Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a corporal with the Shreveport Police Department, shot Plaintiff four times. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 suit against Defendant. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that Defendant was protected by qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s estate filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied the motion without explanation. Plaintiff’s estate timely appealed. Plaintiff’s estate contests the district court’s factual finding that Defendant could not see Plaintiff’s left hand when he opened fire because “Defendant has no credibility.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when considering qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the prior panel of the Fifth Circuit court affirmed that the video potentially supported a finding that Defendant could see that Plaintiff was unarmed, but that panel agreed that the video did not require such a finding. The court explained that given its deferential standard of review, it declines to disturb the district court’s factual determination on that point. The court wrote that based on the district court’s finding that Defendant reasonably believed that Plaintiff was reaching for a weapon, the district court properly held that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Creech Poole v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of thirteen financial crimes. Defendant filed a series of pro se motions for compassionate release. This appeal arises from Defendant's third such motion. Defendant asked to be released based on the dangers posed by the pandemic, his close confinement with other prisoners, his age, and his preexisting heart condition. He also states that his wire fraud conviction was wrongful because it was predicated on a purely intrastate wire transmission and that a wrongful conviction is an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying relief. The motion was denied in a brief order shortly after being filed.   The Fifth Circuit ordered a limited remand for the district court to explain its reasons. The court explained that the district court’s order does not tell us that the court based its decision on Section 3553(a) factors. It states only that the court “considered Defendant’s motion and the applicable law” and determined that the motion should be denied. The court explained that, therefore, it has no reliable indication of the reason for the court’s decision to deny relief. View "USA v. Stanford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

Prisoner, DefendanDefendant, a prisoner, brought an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. His claims rest on the argument that his sentence for the latter offense should have been adjusted to reflect the 13 months he had already spent in prison for his first conviction. Defendant brought this 2255 petition in the Northern District of Texas, faulting his trial counsel for failing to adequately advocate for “back time” at sentencing and faulting his appellate counsel for not raising the issue on appeal. The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied. The district judge (the same judge who sentenced Defendant in the Northern District) adopted the recommendation, dismissed the claims, and denied a certificate of appealability.   The Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed. The court explained that it is true that the Sentencing Guidelines call for credit for time served if there are two related offenses. Both parties agree the offenses are related here. Yet the Guidelines are not obligatory, and the judge in the Northern District of Texas instead sentenced Defendant under U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.3(d). Thus, Defendant’s sentences were treated as concurrent from the day of the second sentencing but did not account for the 13 months of back time. None of this means that Defendant’s lawyers were constitutionally deficient. Defendant’s trial counsel argued for the application of U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.3(b) in a memorandum and noted the argument in open court; he was not constitutionally obliged to do more. Defendant’s appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise the issue because the district court did not contravene any binding case law. View "USA v. Massey" on Justia Law

The United States Food and Drug Administration approved mifepristone for use in 2000 under the brand name Mifeprex. FDA approved a generic version in 2019, and in 2021, FDA announced that it would not enforce an agency regulation requiring mifepristone to be prescribed and dispensed in person. The agency moved that requirement from mifepristone’s conditions for use. The subject of this appeal is those four actions: the 2000 Approval, the 2016 Amendments, the 2019 Generic Approval, and the 2021 Non-Enforcement Decision. Plaintiffs, Medical Organizations and Doctors contend that FDA overlooked important safety risks in approving mifepristone and amending its restrictions. The Medical Organizations and Doctors moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The district court granted the motion but stayed the effective date of each of the challenged actions under 5 U.S.C. Section 705. FDA appealed, as did Intervenor Danco Laboratories, LLC.     The Fifth Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court vacated in part and concluded that the Medical Organizations and Doctors’ claim as to the 2000 Approval is likely barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, until final judgment, Mifeprex will remain available to the public under the conditions for use that existed in 2016. The court also vacated the portion of the order relating to the 2019 Generic Approval because Plaintiffs have not shown that they are injured by that particular action. The generic version of mifepristone will also be available under the same conditions as Mifeprex. The court affirmed the components of the stay order that concern the 2016 Amendments and the 2021 Non-Enforcement Decision. View "Alliance Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, with a plea agreement, to one count of misprision of a felony, to wit: wire fraud. Because of the substantial assistance that he provided the government, the district court sentenced him below the guidelines range to six months of imprisonment. The district court also ordered Defendant to pay $40,254,297.72 in restitution, jointly and severally, with other defendants, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). Defendant appealed the district court’s restitution order. The government moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by Defendant’s appeal waiver; that motion was carried with the case, and the case was fully briefed on the merits.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the restitution order and remanded for the district court to conduct further fact-finding and to adjust the award if necessary. The court held that Defendant’s appeal fits within an exception to his appeal waiver. The court explained that Defendant’s argument that the district court awarded restitution for losses caused by conduct not encompassed by his offense of conviction or by conduct specified in his guilty plea and for losses that predate his involvement with RDAG is a statutory-maximum challenge. Further, the court left it to the district court on remand to make any additional factual findings necessary to determine the amount of restitution statutorily authorized by the MVRA and to enter a new restitution order in that amount. View "USA v. Reinhart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an immigration attorney whose work often requires international travel. Upon his return from one such trip, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) diverted him to secondary screening after his surname appeared in connection with an investigation involving an arms dealer. DHS seized Plaintiff’s phone, decrypted it, screened the files for privilege, searched the remaining files, and then returned the phone to Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued DHS for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed most of Plaintiff’s claims, reasoning that he lacks standing to seek declaratory relief related solely to past events. Next, while the court held that Plaintiff does have standing to seek an injunction requiring DHS to delete the data that it had seized, the court also held that Malik’s constitutional theories have no merit.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that DHS found the cell phone on Plaintiff’s “person” because it was part of the “baggage” that he was carrying with him into the United States. The search easily falls within the “plenary authority” that Congress has granted to the Executive branch. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s statutory argument therefore fails. Next, the court reasoned that the apparent connection between Plaintiff and “an international arms dealer with known ties to the Dallas area” was plenty to create reasonable suspicion—even if Plaintiff is correct that the connection appears dubious in hindsight. View "Malik v. DHS" on Justia Law

Defendant’s sentence was enhanced by enhancement provisions in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Powell appeals, arguing that following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, a conviction for Texas robbery-by-threat is no longer a predicate offense under that act. Defendant argued that Garrett cannot stand post-Taylor.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements cause. Taylor thus expressly addresses offenses that criminalize attempts that may be undertaken without a use or threat of force. The court explained that in other words, Taylor does not reach the crime at issue here and cannot be said to clearly overturn Garrett. Thus, Taylor does not undermine or contravene Garrett’s conclusion that Texas robbery-by-threat constitutes a violent felony. View "USA v. Powell" on Justia Law

San Benito police officer Hector Lopez approached Plaintiff while Plaintiff was standing in the front yard of his property. Lopez pushed open the gate into Plaintiff’s yard. Plaintiff told Lopez he needed a warrant and pushed back. Within seconds, the parties physically struggled, with the fifty-year-old, disabled Plaintiff brought to the ground. Plaintiff was taken into custody and, after receiving medical attention for his injuries, was charged with several offenses. All were dismissed. He now seeks recompense from Defendants Lopez and the City of San Benito for false arrest and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff had raised genuine issues of material fact as to his claim for false arrest against Lopez. The court reversed and remanded concerning the false arrest claim. The court otherwise affirmed. The court explained that because the hot pursuit exception does not apply (and because Lopez has not identified any other applicable exception to the warrant requirement), Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of fact as to whether Lopez had the authority to enter his property to arrest him for disorderly conduct. Further, the court wrote that its conclusion that Lopez lacked authority to make a warrantless entry onto Plaintiff’s property applies equal force to Lopez’s argument that he could have entered the property to arrest Plaintiff or failed to identify. Moreover, a rational factfinder could determine that Lopez arrested Plaintiff before Plaintiff applied any resistance. View "Sauceda v. City of San Benito, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 168 months in prison and ordered him to pay his victims $46,000 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was not competent to enter the plea and challenged the court's restitution order.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Regarding competency, the court relied on Defendant's admission that he only began to exhibit competency concerns during the PSR interview. There is no authority to find that erratic statements made in a PSR interview can somehow retroactively undermine Defendant's competency to plead guilty. Further, the district court did not commit reversible error in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte.In terms of Defendant's restitution argument, the court held that he failed "to show that there is a reasonable probability that such error resulted in his accountability for damages he did not cause or that the district court would have imposed a lower restitution amount but for any error." View "USA v. Teijeiro" on Justia Law