Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

the Biden Administration issued an executive order that re-established an interagency working group (“Working Group”) to formulate guidance on the “social cost of greenhouse gases.” That order directed the Working Group to publish dollar estimates quantifying changes in carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions (collectively, “greenhouse gases”) for consideration by federal agencies when policymaking. Working Group has since published “Interim Estimates” based largely on the findings of its predecessor working group. The Plaintiffs-States (“Plaintiffs”) challenge E.O. 13990 and the Interim Estimates as procedurally invalid, arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with various agency-specific statutes, and ultra vires. They obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court. Defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit panel stayed the injunction.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed this action because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to prove standing. Plaintiffs’ allegations of “injury in fact” rely on a chain of hypotheticals: federal agencies may (or may not) premise their actions on the Interim Estimates in a manner that may (or may not) burden the States. Such injuries do not flow from the Interim Estimates but instead from potential future regulations, i.e., final rules that are subject to their own legislated avenues of scrutiny, dialogue, and judicial review on an appropriately developed record. View "State of Louisiana v. Biden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, his wife, and his three children are Libyan citizens who have resided lawfully in the United States for over a decade. Plaintiff filed an I-140 petition seeking a waiver of the labor-certification requirement of his visa because he is a “professional holding an advanced degree whose work is in the national interest of the United States.” While the petition was pending, Plaintiff and his family filed I-485 applications for status adjustment to legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1255(a). Section 1255 grants the Attorney General the discretion to adjust the status of certain aliens to LPR status if they have met certain statutorily specified conditions. The USCIS granted the family’s I-485 petitions prematurely. The district court found that it had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the original denial of the I-140 because Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the order of dismissal. The court held that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a status-adjustment decision by the USCIS under either the APA or the INA because the alien retains the right to de novo review of that decision in his final removal proceedings. Thus, the court found that Plaintiffs have not yet exhausted administrative remedies and the court may not exercise jurisdiction. View "Elldakli v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”). In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).   The Fifth Circuit denied Cactus Canyon’s petition, holding that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold equipment. But the plain language and purpose support the inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.” The court concluded that the braking standard unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since a “system”—by definition at the time of the standard’s passage—is composed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and hold the vehicle. View "Cactus Canyon Quarries v. MSHR" on Justia Law

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Polanco" on Justia Law

In 2019, after a nine-day jury trial, Defendants C.M. and D.P. were convicted on several counts related to their involvement in a drug trafficking organization. On appeal, C.M. challenged only her kidnapping conviction, while D.P. raised several challenges to each of his convictions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury that the offender’s own interstate or foreign travel could supply the jurisdictional hook. However, in instructing the jury, the district court did not clarify that the offender’s travel must be “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Nonetheless, the court found that this error does not warrant a plain error reversal. Further, the court found that the same evidence supporting D.P.’s conspiracy conviction supports his possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. From that evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that, by calling in the car so that the sham cocaine could be seized and the real drugs successfully sold, D.P. associated and participated in the drug trafficking venture in a way calculated to bring about its success. Moreover, here, D.P.’s arguments as to his motion for a new trial are essentially the same as those raised in his sufficiency challenge. Thus, the court found the evidence sufficient to support each of his convictions. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.P.’s motion for a new trial. View "USA v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Forensic Laboratory, Inc., KHS, the KISD Police Department, the KISD Board of Trustees (“KISD Board”), and a number of KHS, KISD, and KISD Police Department employees in their individual and official capacities. That suit was filed in the state district court in Fort Bend County, Texas. McClelland alleged (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights; and (3) various state law claims, including defamation, spoliation, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants motion to dismiss and denied several other pending motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s void-for-vagueness claim and did not err in dismissing it. It is well settled, in the educational context, that a plaintiff must allege a protected property interest. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is devoid of any such allegations. And, even if he had alleged lack of participation on the football team or team captainship in connection with vagueness, he still would not prevail. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims because Plaintiff did not allege the deprivation of his property or liberty interests. View "McClelland v. Katy Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a Houston lawyer who has appeared before Judge Newman, a former probate judge in Harris County. It is undisputed that Judge Newman used his private Facebook account to support his campaign for reelection as well as share news about his personal and family life with the public. Plaintiff commented on three of Judge Newman’s posts that related to his campaign for reelection. The comments accused Judge Newman of having “court cronies” and doing “favors for them at the expense of other litigants.” He also commented that he would not vote for Judge Newman and accused him of favoritism. Judge Newman deleted the comments and blocked Plaintiff’s account. Plaintiff sued Judge Newman under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that he violated his First Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion to amend his complaint and granted Judge Newman’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that he failed to plead facts sufficient to show that Judge Newman acted under the color of state law as required by Section 1983.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because Judge Newman was not acting under the color of state law when he blocked Plaintiff and deleted his comments, the court held that Plaintiff has not met his burden under Section 1983. The court further held that the way in which Plaintiff sought to amend the complaint would not overcome its deficiencies. View "Kallinen v. Newman" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were a class of people who had been charged with misdemeanor and felony crimes in Dallas County and who were allegedly unconstitutionally incarcerated pretrial solely because they were financially unable to post required bail. While the case was arguably moot, the Fifth Circuit determined it had the discretion to determine whether a federal court should have proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs’ bail “reform” lawsuit in the first place.The court explained that Younger requires federal court abstention when three criteria are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Finding all three prongs of Younger were met, the court overruled ODonnell I, ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 882F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), holding against abstention in this matter. As an alternate holding, the court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs' case was moot. View "Daves v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

A trusted prison inmate was working unsupervised in a hog barn when the ceiling collapsed, striking him in the head. He told the prison agricultural specialist that he needed medical attention. But the specialist thought the inmate looked no worse for wear and ordered him back to work. A short while later, the inmate asked another prison staffer for medical attention. The staffer radioed a supervisor. Based on the staffer’s report, the supervisor, too, thought nothing serious had happened and did not immediately grant the inmate’s request. The inmate’s condition later worsened. He was sent to the hospital and diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that prison staff violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards him. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Plaintiff alleged premises-liability claims. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants based on qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to raise a factual dispute over whether the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. But even if he had, he’d still need to show that his rights were “clearly established at the time of the violation.” The court explained that involves showing that “the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” It just isn’t enough to identify a right as “a broad general proposition.” The district court did not address qualified immunity’s second step. Further, the court agreed with Defendants that even assuming a violation, the law was not clearly established under this standard. View "Rogers v. Jarrett" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one drug conspiracy count for each predicate drug. It also convicted Defendant of two additional counts for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and carisoprodol. The district court sentenced him to 151 months imprisonment, the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. On direct appeal, Defendant argued that errors in the district court’s jury instructions require his retrial. In the alternative, Defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his Sentencing Guidelines offense level.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if idiosyncratic portions of the jury charge lacked clarity on Section 841(a)’s mens rea requirement, the adequate Section 846 mens rea instruction filled any gap by clearly requiring that the jury find that Defendant have understood the illegitimate nature of his conduct. Further, any error in Section 841(a) instruction was harmless. Moreover, the court wrote that here, the trial court’s remarks explained relevant, available inferences in conditional language but did not dictate that the jury reach any specific outcome. The trial court also emphasized to the jury that they should “not assume from anything I may have done or said during the trial that I have any opinion” concerning the case and that the jury must “arrive at your own verdict.” The court found that a review of the remainder of the trial record reveals no evidence of bias on the part of the trial judge. View "USA v. Ajayi" on Justia Law