Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. Sections 78j(b) and 77ff. The district court sentenced Defendant to 168 months in prison and imposed roughly $6.8 million in restitution. In exchange for Defendant's plea, the Government agreed to dismiss five other counts, which carried a maximum term of 100 years in prison. As part of his agreement, Defendant waived his right to appeal.Defendant subsequently filed notice of appeal, challenging the application of a sentencing enhancement and the court's restitution award. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Defendant's appeal, finding that he waived the right to appeal when he signed the plea agreement. View "USA v. Meredith" on Justia Law

Golden Glow Tanning Salon filed a civil rights suit against the City of Columbus, which shut down its business for seven weeks at the outset of the Covid-19 pandemic. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Subsequent experience strongly suggests that draconian shutdowns were debatable measures from a cost-benefit standpoint, in that they inflicted enormous economic damage without necessarily “slowing the spread” of Covid-19. Golden Glow contends that the City Ordinance created an arbitrary distinction between tanning salons and liquor stores that bore no rational relationship to public health given the salon’s ability to operate safely and without customer contact   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the proffered reason is not arbitrary. Further, this conclusion is not altered by Golden Glow’s contention that it could have maintained a safer environment than could liquor stores. Under rational basis review, overinclusive and underinclusive classifications are permissible, as is some resulting inequality. Further, here, the closure of the salon constitutes a deprivation of some economically productive uses (i.e., the uses forbidden by the Ordinance’s Section 2). Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the City Ordinance rendered the entire property “valueless.” The district court was correct to find that there had been no per se taking. View "Golden Glow v. City of Columbus, MS" on Justia Law

Four years ago, L.L. was having a “severe mental health episode” and voicing “suicidal ideations.” So, his mother called the police. When the Chief of Police arrived, he ordered his officers to enter the home and, in the mix-up, L.L. was shot. Plaintiff sued the City of Duncanville for the Chief’s decision, namely “ordering officers . . . into the house.” Plaintiff argued that the Chief was a “policymaker” who—with a “callous disregard for individuals suffering from mental health episodes”—caused the “deprivation” of L.L.’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court wasn’t convinced and dismissed the case.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Chief’s decision to intervene wasn’t based on deliberate indifference to any risk to L.L.’s rights. The court explained that first, it wasn’t “highly predictable” that a Fourth Amendment violation would result from the Chief’s order. The single decision exception—especially when tied to deliberate indifference—applies in rare and narrow scenarios.   Second, Plaintiff can’t show that the Chief, at the time of his order, had the “requisite degree of culpability,” namely that he completely disregarded any risk to Liggins’s Fourth Amendment rights. L.L. had stopped taking his prescription medication and was “suffering from a severe mental health episode.” View "Liggins v. Duncanville TX" on Justia Law

Appellants, two police officers, arrested Plaintiff, a student, at a school basketball game. The district court denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding a dispute of material fact regarding the events surrounding Plaintiff's arrest. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s decision.The Fifth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The issues raised by Plaintiff create factual disputes that meet the required threshold to overcome Appellant's qualified immunity defense at this stage. View "Byrd v. Cornelius" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are two voter registration organizations who challenged Texas’s recently revised requirements for voter residency. The district court concluded Plaintiffs had organizational standing because the new laws caused them to divert resources from other projects and also chilled their ability to advise and register voters. On the merits, the district court ruled that the challenged laws, in large part, impermissibly burdened the right to vote. Texas appealed.   The Fifth Circuit agreed with Texas that Plaintiffs lack organizational standing. So, without reaching the merits, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs argue that it is “a crime under Texas law to help someone to register to vote in violation of [S.B. 1111’s] confusing new requirements.” But Texas law does not criminalize giving good faith but mistaken advice to prospective voters. Rather, the statute on which Plaintiffs rely applies only “if the person knowingly or intentionally” “requests, commands, coerces, or attempts to induce another person to make a false statement on a [voter] registration application.” Plaintiffs do not assert that they plan to “knowingly or intentionally” encourage people to register who are ineligible under S.B. 1111. Plaintiffs’ argument turns on the “confusion and uncertainty” S.B. 1111 supposedly injects into their voter outreach efforts. Uncertainty is not the same as intent, however. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown a serious intention to engage in protected activity arguably proscribed by the challenged law. In sum, the district court erred in concluding Plaintiffs had organizational standing based on a chilled-speech theory View "Texas State LULAC v. Paxton" on Justia Law

in 2008, Congress passed the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and transferred to the Bureau administrative and enforcement authority over 18 federal statutes which prior to the Act were overseen by seven different agencies. In 2016, then-Director of the CFPB proposed a rule to regulate payday, vehicle title, and certain high-cost installment loans (the “Payday Lending Rule”). The Rule's “Payment Provisions” limit a lender’s ability to obtain loan repayments via preauthorized account access.Plaintiffs sued the Bureau seeking an order seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Payday Lending Rule under the theory that it violates the separation of powers doctrine.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the CFPB in total, finding that Congress’s cession of its power of the purse to the Bureau violates the Appropriations Clause and the Constitution’s underlying structural separation of powers. View "Cmty Fin Assoc America v. CFPB" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of numerous crimes stemming from their participation in a violent New Orleans street gang. Defendants filed timely notices of appeal, raising a number of issues. The Fifth Circuit affirmed their convictions in large part, vacated them in part, and remanded. The court explained that because the jury may have improperly relied on the charged RICO conspiracy as a predicate for Defendants’ Section 924 convictions, the court vacated some of the Defendants’ convictions under Counts 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 16, and 18 and remanded for further proceedings. For similar reasons, the court vacated some of the Defendants’ restitution orders and remanded. Otherwise, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Hankton" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of three counts of producing, distributing, receiving, and possessing an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1466A(a)(1); five counts of using an interactive computer service to transport obscene matters, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1462(a); and one count of engaging in the business of selling or transferring obscene matters, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1466(a). On appeal, Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed convictions on Counts 2 through 9, reversed the conviction on Count 1, and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that the fact that the charged drawings here do not depict real minors does not render Arthur’s convictions on Counts 1, 8, and 9 unconstitutional. However, as to Count 1, the court wrote it was not satisfied that the charged image, which was admitted at trial as Government’s Exhibit 10A, is “patently offensive.”   While the charged images in Counts 8 and 9 are both detailed, color, cartoonlike drawings depicting pre-adolescent girls being forced to perform fellatio on disembodied and engorged male genitalia, the charged image in Count 1 is a simple black and white pencil or charcoal drawing with minimal detail depicting an adolescent girl alone, reclining and apparently masturbating. Importantly, unlike the children depicted in the images in Counts 8 and 9, there is no indication that the subject of the image in Count 1 is being forced to perform a sexual act. View "USA v. Arthur" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fled from three officers investigating drug activity. An officer chased Plaintiff and commanded him to stop. Eventually, Plaintiff stopped and turned suddenly toward the officer. The officer feared Plaintiff was reaching for a weapon, so he tased him. Plaintiff and his grandmother sued Harris County and the officer. The district court dismissed the Monell claim against Harris County for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment to the officer based on qualified immunity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish Monell liability on a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) the city failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”   Here, first, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the County failed to train the officers involved on the constitutional use of tasers. Second, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a causal connection between any failure to train officers and the alleged violation here. Third, has not plausibly alleged that any failure to train constituted deliberate indifference. The court further explained that Plaintiff concededly ran from police, then stopped suddenly and turned toward the pursuing officer. Thus, neither Newman nor Darden involves materially similar facts and hence cannot clearly establish the law. View "Henderson v. Harris County" on Justia Law

BP Corporation North America Inc. (“BP America”) a Defendant-Appellee in this action, acquired Standard Oil of Ohio (“Sohio). BP America converted the Sohio Plan into a new plan called the BP America Retirement Plan (the “ARP”). The ARP was also a defined benefit plan that retained the formula used by the Sohio Plan to calculate its members’ pension distributions. BP America converted the ARP into the BP Retirement Accumulation Plan (the “RAP,” the conversion from the ARP to the RAP as the “Conversion,” and the date of the Conversion as the “Conversion Date”), the other Defendant-Appellee in this action. Plaintiffs-Appellees, two Sohio Legacy Employees, (the “Guenther Plaintiffs”) filed a class action complaint against the RAP and BP America.   Four years after the Guenther Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, Movant-Appellant, along with 276 other individuals (the “Press Plaintiffs”) moved to intervene in the Guenther Action “for the purpose of objecting” to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Press Plaintiffs contend that the certified class in the Guenther Action inadequately represents their interests, and therefore, they have a right to intervene in this case.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling denying the intervention. The court held that the Press Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that their interests diverge from those of the Guenther Plaintiffs in any meaningful way. Further, the Press Plaintiffs did not identify a unique interest of their own, they are unable to specify how a determination in the Guenther Action could have a future detrimental preclusive effect. The court wrote it is satisfied that the Press Plaintiffs will be adequately represented. View "Guenther v. BP Retr Accumulation" on Justia Law