Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery, obstruction of commerce by robbery, and using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death. Defendant was charged alongside several others. The district court severed the trial of the then-capital defendants. Defendant’s first trial, in July 2021, ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict. At his retrial in March 2022, a jury convicted Defendant of each of the three counts charged. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it rejected Defendant’s assertion that his substantial rights were affected “because the government’s case was almost entirely premised on DNA evidence.” The court explained that the government also presented eyewitness testimony that, on the morning of the robbery, Defendant helped load a bag of firearms into the vehicle used in the robbery, and the government properly introduced a statement from a non-testifying co-defendant that Defendant was one of the shooters who emerged from the vehicle. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s vague assertion does not establish that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.” View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Louisiana prisoner, sued the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole (“Parole Board”), seeking to have his parole reinstated on the grounds that its rescission just prior to its effective date violated his due process rights. The district court agreed with Plaintiff and ordered his release on parole within 30 days. On appeal, the Parole Board’s arguments include that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the State bases its argument on the premise that the Parole Board has unfettered discretion in all aspects of parole and release decisions. In support of its position, the State relied on an unpublished opinion, Burton v. Bd. of Parole. The court wrote that the opinion relies on Sinclair for its analysis, which the court has already rejected as inapplicable in this case. The court concluded the same now with regard to Burton because, there, the Louisiana First Circuit was considering an appeal from a prisoner’s denial of parole. The opinion discusses “expectancy of release,” while the question here is whether there are limits on the Parole Board to rescind parole after its formal grant but before the effective date of release. The court agreed and explained that Plaintiff’s parole was ostensibly rescinded because of an alleged problem with notice to a victim. He was notified of this reason on May 1, 2017, 10 days after his parole was rescinded. At the time, that was not a permissible reason to rescind his grant of parole. Therefore, Plaintiff’s parole was improperly rescinded. View "Galbraith v. Hooper" on Justia Law

Chapter 423 of the Texas Government Code governs the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—in Texas airspace. In this case, Plaintiffs claimed a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. They also assert a constitutional right to fly drones at low altitudes over critical infrastructure facilities like prisons and large sports venues.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor on the constitutional claims. The court explained that it disagreed with Plaintiffs claim that a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. The court explained that though it does not foreclose any as-applied constitutional defenses to any hypothetical future prosecutions under the drone laws, we hold that these facial challenges fail. The court also rejected Plaintiffs’ cross-appeal claiming that federal regulations occupy the entire field of drone regulation. On this issue, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the field-preemption claim. The court explained that federal law expressly contemplates concurrent non-federal regulation of drones, especially where privacy and critical infrastructure are concerned. View "National Press v. McCraw" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of transporting illegal aliens and conspiracy to transport illegal aliens. But the government used inadmissible evidence to prove that the person being transported was in the United States unlawfully. Defendant challenged the district court’s ruling admitting the G-166F into evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment.   The Fifth Circuit vacated Defendant's conviction for transporting illegal aliens but affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that an alien-smuggling investigation report is not “essentially ministerial” as this court found the I-213 to be in Noria. 945 F.3d at 860. Instead, it is a criminal investigation report—the sort of document the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court therefore found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the G-166F into evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the court explained that it is the government’s burden to establish that using the challenged investigative report was constitutional. The government has not met that burden here. Therefore, admitting the G-166F into evidence violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. However, the court explained that whether the men in Defendant’s car were actually illegal aliens is not relevant to any element in the conspiracy to transport illegal aliens charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy. View "USA v. Foreman" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of sex trafficking of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). On appeal, he challenged the introduction of evidence pulled from his cellphone using Cellebrite technology. He claimed that the district court erred by permitting a police investigator to introduce the Cellebrite extract without first being qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when law enforcement uses Cellebrite to pull information from a phone, and a lay juror would require no additional interpretation to understand that information, the party does not need to introduce the evidence through an expert. The court explained that all the investigator testified to was how he downloaded the information from the phones using Cellebrite technology. At no point did he speak to the reliability of the software, except that he double-checked some of the reports by looking directly at the source material in the phones themselves. To that end, he did not state any information on how Cellebrite operated in a technical sense, nor information that was beyond the knowledge of an average cell phone user. Without a showing of specialized knowledge, the mere use and understanding of a Cellebrite extract at trial is insufficient to require an expert. Operating a Cellebrite device and understanding its report require knowledge in the realm of a reasonably tech-savvy layperson, regardless of the investigator’s testimony that he was a “certified” operator and analyzer. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and convicted of (1) producing child pornography, (2) committing that offense while being required to register as a sex offender, (3) possessing child pornography, and (4) sex trafficking of a child. All four charges involved his conduct with “Minor Victim-1” or “the Minor.” Defendant appealed his conviction for Count 4, sex trafficking of a child. He maintains that in light of Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014), 18 U.S.C. Section 1591 should not be interpreted to reach his conduct, which he terms a “purely local sex offense.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that overturning Defendant’s conviction under Bond requires him to show three things: (1) that allowing his conviction would “significantly change the federal-state balance,” (2) that Congress has not included a clear indication that they meant to reach “purely local crimes,” and (3) that his is a purely local crime. The court explained without expressing any view on (1) or (3), it determines that Defendant failed to demonstrate (2). Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes.” The court explained that it is not alone in adopting a broader interpretation of Section 1591 despite Bond. Because Congress included a clear indication that Section 1591 is meant to reach “purely local crimes,” Defendant’s argument under Bond fails. View "USA v. Renteria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then an Assistant Athletic Director at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)— internally reported Head Football Coach Les Miles for sexually harassing students. LSU retained outside counsel—Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”)—to investigate the matter, culminating in a formal report dated May 15, 2013 (the “Taylor Porter Report”). Matters were privately settled, and Miles stayed on as head coach until 2016. Lewis alleges that Defendants, members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), leadership, and athletics department, along with lawyers at Taylor Porter (“Taylor Porter Defendants” and, collectively, “Defendants”), engaged in a concerted effort to illegally conceal the Taylor Porter Report and Miles’s wrong-doings. Plaintiff also alleged workplace retaliation for having reported Miles. She brings both employment and civil RICO claims. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations as time-barred and inadequately pleaded as to causation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered when Plaintiff was first made aware of her injuries. It matters not when she discovered Defendants’ “enterprise racketeering scheme”—she alleges that this happened in March 2021 with the release of the Husch Blackwell Report. Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that she was made aware of her injuries much earlier. She was subject to overt retaliation after “Miles was cleared of any wrongdoing” by the Taylor Porter Report in 2013. Plaintiff alleged numerous harmful workplace interactions from that point forward. Given that Plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 8, 2021, her claims for injuries that were discovered—or that should have been discovered—before April 8, 2017, are time-barred. View "Lewis v. Danos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with interfering with the duties of a public servant. Eight hundred fifty-six days later, she brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Harris County and a number of law enforcement officials, asserting a series of alleged constitutional rights violations. The district court found the applicable statute of limitations barred all claims and granted all Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and failure to train, supervise, and discipline. She also asserted the district court erred in denying leave to amend her complaint. Finally, Plaintiff requested reassignment to a different district judge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a false arrest claim accrues when charges are filed. Similarly, because a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment is “based upon ‘detention without legal process,’” limitations run once “legal process [is] initiated.” Limitations had long lapsed by the time Plaintiff sued. The false arrest and false imprisonment claims are time-barred, and she concedes that no basis for tolling applies. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment includes twenty-three examples of arrests conducted by Precinct Seven officers that resulted in criminal charges later dismissed for lack of probable cause. They are of no use. All twenty-three lack critical factual detail. That, in turn, precludes Plaintiff from showing that the pattern of examples is sufficiently similar to her incident. Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint—even as amended—would not survive a motion to dismiss. View "Johnson v. Harris County" on Justia Law

Communities can therefore regulate the so-called “secondary effects” of sexually oriented businesses (or “SOBs”), like crime and blight, without running afoul of the First Amendment. The City of Dallas passed Ordinance No. 32125 in 2022. The Ordinance requires licensed SOBs, such as cabarets, escort agencies, and adult video stores, to close between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.. Plaintiffs, a group of SOBs and their trade association, challenged the Ordinance under the First Amendment. After a hearing, the district court found that the City lacked reliable evidence to justify the Ordinance and that the Ordinance overly restricted Plaintiffs’ speech. It therefore preliminarily enjoined the Ordinance.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded. The court explained that under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the Ordinance is likely constitutional. The City’s evidence reasonably showed a link between SOBs’ late-night operations and an increase in “noxious side effects,” such as crime. The court explained that it cannot say that the Ordinance substantially or disproportionately restricts speech. It leaves SOBs free to open for twenty hours a day, seven days a week, while also, in the City’s reasonable view, curtailing the violent crime and 911 calls with which the City was concerned. View "Assoc of Club Exct v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law