Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs' son was killed when he attempted to drive through a low water crossing in Camp Bullis, a military training base outside San Antonio, Texas. As Plaintiff's son navigated the crossing, water swept across the road, ultimately resulting in his death.Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, claiming the government failed to inspect the low water crossing, failed to warn approaching motorists about the dangers of flooding, and failed to install guard rails that may have prevented water from accumulating on the road. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, finding the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") applied.The Fifth Circuit reversed. Under the FTCA, the federal government waives sovereign immunity for actions based on the negligence of federal employees who are acting within the scope of their employment. However, immunity is not waived if the federal employee is carrying out a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency. To be discretionary, an action must involve some element of judgment or choice.Here, the relevant regulation states that "[a]ll Range/Control Area/Impact Area gates will either be locked or guarded by the unit using the area." A natural reading of the regulation imposed an obligation on the officers who were on-site to lock the gate. Thus, the discretionary exception to the FTCA did not apply. View "Barron v. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a temporary employee on a construction job suffered a diabetic attack at work. Six days later, the plaintiff was terminated along with several others. After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff sued her employer in the Eastern District of Texas, bringing claims for damages under the ADA, alleging she had been discriminated against due to her diabetes.The circuit court found that the evidence was that plaintiff was terminated immediately after an event that highlighted her ADA-protected disability. The court reasoned proximity of her diabetic episode on the job and her termination was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case that she was included in the group to be terminated for ADA violative reasons. The court further found that plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination and show that a fact question exists as to whether that explanation is pretextual. Thus, the plaintiff established the elements of her prima facie case and she has also presented “substantial evidence” that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory rationale for her inclusion in the reduction in force was pretextual. An issue of material fact remains regarding whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her disability by including her in the reduction of force. View "Gosby v. Apache Industrial" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged President Biden’s September 9, 2021 order requiring all executive employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. After finding that the equities favored the plaintiffs and that they were likely to succeed at trial, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of President Biden’s Order nationwide.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s prelamination injunction. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) provides “comprehensive and exclusive procedures” for the review of employment-related disputes between civil-service employees and the federal government. The court held that the CSRA provides meaningful administrative review of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available review under the CRSA, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ claim. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their claim was "wholly collateral" to the CSRA scheme. View "Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden" on Justia Law

Defendant was federally charged with various child pornography offenses. However, the district court found him incompetent and committed the defendant for evaluation and treatment. The defendant was released to live with his mother and, shortly thereafter, regained competency. However, before trial, the defendant was again deemed incompetent. The district court committed the defendant to a second term of competency-restoration treatment.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order committed the defendant to a second term of competency-restoration. While it is a violation of due process to try an incompetent person for a crime, 18 U.S.C. 4241(a) allows the court to commit an incompetent defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment for a reasonable period of time, but not to exceed four months. A defendant can be committed for a second term of hospitalization, provided the court finds there is a substantial probability the defendant will regain competency during that time. However, if the medical facility treating the defendant certifies he has regained competency, the court must hold a hearing.The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's claim that once the medical facility certified he was competent, he could only be subject to civil commitment. Section 4241(a) allows for two commitment periods. The hospital warden's certification of the defendant's competency does not affect the district court's ability to order a second period of commitment. View "USA v. Ceasar" on Justia Law

While the defendant was a pain-management doctor, he reached an agreement with a pharmacist (“MM”). Per the agreement, MM would create a boilerplate prescription pad designed to assist the defendant in prescribing unnecessary medication. Second, the defendant signed an incomplete form, and third, his employee would step in and complete administrative work before faxing the form to MM. MM would then complete the form for fraudulent insurance reimbursement.The Government brought an eight-count indictment against the defendant. The jury acquitted him on Counts 1–7, but it hung on Count 8. He moved to dismiss Count 8 on double-jeopardy grounds. The defendant must show that the jury necessarily found some fact, and this fact must be an essential element of a retrial. The court reasoned that the defendant failed to meet this because his participation isn’t a necessary element of the Count 8 offense. Defendant next argues that the Government cannot retry him without broadening the indictment. However, the defendant moved to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds, not on the grounds of constructive amendment or variance. Defendant argued only that the collateral-estoppel portion of the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes a total bar to retrial. Even if the defendant asked the district court to exclude a particular argument, the court does not have the authority to review that decision. View "USA v. Auzenne" on Justia Law

Appellants (“Defense Distributed”) have challenged publication restraints imposed by the U.S. State Department, federal courts, and the State of New Jersey (“NJ”) after appellants published the internet computer-assisted design (“CAD”) files for a single-round plastic pistol. Although Defense Distributed is still prevented from publishing, the CAD files it published remain available on many other websites. At issue in this combined appeal and motion for mandamus relief stems from a district court’s (“DC”) order severing the case and transferring it to a federal court in NJ. The court found that the Defense Distributed satisfied the first two conditions for mandamus relief. Further, the NJ Attorney General did not carry its burden to demonstrate that transfer is more appropriate than the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.The court concluded that the DC’s order severing and transferring the claims against the NJAG to the District of New Jersey was a clear abuse of discretion, giving rise to an appropriate exercise of the court’s mandamus power. View "Defense Distributed v. Bruck" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Williamson County, Texas (“County”), alleging that county prosecutors denied him due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment by lying to his counsel during plea negotiations, misconduct caused by the County’s “closed-file” policy. Appellant alleged that both his Brady and due process claims were enabled by the county’s closed-file policy, which prevented his attorneys from examining evidence, leading him to involuntarily plead guilty. The circuit court reasoned that they could not conclude that the closed-file policy caused the prosecutors to lie. Thus he failed to create a triable issue on the causal connection demanded by Monell. Further, the court held that the appellant’s Brady claim is foreclosed. They reasoned that this court’s precedent has consistently held that Brady focused on the integrity of trials and did not reach pre-trial guilty pleas. The circuit court affirmed the magistrate’s grant of summary judgment as there is no showing that a county policy was the force behind the appellant’s constitutional violation argument. View "Mansfield v. Williamson Cty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and the United States filed suit against the State of Texas, as well as state and local officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of some or all of the new provisions in Senate Bill 1, which amended various provisions of the Texas Election Code pertaining to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers, and more.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Committees' motion to intervene as defendants, concluding that the Committees have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court determined that the Committees made a timely application to intervene by right; they claim interests relating to SB 1 which is the subject of this consolidated suit; their absence from the suit may practically impede their ability to protect their interests; and the existing parties might not adequately represent those interests. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Committees to intervene by right in this suit. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris County Republican Party" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in this civil rights action brought by plaintiff against his prior employer with one exception: the court reversed as to the hostile work environment claim. The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, a single incident of harassment, if sufficiently severe, can give rise to a viable Title VII claim. In this case, the incident plaintiff has pleaded, that his supervisor directly called him a racial epithet containing the n-word in front of his fellow employees, states an actionable claim of hostile work environment. The court remanded for further consideration. View "Woods v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Dallas County. Plaintiff filed suit after he was convicted of sexually abusing his son and the district attorney sought to revoke plaintiff's community supervision and proceed with adjudication. After plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to prison, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ordered plaintiff released since polygraph results are inadmissible under Texas evidence law.The court concluded that the Dallas County district attorney acted as a state policymaker when he decided or acquiesced to the polygraph policy in this case. Therefore, there is no county policymaker to support plaintiff's Monell claim. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to plausibly plead his failure-to-train-or-supervise theory against Dallas County under Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001). View "Arnone v. County of Dallas" on Justia Law