Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court in 1991. The United States Supreme Court ordered Petitioner resentenced in 2007. After he was sentenced to death a second time, Petitioner exhausted his state remedies and then petitioned for federal habeas relief. The district court denied his petition and did not certify any questions for appellate review. Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability (“COA”).   The Fifth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application for a COA. The court explained that the district court found the state court’s rejection of prejudice to be reasonable under Strickland, especially considering the jury’s opportunity to assess Petitioner’s credibility in light of the eyewitness description of the crime’s brutality. No reasonable jurist could find the district court’s assessment debatable or wrong. Further, the court reasoned that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion that, as evidenced in extremely thorough opinions by the state court and magistrate judge, the state court reasonably applied Strickland in holding that trial counsel was not ineffective in preparing and presenting a mitigation defense. View "Brewer v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant was a local law-enforcement agent who worked as a taskforce officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Defendant was charged with stealing money and property from arrestees, as well as destroying evidence of those activities. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Following the verdict, Defendant asserted that one of the jurors (“Juror”) had failed to disclose his acquaintance with Defendant and Defendant’s wife, and Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of juror bias. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to twenty-seven months of imprisonment. Defendant argued that the Juror’s prior romantic relationship with Defendant’s wife necessitated, at a minimum, a questioning before the court.” Defendant asserted that such questioning would reveal that the Juror was actually biased, entitling Defendant to a new trial.   The Fifth Circuit remanded for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of juror bias. The court explained that although not every claim of actual bias on behalf of a juror militates a hearing, the district court here abused its discretion by ruling on the motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant has established that the Juror and Defendant’s wife were friends in high school, that the Juror attended Defendant’s wedding, and that the Juror and Defendant’s wife communicated over social media up until Defendant was indicted. The Juror failed to reveal any of this information during voir dire. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant made a sufficient showing to entitle him to a hearing on his juror bias claim. View "USA v. Gemar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent more than twelve years in state prison because of his wrongful conviction for two murders. In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was released from prison. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state courts. His petition was denied because (1) it was not based on a finding that Plaintiff was “actually innocent,” (2) Plaintiff had not received a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. While Plaintiff was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in federal district court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.   The Fifth Circuit previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas Supreme Court in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In light of this clarified meaning of Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act, the court analyzed the district court’s grant of Defendants summary judgment motion and found that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit is barred by his acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation. View "Brown v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

SR Construction held a lien on real property owned by RE Palm Springs II. The property owner is a corporate affiliate of Hall Palm Springs LLC, who had financed the original undertaking for a separate real estate developer. The latter requested leave of the bankruptcy court to submit a credit bid to purchase the property from its affiliate, which the bankruptcy court granted. The bankruptcy court later approved the sale and discharged all liens. The construction company appealed the bankruptcy court’s credit-bid and sale orders. Finding that the lender was a good faith purchaser, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and dismissed the appeal as moot under Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the pandemic dramatically changed not only the lender’s plans for the Property but it also severely impacted the affiliate’s ability to market and sell a hotel, particularly an unfinished one. In sum, these two factors must also be weighed in considering whether any of the actions or procedures, particularly with regard to pricing or timing issues, were performed in bad faith or as a result of sub-optimal external forces beyond the lender’s control. The court explained that the record facts, framed by the external context and circumstances, make plain that there is no error in the judgments of the able bankruptcy and district courts. Accordingly, the court held that the lender did not engage in fraud and was a “good faith purchaser.” View "SR Construction v. Hall Palm Springs" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from Plaintiff’s suit against the City of Harahan (“the City”) for its alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In October 2019, the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”) Chief of Police determined that Plaintiff was guilty of numerous offenses. Plaintiff was entitled to a fifteen-day appeal window of the Chief’s disciplinary determinations. Plaintiff exercised his right to appeal a week after the charges. However, the Chief emailed the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s office (“JPDA”) to inform it of his disciplinary action against Plaintiff before he exercised his right. Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit against the City for violation of his procedural due process rights, stigma-plus-infringement, and defamation. He included Louisiana state law claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The City moved to dismiss his Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(c). The primary issue is whether the district court erroneously determined that Plaintiff had a liberty interest in his “future employment as a law enforcement officer.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule 12(c) motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s due process claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s alleged liberty interest in his career in law enforcement has no basis in Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent. Moreover, he does not provide a different constitutional anchor for this proposed liberty interest. Because he fails to state facts supporting the violation of a cognizable liberty interest, he fails to plead a due process violation. Furthermore, the court declined to address the adequacy of the process he received. View "Adams v. City of Harahan" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, Houston Police Officer fatally shot a man. Plaintiffs, including the parents and estate of the victim, brought multiple claims against the officer who fatally shot the man, two other police officers, and the city. The individual defendants claimed qualified immunity. The district court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss in response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, dismissed Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal and requested reassignment to a different district judge. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Defendant for excessive force, denial of medical care, and unlawful arrest was an error. The court reversed and remanded those claims. The court explained that taking as true that Defendant had no reason to believe the man was armed and that the shooting officer knew the man was seriously injured and likely could not move, a police officer would know, under these precedents, that to handcuff the man was an arrest without probable cause under clearly established law. The court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims is affirmed. The court denied, as moot, Plaintiffs’ request for reassignment to a new judge. View "Allen v. Hays" on Justia Law

Louisiana passed the Truth in Labeling of Food Products Act (the “Act”) to “protect consumers from misleading and false labeling of food products that are edible by humans.” The Act bars, among other things, the intentional “misbranding or misrepresenting of any food product as an agricultural product” through several different labeling practices. Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. (d/b/a Tofurky), markets and sells its products in Louisiana. Tofurky believes it operates under a constant threat of enforcement. Tofurky sued Louisiana’s Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court sided with Tofurky. It held that Tofurky had standing to challenge the Act and that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on Tofurky’s right to free speech. The State appealed.   The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court explained that nothing in the statute’s language requires the State to enforce its punitive provisions on a company that sells its products in a way that just so happens to confuse a consumer. The State’s construction limits the Act’s scope to representations by companies that actually intend consumers to be misled about whether a product is an “agricultural product” when it is not. This interpretation is not contradictory to the Act, and the court thus accepted it for the present purposes of evaluating Tofurky’s facial challenge. The district court erred in ignoring the State’s limiting construction and in implementing its own interpretation of the Act. View "Turtle Island Foods v. Strain" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Texas Government Code Section 808. He contends that Section 808’s divestment requirement violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing and dismissed his claims against the Texas Comptroller and the Texas Attorney General (collectively, “Defendants”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims. Article III grants jurisdiction to federal courts only over actions involving an “actual case or controversy.” The court concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged injury is—at most—speculative; he has wholly failed to allege that any risk of economic harm is “certainly impending.” Because Plaintiff cannot show how any investment or divestment decisions will affect his future payments, he cannot show that he has suffered an injury. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Section 808 causes him an injury by violating his own personal Fourteenth or First Amendment rights. View "Abdullah v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of depriving two persons of their constitutional rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 242. The district court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 12 and 360 months of imprisonment and ordered Defendant to pay $10,000 in restitution to one of the victims. Defendant appealed, arguing that the government failed to disclose impeachment evidence in violation of the Brady rule, and he sought a new trial on that basis.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the withheld evidence was not material. The court explained that there is no reasonable probability that if the government had disclosed the evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s theory of how he would have used evidence of the victim’s arrest and pending criminal case to impeach the victim rests on speculation. Defendant does not point to any evidence that federal prosecutors could have influenced the Texas prosecutor’s conduct before the grand jury or the grand jury’s findings.   Moreover, the court concluded that Defendant is incorrect in sentencing him the district court “drew an adverse inference” from his silence that “may have resulted in added imprisonment.” Defendant does not point to any specific foundation in the record for his claim that the district court relied on his lack of remorse in determining his sentence. Any inferences the district court drew from Defendant’s refusal to comment at the sentencing hearing did not adversely impact his sentence and did not burden his Fifth Amendment privilege. View "USA v. Sepulveda" on Justia Law

A Texas jury convicted Defendant of murder and sentenced him to death. After his direct appeal and habeas petitions were both denied in state court, Defendant raised 31 claims in a federal habeas petition. The district court denied all his claims and also denied a certificate of appealability (COA). Defendant asked the Fifth Circuit to issue a COA on eight of those claims, which he presents as posing five distinct legal issues.   The Fifth Circuit denied Defendant a COA on all of his claims. The court first found that it is beyond debate that Defendant’s claim would still be unexhausted for failing to fairly present the Confrontation Clause claim to the state habeas court. Further, the court explained that the state court concluded that Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to use a peremptory strike against these jurors. Defendant has not identified any clearly established federal law that would allow reasonable jurists to debate this conclusion. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant failed to rebut the prosecution’s fifth stated reason for striking a juror at all. Therefore, the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s Batson claim is not debatable. Next, the court found that the habeas court conducted an extensive argument-by-argument review of Defendant’s comparative juror analysis argument. It considered each argument that Defendant said should have been raised. It found that each of these arguments was meritless and that, as a result, Defendant’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them. View "Harper v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law