Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants, in concert with a co-conspirator, became involved in an armored car robbery at a bank automated teller machine (ATM) scheme masterminded by the co-conspirator. The scheme involved staking out ATMs to identify when armored car drivers would replenish the cash inside and then robbing the armored car at the time of delivery by shooting and killing the driver. As the result of the Wells Fargo ATM robbery and the attempted robbery of the Amegy ATM, the surviving Defendants were charged and prosecuted for aiding and abetting robbery, attempted robbery, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death of a person. In one consolidated case, after a two-week jury trial, the Defendants were each convicted on all counts. On appeal, the Defendants each raise multiple issues challenging their convictions and sentences. Specifically, all four Defendants argue that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)’s elements clause and thus cannot support their convictions under Count Four.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendants’ convictions as to Count four and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. The court explained that the Supreme Court has recently held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. Accordingly, the court wrote it must vacate Defendants’ convictions on Count Four. Because Defendants’ sentences on the remaining counts are not “interrelated or interdependent” on Count Four, resentencing is unnecessary. View "USA v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity. In the plea agreement, Defendant and the government agreed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), that a sentence of 360 months imprisonment was appropriate. However, Defendant also filed a sentencing memorandum arguing that the district court should depart or vary downwards by 60- months from the agreed-upon 360-month sentence to account for five years that Defendant was detained in administrative segregation prior to his plea. The district court accepted Defendant’s plea, which bound the district court under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) to sentence Defendant to the agreed-upon sentence. The district court sentenced Defendant at the same hearing to the 360-month term of imprisonment specified in the plea agreement. Before doing so, the district court denied Defendant’s request for the 60-month downward variance. On appeal, Defendant argued that his 360-month sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to properly “account for the five years of solitary confinement” that Defendant endured before his rearraignment.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that at the sentencing hearing, the district court noted Defendant’s motion for a downward variance based on his time spent in administrative segregation and denied the motion because of “the defendant’s role in the offense.” Given Defendant’s involvement in attempted and completed murders in the course of the racketeering conspiracy, the court wrote that it cannot say that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Moreover, Defendant’s argument on appeal ignores that he got the benefit of his bargain with the government. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Methodist Hospitals of Dallas (Methodist) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC asserts that Methodist’s categorical policy of hiring the most qualified candidate violates the ADA when a qualified disabled employee requests reassignment to a vacant role, even if he or she is not the most qualified applicant. The EEOC also alleged that Methodist failed to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee, who was not reassigned to a vacant position for which she applied. The district court granted Methodist’s motion for summary judgment on both claims. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett requires Methodist to make exceptions to its most-qualified-applicant policy and that the employee was entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court as to Methodist’s most-qualified-applicant policy and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court affirmed the judgment as to the EEOC’s reasonable accommodations claim involving the employee. The court explained that at summary judgment, an employee’s “unilateral withdrawal from the interactive process is fatal to her claim,” so long as the employer “engaged in a good-faith, interactive process with the employee regarding her request for a reasonable accommodation.” Based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Methodist was unwilling to participate in the interactive process. When the employee did not respond to either the August 7th letter or the follow-up letter after her appeal of her termination, she caused the breakdown of the interactive process. Thus, Methodist did not act unlawfully. View "EEOC v. Methodist Hospitals" on Justia Law

A disabled public-school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine, an exception to the general rule that government has no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect people from privately inflicted harms. The school officials sought dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that the state-created danger doctrine was not clearly established in this circuit when the underlying events occurred. The district court denied their motion.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. The court further wrote that it does not think it is prudent to adopt a never-recognized theory of Section 1983 liability in the absence of rigorous briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action, however widely accepted in other circuits, works in terms of its practical contours and application, details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Also, beyond the lack of thorough briefing, the court explained it is reluctant to expand substantive due process doctrine given the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

Four police officers unlawfully arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The officers appeal the district court’s denial of their summary judgment motion as to (1) excessive force (Officer W.), (2) false arrest (all officers), and (3) fabrication of evidence (Officer L.).   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that Officer W. argued that Plaintiff took a defensive and threatening posture, resisted being pulled from the vehicle, struggled after being removed, and willfully and aggressively refused to follow commands while resisting the officer’s detainment. Contrary to Officer W.’s argument, those facts are of a genuine dispute. Officer W. failed to take the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, instead relying on facts different from those assumed by the district court. Accordingly, the court wrote that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Officer W.’s appeal of the genuineness of the district court’s factual determinations.   Further, the court addressed the basis of our jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal, which does not invoke qualified immunity. Federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” Denial of summary judgment is not a final decision. Thus, the court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal of this claim. View "Ducksworth v. Landrum" on Justia Law

Springboards for Education (“Springboards”) brought trademark infringement claims against McAllen Independent School District (“MISD”), a public school district in Texas, and IDEA Public Schools (“IDEA”), a nonprofit organization operating charter schools in Texas. The district court dismissed the suit against IDEA, concluding it was an arm of the state and therefore shared Texas’s sovereign immunity. As for MISD, the court found that it did not have sovereign immunity but ultimately granted summary judgment in MISD’s favor.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for MISD. The court explained that while it disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that IDEA has sovereign immunity, the court affirmed the judgment for IDEA on alternate grounds. The court reasoned that in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state, the court balances the so-called “Clark factors,” which our court first articulated decades ago in Clark v. Tarrant County. Those factors are: (1) whether state statutes and case law view the entity as an arm of the state; (2) the source of the entity’s funding; (3) the entity’s degree of local autonomy; (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems; (5) whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether it has the right to hold and use property. The court held that factors one and three favor sovereign immunity while factors two, four, five, and six do not. The court concluded that IDEA is not an arm of the state and does not share in Texas’s sovereign immunity. View "Springboards v. IDEA Public Schools" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for possessing a firearm while under a domestic violence restraining order in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section. 922(g)(8). On appeal, Defendant renewed his constitutional challenge to Section 922(g)(8). Defendant again acknowledged that his argument was foreclosed, and a prior panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed. But after Bruen, the prior panel withdrew its opinion, ordered supplemental briefing, and ordered the clerk to expedite this case for oral argument before another panel of the court. Defendant now contends that Bruen overrules our precedent and that under Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court explained that Section 922(g)(8) embodies salutary policy goals meant to protect vulnerable people in society. Weighing those policy goals’ merits through the sort of means-end scrutiny the court’s prior precedent indulged. The court previously concluded that the societal benefits of Section 922(g)(8) outweighed its burden on Defendant’s Second Amendment rights. But Bruen forecloses any such analysis in favor of a historical analogical inquiry into the scope of the allowable burden on the Second Amendment right. Through that lens, the court concluded that Section 922(g)(8)’s ban on the possession of firearms is an “outlier that our ancestors would never have accepted.”  Therefore, the statute is unconstitutional, and Defendant’s conviction under that statute must be vacated View "USA v. Rahimi" on Justia Law

According to the indictment, Defendant, a citizen of Switzerland and a partner in a Swiss wealth-management firm, and co-Defendant, a citizen of Portugal and Switzerland and an employee of a different Swiss wealth-management firm (together, “Defendants”), engaged in an international bribery scheme wherein U.S.-based businesses paid bribes to Venezuelan officials for priority payment of invoices and other favorable treatment from Venezuela’s state-owned energy company. A grand jury returned a nineteen-count indictment charging Defendants with various offenses stemming from their alleged international bribery scheme. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motions to dismiss was improper because the indictment adequately conforms to minimal constitutional standards. Further, the indictment did not violate co-Defendant’s due process rights. Moreover, the court wrote the district court’s conclusion that Section 3292 failed to toll the statute of limitations is erroneous. The court explained that the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person in co-Defendant’s position would not have equated the restraint on his freedom of movement with formal arrest. View "USA v. Murta" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child sexual abuse material. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months of imprisonment followed by lifetime supervision and ordered Defendant to pay a total of $61,500 in restitution to seven victims depicted in Defendant’s materials. On appeal, Defendant sought to vacate the order of restitution, contending that it was imposed in violation of the proximate-cause requirements described in Paroline v. United States. The Government moved to dismiss the appeal on the theory that it is waived by the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss. The court explained that because it is clear that the district court considered the Paroline factors at sentencing and ordered restitution as authorized by Section 2259, the statutory-maximum exception does not apply. Nor did the district court merely rubber-stamp the conclusion. To the contrary, it gave meaningful consideration to whether the evidence showed that Defendant’s conduct proximately caused the victims’ loss. Accordingly, the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement bars this appeal. View "USA v. Alfred" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are captains of charter boats operating in the Gulf of Mexico with federal for-hire permits, and their companies. They filed a class-action complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana in August of 2020, naming as Defendants the Department of Commerce, NOAA, NMFS, and related federal officials. This appeal concerns a regulation issued by the United States Department of Commerce that requires charter-boat owners to, at their own expense, install onboard a vessel monitoring system that continuously transmits the boat’s GPS location to the Government, regardless of whether the vessel is being used for commercial or personal purposes.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and held that in promulgating this regulation, the Government committed multiple independent Administrative Procedure Act violations, and very likely violated the Fourth Amendment. The court wrote that two components of the Final Rule are unlawful. First, the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not authorize the Government to issue the GPS-tracking requirement. In addition, that rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act because it is arbitrary and capricious, in turn because the Government failed to address Fourth Amendment issues when considering it and failed to rationally consider the associated costs and benefits. Second, the business-information requirement violates the APA because the Government did not give fair notice that it would require the type of data specified in the Final Rule. View "Mexican Gulf v. U.S. Dept. of Comm" on Justia Law