Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Two members of a group of criminals whose business model was to steal drugs and money from other criminals were jointly tried. The multiple counts in the indictment charged the defendants with offenses involving drugs, firearms, carjackings, and robbery. Both Defendants were convicted after a jury trial. Among the many appellate issues are the propriety of introducing certain evidence gathered from cell phones, possible errors in the description of certain offenses in the indictment and jury instructions, and whether the judge improperly made fact findings about drug quantities.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the judgment of conviction on Counts Six and Eight for resentencing, reversed the judgment of conviction on Count Seventeen and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal, and affirmed in all other respects. In regards to counts Six and Eight, the court explained that though the two counts allege separate incidents on different dates, multiple firearm counts cannot be predicated on the same conspiracy: “imposing consecutive sentences in these circumstances is inconsistent with the rule in this circuit.” The drug conspiracy was the only predicate offense for each of these counts. The Government stated and the court agreed, the convictions on those two counts must be vacated and, on remand, the Government will be required to elect which count to dismiss. View "USA v. Montemayor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Defense Distributed and the Second Amendment Foundation produce, and make accessible, information related to the 3D printing of firearms. The U.S. Government and various states have imposed restraints on the publication of that information. Plaintiffs have challenged those restraints in federal courts as violating the First Amendment. The instant case involves publication restraints that Defendant, first as Acting Attorney General, then as Attorney General, of New Jersey (“NJAG”), has placed on Plaintiffs.   On remand, the district court severed the claims against the State Department and NJAG and transferred the claims against NJAG to the District of New Jersey. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that that decision was a clear abuse of discretion and ordered the district court to vacate it sever-and-transfer order. The New Jersey court refused to transfer the case back to the Western District of Texas. In response, Plaintiffs moved, in the Western District of Texas, for a preliminary injunction against the publication restraints imposed by NJAG. The district court entered a short order holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider claims against NJAG and dismissed the preliminary-injunction motion.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal holding that the court no longer has the power to hear the case or grant the relief requested. The court explained that the expectation is that circuit courts direct “the transferor district court to request that the transferee district court return the case.” The refusal of the District of New Jersey to retransfer is unprecedented in that regard. The effect of that decision permits a New Jersey district court functionally to nullify a Fifth Circuit decision. View "Defense Distributed v. Platkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment for the State after Plaintiffs alleged numerous state and federal constitutional violations in connection with the State’s Facility Need Review program (“FNR” or “FNR program”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FNR program survives rational basis review and the Supreme Court has foreclosed Plaintiffs’ Privileges or Immunities Clause claim. The court explained that the FNR program survives rational basis review because it advances the State’s legitimate interest in enhancing consumer welfare. LDH offers many legitimate reasons for its FNR regime. Of those reasons, Plaintiffs have the most difficulty defeating the contention that LDH uses. The court held in favor of the State because Plaintiffs failed to negate “every conceivable basis which might support” the FNR program. View "Newell-Davis v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of smuggling bulk cash in violation of 31 U.S.C. Section 5332. He was sentenced to sixteen months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a stop and search at the border as he was leaving the United States and attempting to enter Mexico.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the border-search exception allows “routine” searches and seizures without individualized suspicion or probable cause. Here, Appellant first argued that the canine sniff of his person required reasonable suspicion. The court wrote it did not because the canine sniff here was a routine border search and therefore did not require individualized suspicion. Appellant’s detention did not exceed the bounds of routine border searches and therefore did not require reasonable suspicion. Finally, the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s suppression motion View "USA v. Tenorio" on Justia Law

The State of Texas appeals the district court’s decision that Plaintiffs’ federal Taking Clause claims against the State may proceed in federal court. Because we hold that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision for want of jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to return this case to the state courts. The court explained that the Supreme Court of Texas recognizes takings claims under the federal and state constitutions, with differing remedies and constraints turning on the character and nature of the taking; nothing in this description of Texas law is intended to replace its role as the sole determinant of Texas state law. View "Devillier v. State of Texas" on Justia Law

The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act (HISA) is a federal law that nationalizes governance of the thoroughbred horseracing industry. To formulate detailed rules on an array of topics, HISA empowers a private entity called the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”), which operates under Federal Trade Commission oversight. Soon after its passage, HISA was challenged by various horsemen’s associations, which were later joined by Texas and the state’s racing commission. Plaintiffs argued HISA is facially unconstitutional because it delegates government power to a private entity without sufficient agency supervision. The district court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ “concerns are legitimate,” that HISA has “unique features,” and that its structure “pushes the boundaries of public-private collaboration.” Nonetheless, the court rejected the private non-delegation challenge.   The Fifth Circuit declared that the HISA is unconstitutional because it violates the private non-delegation doctrine. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded. The court explained that while acknowledging the Authority’s “sweeping” power, the district court thought it was balanced by the FTC’s “equally” sweeping oversight. Not so. HISA restricts FTC review of the Authority’s proposed rules. If those rules are “consistent” with HISA’s broad principles, the FTC must approve them. And even if it finds an inconsistency, the FTC can only suggest changes. What’s more, the FTC concedes it cannot review the Authority’s policy choices. The Authority’s power outstrips any private delegation the Supreme Court or the Fifth Circuit has allowed. Thus the court declared HISA facially unconstitutional. View "National Horsemen's Benevolent v. Black" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for illegally reentering the United States, a violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment on equal protection grounds. After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court sentenced him to 30 months imprisonment and three years supervised release. On appeal, Defendant argues that Section 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection principles. As for his sentence, he asserts that the district court (1) failed to consider sentencing disparities, (2) improperly considered the timing of an appeal in sentencing him to three years of supervised release, and (3) failed to consider the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy on supervised release for deportable defendants.   The Fifth Circuit agreed that the district court abused its discretion by considering the appeal clock in determining the appropriate term of supervised release. Accordingly, the court vacated that part of Defendant’s sentence and remanded for reconsideration of the supervised-release term. The court otherwise affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The court found that the district court imposed three years of supervised release solely out of fear that a lower sentence would moot an appeal. The timing of an appeal is not a factor that courts are tasked with considering in imposing supervised release. Such a consideration is also irrelevant because Defendant could appeal his conviction even after his sentence ends. The district court abused its discretion by basing the term of supervised release on the irrelevant timing for an appeal. View "USA v. Barcenas-Rumualdo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who identify as Moorish Americans, sought to enter the Caddo Parish Courthouse to file documents with the court clerk. Upon arriving at the security-screening station, plaintiffs informed the officers on duty that they wished to enter without passing through the security screening. After Plaintiffs’ repeated refusals to depart, the officers stated they would count to three and, if Plaintiffs refused to leave, they would be arrested. They did not depart and were arrested, charged with violating Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 14:63.3.Plaintiffs brought a litany of claims against various officials serving in Caddo Parish and the Louisiana state government based on their actions taken during the arrest. Plaintiffs also moved for recusal of the magistrate judge, which the district court denied.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have pointed to no precedent that abrogates the general “search incident to arrest” rule when religious headwear is involved. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Further, the court held that there was no error in the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for recusal of the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge did not work on this case in private practice nor work with Defendants’ counsel in the practice of law while he was working on this case. Nor is there evidence of any bias or knowledge of the case that would have required the district court, in its discretion, to order recusal. View "Foley Bey v. Prator" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of numerous wire fraud and money-laundering charges arising from a fraudulent scheme to cause the Department of Veterans Affairs to pay over $71 million in GI-Bill funding to his trade school. Defendant raised several challenges to his convictions and his sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in nearly all respects, except that it vacated the forfeiture order and remanded it for further proceedings. The court held that Defendant fails to show the evidence was insufficient to allow a rational jury to convict him on the money-laundering counts. Further, the court concluded that conclude that the indictment was not faulty and the district court did not err in declining to order a bill of particulars.   Moreover, the court explained that illegally provided services that could have “hypothetically” been provided in a “legal manner”—like Defendant’s operation of the school—implicate the second definition of proceeds under Section 981(a)(2)(B), under which a defendant may deduct “the direct costs incurred in providing the goods or services.” The focus of any Section 981(a)(2) analysis is the underlying criminal conduct, not the crime itself.   That subsection further provides that Defendant “shall have the burden of proof with respect to the issue of direct costs” and also that those costs “shall not include any part of the overhead expenses of the entity providing the goods and services, or any part of the income taxes paid by the entity.” Therefore the court remanded for determining whether Defendant can prove any offset under the terms of Section 981(a)(2)(B). View "USA v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant challenges two conditions of his sentence, 1.) that he refrain from excessive alcohol consumption, and 2.) that he take all mental-health medications that are prescribed by his treating physician. The government conceded that condition 1 should be struck because it was not orally pronounced by the district court. However, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's claim that the district court's general discussion of the importance of mental health treatment was sufficient to meet the notice requirement. Thus, the court struck both conditions. View "USA v. Prado" on Justia Law