Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

John Jay’s assistant coach (“Coach”) was “increasingly agitated, angry and enraged over his belief that the referee crew was making ‘bad calls,’” and over “alleged racial comments” Plaintiff, a referee, had directed at players. Coach told John Jay players “to hit” Plaintiff because “he need[ed] to pay the price.” The Coach pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily injury, affirming that he did “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to Plaintiff by striking him.” This civil rights suit, filed in state court and later removed to federal court, followed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the school district. The court held no policy or custom of Northside Independent School District directed the assault on Plaintiff—quite the opposite, the Coach had gone rogue in ordering the assault—so the district is not liable under section 1983.   But the state-created-danger theory does not even fit this situation in which a public employee ordered private actors to commit an assault. Instead, the theory applies when a state actor creates a dangerous condition that results in harm. It involves a mens rea of deliberate indifference, not the intentional infliction of harm. Instead, it is an example of a public official’s ordering private actors to engage in the conduct. The law has long recognized that state action exists when a state actor commands others to commit acts as much as when the state actor commits those act. Further, the court left it to the district court to determine complaint has alleged a violation of clearly established due process law. View "Watts v. Northside Indep Sch Dist, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an engineer for the City of Pharr, Texas. When his supervisors asked him to sign a document he did not believe was true, Plaintiff refused. Ultimately, he was terminated and filed this case against the city and two of Plaintiff's supervisors.Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court held a hearing and denied Defendant's motion. Two days later, the court entered a minute order; however, no written order was attached. Exactly 412 days later, Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment, claiming that the court's oral ruling was not appealable and that he is technically appealing the court's refusal to rile on his motion.The Fifth Circuit rejected Defendant's reasoning. A bench ruling can be effective without a written order and triggers appeal deadlines if it is final. Here, the court's order was final. While the district court's ruling did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 58, an alternate interpretation would give Defendant infinite time to appeal. View "Ueckert v. Guerra" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2021, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion in this case, upholding the district court's rejection of Plaintiff's challenge to an ATF rule determining that bump stocks are "machineguns" for purposes of the National Firearms Act (NFA) and the federal statutory bar on the possession or sale of new machine guns.However, after a majority of the eligible circuit judges voted in favor of hearing the case en banc, the court vacated its prior opinion so the entire court could hear the case. View "Cargill v. Garland" on Justia Law

A county chapter of the NAACP and four individual Plaintiffs brought suit against the district attorney (“DA”) for the Mississippi counties in which they live, claiming he regularly discriminates against black potential jurors by striking them from juries because of their race. The Plaintiffs asserted violations of their own constitutional rights to serve on juries. The district court determined that it should apply one of the Supreme Court’s abstention doctrines and dismissed the case.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed holding that Plaintiffs have not alleged a certainly impending threat or a substantial risk to their rights that would satisfy the requirements of Article III. The court explained that to prevail on a claim for prospective equitable relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate continuing harm or a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of a citizen not to be excluded from a petit jury because of his or her race. A juror who alleges being struck from a jury because of race has alleged a cognizable injury for purposes of Article III standing.Here, Plaintiffs allege that their injury is the imminent threat that the DA will deny them an opportunity for jury service by excluding them because of their race. However, save one, none of the Plaintiffs have ever been struck from a jury by the DA. Further, members of the county chapter cannot demonstrate an imminent threat that they will be struck unconstitutionally from a petit jury by the DA. Thus, Plaintiffs have not established standing. View "Attala County, MS Branch v. Evans" on Justia Law

Plaintiff led police on a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood. Once Plaintiff exited his vehicle, Defendant sheriff's deputy tased Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the deputy, claiming he violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights. The District Court denied the deputy's claim of qualified immunity, finding there were material factual disputes as to whether a reasonable officer would have viewed Plaintiff as an immediate threat; whether Plaintiff's apparent surrender was a ploy to evade arrest; and whether Plaintiff was tased once or twice.The Fifth Circuit reversed. After considering the threat posed by Plaintiff in fleeing law enforcement as well as the force used by the deputy, the court determined that the deputy did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Plaintiff was unable to overcome the bar of qualified immunity. View "Salazar v. Molina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former FBI special agent, asked a federal district court to order the FBI to issue him a top-secret clearance and reinstate his employment. He also sought damages against FBI officials for revoking his clearance and suspending him, for preventing him from taking other employment while suspended, and for delaying the release of letters that Plaintiff says contain his protected speech. The district court dismissed those claims. It concluded that Plaintiff has no cause of action against the officers in their individual capacities. And it reasoned that its subject matter jurisdiction does not include the power to order the FBI to reinstate his security clearance.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. His claims seeking to reverse his suspension and termination fall outside the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. And he has no cause of action to bring the remaining individual capacity claims. The court explained that the Supreme Court has twice rejected federal employees’ attempts to sidestep the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA’s”) remedial scheme. The court found that just as the CSRA precludes extra-statutory review of “adverse actions” defined by Section 7712, it precludes extra-statutory review of ancillary constitutional claims brought as a “vehicle by which [plaintiffs] seek to reverse” those adverse actions. View "Zummer v. Sallet" on Justia Law

Defendants dismissed Plaintiff from two graduate nursing studies programs. She sued, claiming that her dismissal violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause. The district court refused to dismiss some of her claims. The Defendants appealed part of that order, contending that they have sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims and that she failed to state Fourteenth Amendment claims.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Defendants' appeal in part finding that the court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court affirmed the order in part and reversed the order in part, concluding that Plaintiff stated some Title II claims but not all of the claims that the district court refused to dismiss. Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity at this stage of the litigation because Plaintiff’s allegations did not permit the court to assume that Defendants did not violate her due-process rights. The court explained that it has appellate jurisdiction over only the denial of sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims. The court wrote it must assume that Plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. The state may or may not be correct that its rebuttal evidence vitiates any inference that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability. But the pleading stage was not the right time to raise those contentions. Although the court has done so in the past, Plaintiff’s allegations do not permit the court to assume that the Due Process Clause was not violated. View "Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five counts of sex trafficking. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that there is insufficient evidence to support one count of his conviction, and that the prosecutor made an improper remark in her closing argument.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that under the Speedy Trial Act the federal government must file an information or indictment against the defendant “within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges” otherwise the charges must be dismissed. Defendant argues that the Speedy Trial Act clock must include his detention by state authorities as the state charges were a “ruse” to avoid its reach in that State and federal authorities cannot “collude” to detain a defendant “solely for the purpose of bypassing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.” Here, the court held that the state had a legitimate and independent reason to detain Defendant and was not holding him primarily as a ruse for the federal government’s eventual arrest, Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act. Further, Defendant was unable to show that the length of the delay was prejudicial. View "USA v. Mearis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, brings a Section 1983 suit alleging the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and unidentified prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court requested the Texas State Attorney General’s Office provide a supplemental administrative report, known as a Martinez report, to develop the record. Upon reviewing the report, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims as frivolous.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court explained that in reviewing whether a district court properly dismissed a prisoner’s complaint for failure to state a claim, it applies the same standard as dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Further to show deliberate indifference a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was aware that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Here, Plaintiff did not mention any relationship between the allegedly unconstitutional acts and the Director or any prison policy. Without such an allegation, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against him.   Next, the court concluded that if the Martinez report conflicts with the pro se plaintiff’s allegations, the district court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, not the records in the report. Here, the district court relied on the Martinez report’s medical records in the face of Plaintiff’s conflicting allegations to conclude Plaintiff’s treatment was sufficient and any delay in treatment was not due to deliberate indifference. View "Davis v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action shortly after her son’s death, alleging that officers violated her son’s constitutional rights by failing to provide him with medical treatment while he was dying in a jail cell. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the officers’ motion. It found genuine disputes of material fact surrounding Plaintiff’s claims that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the man’s serious medical needs. And it concluded that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and found that (1) the fact disputes identified by the district court are material to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, and (2) the court’s decision in Easter clearly established the man’s rights before the officers allegedly violated them.The court explained that in reviewing qualified immunity it looks to: (1) whether the defendant violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory rights; and (2) whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the violation. The court reasoned those it lacks jurisdiction to review the genuineness argument because the officers’ arguments do not address why the fact disputes the district court did find cannot affect the outcome of Plaintiff’s lawsuit—the materiality inquiry. Further, in reviewing Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 2006), the court held that a reasonable jury could find that the officers each refused to treat the man, ignored his cries for help, and overall evinced a wanton disregard for his serious medical needs. View "Sims v. Griffin" on Justia Law