Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

While awaiting trial a woman began tapping her hairbrush on the cell door. One of the two primary jailers asked the woman to turn around to be handcuffed. When she did not obey, the jailer used pepper spray which caused her to retreat toward the far wall. While the woman remained at the back of her cell facing away from the jailers, one of the jailers sprayed the woman with pepper spray three more times.   The struggle resulted in the woman lying flat on her stomach with her hands handcuffed behind her back, and one of the jailers, who weighed 230 pounds, sitting atop of her with his knee on her back. The other jailer, who weighed 390 pounds, pressed his forearm against her neck for over two minutes. The jailers rolled the woman over to find her unresponsive and she was declared dead. The woman’s parents filed a section 1983 suit against the county and the jailers. At summary judgment, the district court held that the jailers’ use of force was reasonable.   The Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that a jury could conclude that the jailers used excessive force. Further, the jailers’ continuing to apply that force for more than two minutes after the woman was subdued would violate clearly established law. The court explained any reasonable officer would see that the woman represented a low threat at the moment when the jailer threw her to the floor and applied continuous force. Further, the woman did not actively resist at these critical stages of the encounter. Finally, the amount of force was not proportional to the need for force. View "Fairchild, et al v. Coryell Cty, et al" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Defendant moved to suppress the revolver and ammo, arguing the officers unlawfully stopped him. At an evidentiary hearing, an officer testified for the government, and Defendant introduced bodycam footage from an officer who arrived on scene after the seizure, as well as photographs and maps of the area.   Defendant challenged only whether the officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop; he does not challenge the frisk. He argued the description of the wanted gang member was too general and the detail about the past flight from police on the bicycle was too “sparse” and potentially “stale.” The government relied on the description of the subject and the bicycle, the location, and the officers’ knowledge of gang activity in the area.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and vacated his conviction and sentence. The court held that the officers’ stop of Defendant was not supported by reasonable suspicion. This case involves an outstanding warrant—completed criminal activity—so the information the officers relied on must satisfy a higher level of specificity than if they were responding to a report of ongoing or very recent criminal activity.   Further, the court wrote it does not blindly accept officers’ reliance on information obtained through police channels; the government must substantiate the basis of the information. Here, the government has not established reasonable suspicion that could have been transferred between officers, the collective knowledge doctrine does not apply. View "USA v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of sexually abusing a minor girl over a period of three years and conspiring to obstruct justice by destroying his laptop computer. Defendant appealed raising numerous arguments. The Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s decision and affirmed.   Defendant argued that the federal prosecution violated double jeopardy because he was subjected to punitive pretrial bond conditions in state court before being tried and convicted in federal court. The court explained that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person may be “twice put in jeopardy” “for the same offense.” Thus, the court held that law-of-the-case doctrine forecloses Defendant’s double jeopardy argument.   Further, Defendant argued that his constitutional rights were violated when he was prohibited from discovering certain evidence that purportedly showed the victim and others’ financial motives to lie. The court found that the relevant events do not establish that Defendant was denied a “meaningful opportunity” to present a complete defense.   Finally, the court reviewed the district court’s decision to exclude evidence as a sanction for violating a discovery rule or pretrial order for abuse of discretion. Aside from arguing that exclusion is never appropriate, Defendant does not contend that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his medical records. Consequently, we treat the issue as waived and leave undisturbed the district court’s decision to exclude these documents. View "USA v. Wills" on Justia Law

In a criminal appeal, Defendant presented two issues. First, whether evidence discovered after a consent search of Defendant’s car should be suppressed because law enforcement stopped Morris without reasonable suspicion or overbore his free will to obtain consent to search his vehicle. Second, whether at sentencing the district court erred in holding that Defendant was ineligible for a minor role adjustment because the other participants in the crime had not been indicted or otherwise identified. 
 The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and remanded for reconsideration of his motion to suppress. The court wrote it was convinced that the sheriff’s deputies in the case effected a stop of Defendant under the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that because the district court held that Defendant was not stopped, it did not determine whether the deputies had reasonable suspicion to do so. Thus, the court’s decision is a determination that the district court must make in the first instance, as it usually involves assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing this evidence under the totality of the circumstances. View "USA v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendants settled a civil enforcement action that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) brought against them for alleged securities violations. The SEC barred Defendants from denying that they engaged in the charged conduct as a condition of settlement (the “no-deny policy”). The parties executed consent agreements containing provisions to that effect and submitted them to the district court, which entered final judgments. Five years later, Defendants filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(5) seeking relief from the final judgments to the extent that they incorporated the no-deny policy. They argued that the no-deny policy violates their First Amendment and due process rights. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling holding that Defendants are not entitled to relief based on any alleged First Amendment Violations. Defendants argue that, in denying their motion for Rule 60(b)(4) relief, the district court adopted a cribbed view of Espinosa that the Fifth Circuit rejected in Brumfield. The court wrote that Defendants read Brumfield too broadly. That decision expressly recognized that “a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) only if the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, ‘or it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’”   Next, Defendants asserted that the judgments here should “be set aside as violating the public interest under Rule 60(b)(5).” They argue that retaining the no-deny policy in the judgments harms the public interest. The court explained that Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief. View "SEC v. Novinger" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) has denied prisoner requests to hold religious gatherings for the Nation of Gods and Earths (“the Nation”).   In response, Plaintiff, brought this suit against the TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Volunteer Services and Special Populations, in the hope of vindicating the rights of the Nation’s adherents to congregate. The suit was initially filed pro se over half a decade ago. But Tucker began receiving the aid of pro bono legal counsel a few years later. The State now says that it has promulgated a new policy to govern congregation requests on behalf of the Nation’s adherents. As a result, the State contends that this suit is now moot.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment to the congregation claim, holding that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to “whether the state’s ban: (1) advances a compelling interest (2) through the least restrictive means.” Tucker v. Collier (Tucker I), 906 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2018). After adopting the changes, TDCJ sought summary judgment on the grounds that Tucker’s case was. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim as moot.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found that the case is not moot. The court explained that TDCJ’s policy change gives Plaintiff nothing more than the right to apply for a congregation—to date TDCJ has never approved the Nation for congregation. And it is the latter that this suit seeks to obtain. View "Tucker v. Gaddis" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Defendant, seeking habeas relief, alleged that prosecutors unconstitutionally suppressed a document that would have aided his case and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and his direct appeal.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that any of his habeas claims merit relief. Defendant first asserted that the prosecution violated his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing FD-302 evidence favorable to his case. The court wrote that the impeachment value of the 302 is insufficient to undermine confidence in the trial and the jury’s verdict, such that the 302 is not material, and Defendant’s Brady claim therefore fails.   Next, because none of the prosecutor’s statements, taken in context, constitute improper vouching, Defendant cannot argue that his trial counsel should have objected to them and was ineffective for not doing so. And even if the prosecution acted improperly as to some of its closing remarks, Defendant fails to show how any strategic decision on his counsel’s part not to object rises to ineffective assistance. View "USA v. Valas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The jury instructions did not specify that the jury must find that Defendant knew he was a felon when he possessed a firearm. After Defendant’s conviction and sentencing, the Supreme Court decided in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), that knowledge of felony status is an essential element of that offense. The following year, Defendant filed a motion with the district court under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, arguing that because of Rehaif the court should vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Rehaif did not establish a new right that applies retroactively as required for such collateral actions.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court considered whether in Rehaif the Supreme Court newly recognized a right and whether that right has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review. The court concluded that the Supreme Court did indeed recognize a new right—the defendant’s right to have the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of his felony status when he possessed a firearm.Next, the court wrote, that rule applies retroactively. The Supreme Court has explained that “[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively” to finalized convictions. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). The court explained that remand is appropriate because the district court has not addressed procedural default or the merits of Defendant’s claim. View "USA v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The district court enjoined Texas laws regulating the disposal of embryonic and fetal tissue remains. The state requires facilities performing abortions to dispose of these remains in one of four ways: “(1) interment”; (2) cremation; (3) incineration followed by interment; or (4) steam disinfection followed by interment. Tex. Health & Safety Code Section  697.004(a). The district court assumed that the Texas laws further a legitimate state interest. Under the Casey balancing approach, the district court concluded that “the challenged laws impose significant burdens on abortion access that far outweigh the benefits the challenged laws confer.”   The Fifth Circuit held that because the Supreme Court overruled Casey and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), now under Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., -- S. Ct. --, 2022 WL 2276808 “[t]he Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibiting abortion.” Thus, the court vacated the injunction issued in the case and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Dobbs. View "Whole Woman's Health, et al v. Young" on Justia Law