Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment against Plaintiff, acting as the personal representative of the estate of Ambrosia Fagre (Amber), on claims related to Amber's death, holding that the district court did not err when it granted Trooper Jeffrey Parks's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim.Plaintiff's complaint alleged use of excessive force against Amber in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under section 1983 and use of excessive force against Amber in violation of Me. Const. art. I, 5 under the Maine Civil Rights Act, failure to protect Amber in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and negligence and wrongful death under Maine state law. The district court granted Trooper Parks's motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment on Plaintiff's section 1983 claim was warranted, and Trooper Parks was also entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) the district court did not err by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims because Trooper Parks was entitled to immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act, Me. Stat. Tit. 14, 8111(1). View "Fagre v. Parks" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated Defendants' convictions for their roles in an expansive drug-trafficking conspiracy, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions but the trial was rendered unfair due to repeated, one-sided intercessions by the trial judge.The primary challenge of all four defendants on appeal was that they were entitled to a new trial because, throughout the eleven-day jury trial, the district court judge interjected during witness testimony in a manner that signaled an anti-defense bias to the jury and caused Defendants prejudice. The First Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge's perceptible partiality impaired the integrity and fairness of the trial and that this judicial misconduct infringed upon all Defendants' right to a fair trial. View "United States v. Raymundi-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) reasonably applied clearly established law in holding that improper statements by the prosecutor during Appellant's trial did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.After a jury trial in Massachusetts state court Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper. The SJC affirmed Appellant's conviction, concluding that the prosecutor's "unfortunate" remarks did not warrant a new trial. Appellant later filed a habeas petition, which the district court denied. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court's conclusion that the prosecutor's challenged statements did not render Appellant's trial fundamentally unfair was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. View "Taylor v. Medeiros" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed this appeal without prejudice for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that the appeal was premature.In the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Maine responded to the threat of contagion by issuing executive orders limiting all non-essential activities and gatherings. Plaintiff Calvary Chapel of Bangor brought this action arguing that those orders violated the First Amendment's Free Speech, Free Exercise, Assembly, and Establishment protections. The district court refused Plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that this case did not display the criteria this Court has previously identified as characterizing a de facto denial of injunctive relief and that the remaining requirements for appealability were not satisfied. View "Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of a drug offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the drug evidence as having resulted from an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Drug evidence was obtained from under the hood of a truck in which Defendant was a passenger. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the government lacked probable cause to remove him from the truck and handcuff him during the search of the vehicle and to search the truck, and (2) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to support their activities. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the officers were operating from a tip from a reliable informant that the individuals in the truck had drugs and were about to complete a drug sale, and no more information was needed to justify the seizure of Defendant and the inspection of the vehicle; and (2) because the officers had probable cause to seize Defendant and search the truck, they also had reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals concerning the "categorical and sweeping nature" of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, 99, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Section 99 violates the First Amendment in criminalizing the secret, nonconsensual audio recording of police officers discharging their official duties in public spaces, holding that the district court properly accounted for the values of both privacy and accountability within our constitutional system.Section 99 makes it a crime to record another person's words secretly and without consent, but Massachusetts does not recognize any exceptions based on whether that person has an expectation of privacy in what is recorded. In 2016, two sets of plaintiffs - the Martin Plaintiffs and Project Veritas Action Fund - filed suit alleging that Section 99 violates the First Amendment. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Martin Plaintiffs; and (2) affirmed the district court's order dismissing Project Veritas's First Amendment overbreadth challenge for failing to state a claim but vacated on ripeness grounds the dismissal with prejudice of Project Veritas's remaining First Amendment challenges to the statute and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, Martin v. Rollins" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Petitioner's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance in deciding not to call two witnesses during Petitioner's trial and introduce certain documents.After a trial, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine and of aiding and abetting others to do so as well. Thereafter, Petitioner field a timely habeas petition, arguing that his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated by deciding not to call two witnesses during trial. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Defendant's ineffective assistance claim failed because there was no reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different had counsel called the two witnesses. View "Rijo v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a Union's motion to dismiss two Hampshire state employees' (Appellants) complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that Appellants' claim based on Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), was not cognizable under section 1983.Appellants sought retrospective relief for themselves and other state employees who were not members of the State Employees' Association of New Hampshire (the Union) but were forced to pay "agency fees" to it prior to the decision in Janus. In Janus, the United States Supreme Court overruled its decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and held that "agency fee" arrangements violate the First Amendment. The district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss Appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly held that Appellants' damages claim failed. View "Doughty v. State Employees' Ass'n of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the government failed to show that the district court granted reversible error by granting the motion for a new trial upon finding when the court deemed to be a violation of the Confrontation Clause.Defendant was convicted of three counts charging her with wire fraud, honest services wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit both types of wire fraud. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the Confrontation Clause was violated in the proceedings below and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no plain error in the district court's choice of the applicable standard of harmlessness. View "United States v. Ackerly" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), holding that the life without parole sentence imposed by the district court was not unconstitutional and that Defendant's remaining claims of error were unavailing.On appeal, Defendant, who was twenty years old at the time he committed the charged crime, sought to vacate his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on Eighth Amendment grounds. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to make the case for extending the Miller ban on life-without-parole sentences to offenders like Defendant who were in the eighteen-to-twenty range when they committed the crimes of conviction; (2) the district court did not err in determining that Defendant had twice committed the predicate offense of first-degree murder even where the jury had been instructed only on second-degree murder; and (3) Defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law