate judge in his hometown of Fort Pierce, Florida. Defendant was convicted in federal court of (1) mailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 876(c) and (2) threatening a federal official. For his crimes, he was sentenced to 60 months in prison. Defendant now challenged his convictions and sentence on five grounds.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the judge expressly considered two other factors when making his sentencing decision, both of which he cited as bases for an upward departure: (1) Defendant’s history of making threats; and (2) the evidence of racial animus. Further, even if the district judge’s reference to his own religious experience was improper, it didn’t “substantially affect his selection of Defendant’s sentence”—and, therefore, was harmless. View "USA v. Lawrence F. Curtin" on Justia Law

This appeal centers around section 4(a)(1)–(3) of Alabama’s Vulnerable Child Compassion and Protection Act (the “Act”). Section 4(a)(1)–(3) of the Act states that “no person shall engage in or cause” the prescription or administration of puberty-blocking medication or cross-sex hormone treatment to a minor “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor’s perception of his or her gender or sex if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Shortly after the Act was signed into law, a group of transgender minors, their parents, and other concerned individuals challenged the Act’s constitutionality, claiming that it violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As part of that lawsuit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Alabama from enforcing section 4(a)(1)–(3) of the Act.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing this preliminary injunction because it applied the wrong standard of scrutiny. The plaintiffs have not presented any authority that supports the existence of a constitutional right to “treat [one’s] children with transitioning medications subject to medically accepted standards.” Nor have they shown that section 4(a)(1)–(3) classifies on the basis of sex or any other protected characteristic. Accordingly, section 4(a)(1)–(3) is subject only to rational basis review. The court explained that the district court erred by reviewing the statute under a heightened standard of scrutiny, its determination that Paintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits cannot stand. View "Paul Eknes-Tucker, et al. v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of illegally structuring two separate land-sale contract payments of around $270,000 each. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Defendant asserts that the court should vacate his conviction due to a plainly erroneous jury instruction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that in reviewing the record to determine how a jury might reasonably conclude that he structured deposits to avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement, it appears that Defendant made 22 cash deposits below $10,000 over seven days to satisfy the first payment. Then, Defendant made 38 cash deposits under $10,000 over the course of around seven and a half months to satisfy the second payment. there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it concludes that a “reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”   Further, the court concluded that the instructions properly listed the statutory elements for structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. Section 5324(a)(3), and the jury concluded that the government satisfied its burden of proof on these points. That the government could not prove Bird intended to evade Form 4789 specifically does not undermine the soundness of the verdict. Finally, the court explained that Defendant and the government jointly proposed the jury instructions that the district court ultimately used. By supplying the instructions, Defendant invited any purported error. Consequently, the court declined to review his challenge to the jury's instructions. View "USA v. Zachary Bird" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a multiple-count indictment against dozens of members of the Gangster Disciples. Five of them, Alonzo Walton, Kevin Clayton, Donald Glass, Antarious Caldwell, and Vancito Gumbs, appeal their convictions and sentences following a joint trial. Some argue that the district court should have suppressed wiretap evidence against them. Some argue that their enhanced sentences under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violate the Sixth Amendment because the jury failed to find that the conspiracy involved murder. Several argued that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to play a video about unconscious bias, excluded a professor of social work’s expert opinion testimony, secured the defendants with ankle restraints at trial, allowed the prosecution to store evidentiary firearms in the courtroom, and questioned a witness. And they also brought individual procedural and sentencing challenges.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated one of Caldwell’s convictions and his sentence due to an intervening precedent but otherwise affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court explained that Count 17 of the indictment contemplated that the offense of attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act. But the Supreme Court recently held in Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under section 924(c).  Thus, the court held that it must vacate Caldwell’s conviction. The court remanded or the district court to resentence Caldwell for his remaining counts of conviction. View "USA v. Antarious Caldwell, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had a two-day trial at which he testified, asserting a justification defense. The jury rejected that defense, finding him guilty. The district court denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. After calculating a guidelines range of 100 to 120 months, the court sentenced him to 80 months imprisonment. He challenged his conviction and his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant had not established self-defense as a justification for shooting the victim. The court explained that the evidence showed that Defendant escalated the situation and interposed himself when his girlfriend was attempting to handle it. He claimed his actions were justified because he had to defend himself, but it was Defendant who had insisted that his girlfriend get her gun when she did not want to; she wanted to see who was outside and resolve the situation herself. The court reasoned that Defendant also could have called 911 and asked that law enforcement officers be sent to the house. It wasn’t clear error for the district court to find that Defendant, a convicted felon, had possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense. View "USA v. Hannibal Moore" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Polk County and two employees who worked at the jail, alleging that the Jail and its employees interfered with his right to communicate freely and confidentially with his attorneys by forcing him to scan his legal mail into a computer with a memory chip.  When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at that Jail, the Jail required him to scan his legal mail into a computer that contained a memory chip. Though Plaintiff does not know whether anyone other than he read his mail, he worried that the Jail could and may have since it had access to the computer into which he had scanned his mail. Plaintiff sued Polk County and two employees who worked at the Jail. He alleged, among other things, that the Jail and its employees interfered with his right to communicate freely and confidentially with his attorneys by forcing him to scan his legal mail into a computer with a memory chip.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to allow for the reasonable inference that the Jail’s mail-scanning policy infringed on his free-speech rights. However, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the Due Process Clause. The court explained that because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and because his claim involves the deprivation of a “basic necessity” like access to recreational activity, he must satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s objective and subjective standards to prevail on his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And that’s where his problem arises, as he argues only that the conditions of his confinement were objectively unreasonable. View "Rickey Christmas v. Lieutenant J. Nabors, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant filed an Application for Naturalization (Form N-400), on which she certified under penalty of perjury that she had never “committed a crime or offense for which she was NOT arrested.” Defendant was charged in 2012 with healthcare fraud and conspiracy crimes. In 2012, Lopez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. In 2021, the United States filed a complaint in the district court to revoke Defendant’s naturalization. The complaint alleged   had illegally procured her naturalization on the ground that she had failed to meet the requirement of “good moral character.” The government moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Defendant had illegally procured her naturalization because she had committed a crime of moral turpitude during the statutory period. The district court granted that motion. It concluded that the conspiracy crime to which Defendant pleaded guilty overlapped with the statutory “good moral character.”   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that structuring a transaction to avoid a reporting requirement, as defined by 18 U.S.C. section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), is also not a crime categorically involving moral turpitude. The offense does not necessarily involve fraud. And, although the crime arguably involves deceit, it does not necessarily involve an activity that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Thus, the court held that a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. View "USA v. Lisette Lopez" on Justia Law