Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a 1983 claim, arguing that he was held in administrative segregation for 300 days over his 30-day disciplinary sentence without additional due process, such as new disciplinary hearings or periodic review of his custody status. The magistrate judge reviewed Petitioner's suit under 28 USC 1915(e) and 1915A and issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Petitioner's federal claims be dismissed with prejudice as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim. The district court reviewed and adopted the magistrate judge’s report, dismissing Petitioner's 1983 suit with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim.The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court failed to apply the appropriate, multi-faceted legal test considering the conditions and length of confinement, and thus, dismissing the Petition was an abuse of discretion. View "Carmouche v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) bars an individual from possessing a firearm if he is an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. Patrick Daniels is one such “unlawful user”—he admitted to smoking marihuana multiple days per month. But the government presented no evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of arrest, nor did it identify when he last had used marihuana. Still, based on his confession to regular usage, a jury convicted Defendant of violating Section 922(g)(3). The question is whether Defendant’s conviction violates his right to bear arms. The answer depends on whether Section 922(g)(3) is consistent with the nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation.”   The Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction and render a dismissal of the indictment. The court explained that the nation’s history and tradition may support some limits on an intoxicated person’s right to carry a weapon, but it does not justify disarming a sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage. Nor do more generalized traditions of disarming dangerous persons support this restriction on nonviolent drug users. Thus, the court held that as applied to Defendant, then, Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment. View "USA v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the production of child pornography. On appeal, he challenged the district court’s application of a sentence enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(e) based on his prior conviction for fondling a child, also referred to as lustful touching of a child.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that the Mississippi statute relates to “abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward,” as defined under section 2251(e) because the statute proscribes conduct that: (1) involves a child; (2) is sexual in nature; (3) is abusive; and (4) involves physical contact. The Mississippi statute only criminalizes conduct involving a child under the age of 18, so the first element is met. Moreover, because the statute also proscribes conduct involving “handling, touching or rubbing,” it meets the generic definitions of “abuse” and “contact” as well. Accordingly, the court held that there is no ambiguity as to the enhancements’ application; the rule of lenity is inapplicable. View "USA v. Northington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former Texas state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Defendant alleged in his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action that the director of his former state prison’s faith-based dorm program conspired with a prison chaplain to retaliate against him for filing a complaint under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). He challenged the district court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that the purpose of the rule laid out in Heck was to stop civil tort actions for damages where the plaintiff would be required “to prove the unlawfulness of his . . . confinement.” Here, Defendant believes he is owed money damages because he was not released after his early 2021 parole hearing due to Defendants alleged retaliatory actions. The court wrote that granting such relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his confinement after that hearing for reaching the wrong determination. Consequently, Heck renders Defendant’s claims frivolous. View "Collins v. Dallas Ldrshp Fdn" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of enticement of a minor, travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and transfer of obscene material to a minor. A total offense level of 41 and a criminal history category of I yielded a guideline imprisonment range of 324 to 405 months. The district court adopted the Pre-Sentence Report and sentenced him to 405 months in prison, a life term of supervised release, a $300 special assessment ($100 for each count), and a $15,000 Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act special assessment ($5,000 for each count). Defendant appealed, raising multiple challenges to his sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to Defendant’s conviction. However, the court vacated the district court’s judgment as to that special assessment. The court explained that Defendant does not identify any case law establishing that his conduct on two different days should constitute a single occasion of abuse or establishing that the prohibited sexual acts must continue for a certain period of time or occur on a certain number of occasions to constitute a pattern. Therefore, the court held that the commission of distinct sexual assaults constitutes “separate occasions,” whether on the same or different days, for purposes of Section 4B1.5(b)(1). View "USA v. Sadeek" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to three counts of possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He raised various issues on appeal.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that the district court’s ambiguous sentence impacted the “outcome of the proceeding” in at least two ways. First, the Bureau of Prisons decided that the sentence was so ambiguous that it “could not be executed.” That obviously would never have happened save for the error. The court further explained that after it was made aware of the error, the district court attempted to impose a completely different sentence at the null-and-void July re-hearing. The court reasoned that rarely does it have such strong evidence “that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Moreover, the court explained that the district court has already expressed its willingness to change Defendant’s sentence once. The court, therefore, left it to the district court on remand to exercise its jurisdiction and discretion to impose any sentence at or below the statutory maximum. View "USA v. Willis" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her son entered the United States illegally after fleeing alleged gang violence in Honduras. They sought asylum and related relief but were denied; their appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) was likewise dismissed. Petitioner then moved the BIA to reopen her and her son’s removal proceedings. The BIA denied her motion. Petitioner petitioned for a review of that denial.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part, explaining that the court lacked jurisdiction over the BIA’s refusal to reopen Petitioner, and it otherwise rejects her claims on the merits. The court explained that there is no per se rule that every family-based PSG is cognizable. Congress did not make persecution based on “family” a statutorily enumerated ground for asylum or withholding of removal. The court wrote that Petitioner was required to put forward at least some evidence of the social distinction of her son’s nuclear family in Honduran society. Because she did not, she failed to make out a prima facie case of eligibility for withholding of removal or asylum. The consequence is that she failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused by allegedly ineffective counsel. The BIA did not err in denying her motion to reopen proceedings on her withholding-of-removal and asylum claims. Moreover, the court explained that attempting to raise a due process claim through an argument about the BIA’s failure to reopen sua sponte does not bring the claim within the court’s jurisdiction. View "Garcia-Gonzalez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Brothers and energy consultant executives led an international bribery scheme implicating companies and individuals across the globe. They pleaded guilty to crimes related to their participation in the enterprise and their attempts to cover it up. Several press agencies intervened and successfully moved to unseal almost all the documents in the case up to that point. Not only were many of the documents filed under seal, but the district court also closed part of the sentencing hearing to the press and public. At the same time, media interest in the case remained high, and the intervening press organizations moved to unseal numerous documents related to the sentencing. The district court denied their motion. On appeal, the intervening organizations maintain that they have both a First Amendment and a common-law right to access at least some of the sealed information.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervenors’ motion to unseal documents related to Defendant’s sentencing. The court held that intervenors were not so deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard as to justify reversal. They had notice of the general reasons that the parties would likely proffer to keep the information under seal. The documents unsealed after the court granted intervenors’ 2020 motion contained passages identifying the interests that the parties viewed as compelling enough to justify sealing. The court explained that even if the court had unsealed the opposition brief as much as possible while still safeguarding the interests it identified in its ultimate order, the outcome would not have changed. View "USA v. Financial Times" on Justia Law

This case is part of the battle between telecommunications providers that are attempting to expand next-generation wireless services (commonly called 5G) and municipalities that are resisting that expansion. The City of Pasadena used another method: aesthetic design standards incorporating spacing and undergrounding requirements The city invoked those requirements to block Crown Castle’s ability to develop a 5G network in the region, and Crown Castle sued for relief. Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) anticipated those strategies and previously had passed the Federal Telecommunications Act (“FTA”) and responsive regulations. As a result, the district court decided in favor of Crown Castle, primarily basing its decision on the expansive language of the FTA and an FCC ruling interpreting the Act in light of 5G technology and associated challenges.The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the FTA preempts the city’s spacing and undergrounding requirements, and the city forfeited its arguments relating to the safe-harbor provision in the FTA. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering a permanent injunction. The court explained that, as the court found, the regulations affect only small cell nodes that would permit T-Mobile to offer extensive 5G service in Pasadena. Moreover, the court wrote that a party seeking a permanent injunction must establish (1) actual success on the merits; (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in that party’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. All those factors weigh in Crown Castle’s favor. View "Crown Castle Fiber v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

In this class action, Plaintiffs, representing persons who have been convicted of certain crimes and have completed the terms of their sentences, challenge their disenfranchisement by two provisions of Article XII of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. The first provision, Section 241, mandates permanent, lifetime disenfranchisement of a person convicted of a crime of any one of “murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy.” The second, Section 253, provides for a discretionary, standardless scheme for the Mississippi Legislature to restore the right to vote to disenfranchised persons on an individualized basis by a two-thirds vote of all members of each house of the Legislature. Plaintiffs sued Mississippi’s Secretary of State (the “Secretary”), contending that Section 241 violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection under the law.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s contrary ruling, render judgment for Plaintiffs on this claim, and remanded the case with instructions that the district court grant relief declaring Section 241 unconstitutional and enjoining the Secretary from enforcing Section 241 against the Plaintiffs and the members of the class they represent. Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim against the Secretary with respect to Section 241, however, is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the legislative process embodied in Section 253 through this action. View "Hopkins, et al v. Hosemann" on Justia Law