Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and was sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years of supervised release. The sentencing court later agreed to transfer Defendant’s supervision to South Carolina so long as he consented to new conditions. When the probation officer told Defendant’s treatment provider, the provider responded that Cohen’s behavior violated the program’s pornography rules and would be raised at an upcoming group therapy session. The district court directed probation to issue a warrant for Defendant’s arrest for violating the terms of his supervised release. At the revocation hearing, Defendant admitted trading photos of his erect penis for pictures of undressed women during sexually explicit conversations but argued his behavior did not violate his supervised release conditions. The district court revoked Defendant’s release. The district court sentenced Defendant to time served followed by lifetime supervision, during which he would be subject to various special conditions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Defendant’s supervised release and the imposition of lifetime supervision. The court vacated the first clause of special condition eleven and remanded for entry of a modified judgment striking that clause. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. The court reasoned that because the district court identified no other basis for concluding Defendant violated the participation condition, its determination on that point was legally erroneous. View "US v. Marshall Cohen" on Justia Law

The Town of Chapel Hill, North Carolina (the “Town”) requires housing developers seeking a special use permit to set aside a portion of their developments for low-income residents or pay a fee in lieu of that condition. In 2015, Plaintiff initiated its purchase of property subject to the fee-in-lieu. Plaintiff paid the requisite fee installments, commenced the development project, and sold each parcel. After Plaintiff satisfied its final fee installment in March 2019, it brought this lawsuit under a state cause of action to recover the whole sum it had paid to the Town and alleged federal takings and due process violations. The district court never reached those claims because it determined that Plaintiff waited too long to pursue them. The district court dismissed the case under North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Plaintiff promptly appealed, asking the Fourth Circuit to hold that the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s federal claims began instead when it paid the fee installments.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims. Having disposed of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the court also affirmed the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. The court explained, Plaintiff first had reason to know of this injury no later than 2015. Thus, its claim that the permit condition violated its rights to just compensation and due process accrued at that point and extinguished three years later. By the time Plaintiff filed suit, the sun had set on its federal claims. View "Epcon Homestead, LLC v. Town of Chapel Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition asserting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) failed to provide her daughter, A.C., with a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled for Plaintiff on two of the seven issues she had raised but against her on all others. Plaintiff sought review contending that the ALJ had improperly delegated the remedy for the two issues and erred in deciding the rest. Plaintiff further argued that the ALJ’s adverse findings were not entitled to deference. The district court granted summary judgment to CMS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that based on the extensive process Plaintiff received in the handling of her case, as well as the detail provided in the ALJ’s written decision, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings were regularly made. The court further held that the district court was correct to accord those findings deference and to determine that Plaintiff failed to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence on the five issues she disputes. While the deference in these cases is owed the ALJ, it is not remiss to point out that the district court likewise proceeded with its own thorough review in a lengthy opinion. Plaintiff does not persuasively challenge the court’s decision on appeal. Further, the court wrote, it discerns no abuse of remedial discretion on the part of the district court in allowing the respondent to fashion “benchmark(s) and criteria” in A.C.’s IEP indicating when she may move on from Metro School. View "Hind Bouabid v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

Defendant was a detective in Baltimore’s Gun Trace Task Force, a unit charged with investigating firearms-related crimes. After a trial where the government showed Defendant and some of his colleagues stole money, drugs, and other items on the job, a jury convicted him of Hobbs Act robbery and racketeering offenses. The district court sentenced Defendant to 18 years of imprisonment, to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. This appeal challenges the district court’s later-imposed restitution order. Defendant claimed the restitution order is unwarranted and unsupported. The people to whom the court ordered Defendant to make restitution both admitted to selling drugs, and one said at least some of the stolen cash came from illegal drug sales. Defendant argued these people were not “victims” under 18 U.S.C. Section 3663A(a)(2) because “[t]he proceeds of illegal activity are not the property of the person who obtained the funds through that activity” and the government failed to prove that either the cash or personal property was “untainted.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although one of the people to whom Defendant was ordered to make restitution admitted some of the stolen cash was drug proceeds, the same person insisted the rest was lawfully earned from his job as a painter. Defendant, in contrast, suggests all the stolen cash and property were drug proceeds. The restitution statutes supply no rules for how district courts are to resolve these sorts of questions. The court wrote that, in the end, “no amount of policy talk can overcome plain statutory text.” View "US v. Marcus Taylor" on Justia Law

Following an investigation by the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission and the testing of DNA evidence, a state court vacated Plaintiffs-brothers’ convictions, finding significant evidence of innocence. North Carolina Governor Patrick McCrory granted each a “Pardon of Innocence.” When they were released, they had served 31 years in prison. Through appointed guardians, the two commenced this action against six law enforcement officers, the town of Red Springs, and Robeson County under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of their due process rights. The jury awarded Plaintiffs a total of $62 million in compensatory damages and $13 million in punitive damages.   On appeal, Defendants challenged (1) the district court’s conduct of the trial on several procedural grounds, arguing that they were denied a fair trial and that the district court, therefore, erred in denying their motion for a new trial; (2) the court’s refusal to reduce the jury’s verdict by the $11.5 million that the Plaintiffs had received from others as redress for their injuries prior to the verdict; (3) the court’s addition of $36 million in prejudgment interest to the jury’s award; and (4) the reasonableness of the court’s award of attorneys fees.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial; vacated its order denying Defendants’ motion to reduce the jury’s compensatory damages award, and directed that the court reduce the award by $10 million and determine whether the award should be reduced by another $1.5 million; reversed the court’s order awarding prejudgment interest; and affirmed the court’s award of attorneys fees and costs. View "J. Gilliam v. Leroy Allen" on Justia Law

In 2015, a jury convicted Petitioner of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence”—in Petitioner’s case, attempted Hobbs Act robbery— in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Petitioner’s Section 924(c) conviction (and the associated ten-year prison sentence) is no longer valid.   Having previously sought relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, Petitioner now moves for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 motion to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction. The court granted Petitioner’s authorization motion, finding that he meets the standard for filing a second or successive motion set forth in Section 2255(h)(2). The court explained that Petitioner must “make a prima facie showing that” his claim satisfies the Section 2255(h) gatekeeping test. The parties agree that Petitioner has made a prima facie showing that his Davis claim satisfies Section 2255(h)(2), which requires his second or successive motion to contain “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Petitioner and the Government contend that Thomas, wherein the Fourth Circuit has held that petitioner’s Davis claim met the Section 2255(h)(2) requirements, is on all fours with the instant case. View "In re: Kenneth Graham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of the Estate of former federal inmate brought suit against the United States and several Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials after the decedent was allegedly beaten to death by fellow inmates. The Estate (“Appellant”) alleges that BOP officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect the decedent from the attack and failing to intervene to prevent his transfer to a “violent” facility. Appellant also sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that prison officials had been negligent in their failure to intervene and protect the decedent. Appellant argues that its Eighth Amendment claims are cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Appellant’s Bivens claims arise in a new context and that several special factors, including separation-of-power implications and an increased burden on the federal prison system, counsel against an extension of Bivens in this new context. The court also concluded that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies to BOP officials’ decisions to transfer Bulger and place him in general population. View "William Bulger v. Hugh Hurwitz" on Justia Law

On March 20, Plaintiff, an inmate, experienced abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. He was transported to an outside hospital for evaluation and testing. The results were deemed “unremarkable,” and Plaintiff was returned to his home institution. Ultimately, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an abdominal infection due to a small bowel obstruction and alleged permanent injury.Plaintiff brought a claim of deliberate indifference against various prison officials ("Defendants"). The district court dismisses Plaintiff's claim under 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's “generalized, conclusory, and collective allegations” fail to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part of each Defendant.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's complaint made collective allegations against all “Defendants,” without identifying how each individual Defendant personally interacted with Langford or was responsible for the denial of his Eighth Amendment rights. View "Chad Langford v. Hector Joyner" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for various sexual exploitation offenses related to photographs he took of his daughter after law enforcement executed a search warrant at his home, leading to the discovery of certain photographs. Defendant was ultimately convicted and appealed.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant affidavit lacked probable cause because the conduct described occurred five to eight years earlier and that the good faith exception did not apply. Defendant also challenged the admission of video evidence of the complaining witness. Finally, he challenged the application of a sentencing enhancement under Sec. 4B1.5(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines based on "a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct."The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Regarding Defendant's motion to suppress, the court held that the district court appropriately concluded that probable cause existed, given the nature of the allegations and the type of evidence that was the object of the search. Regarding the challenged evidence, the court explained that the videos were "inextricably intertwined" with evidence of the charged offense. Finally, the court rejected Defendant's claim of error regarding the sentencing enhancement, finding that the district court did not commit clear error in finding Defendant's conduct showed a "pattern of activity" of prohibited sexual conduct. View "US v. William Ebert" on Justia Law

While on supervised release for a child pornography conviction, Defendant submitted to polygraph testing. During his polygraph exam, Defendant admitted to possessing adult pornography. In addition, his answers to other questions indicated possible deception. After the exam, Defendant’s probation officer asked him if he possessed child pornography. Linville admitted he did. Then, after he and the probation officer traveled to Defendant’s home, he turned the adult and child pornography over to probation. In addition to petitioning for the revocation of his supervised release, the government charged Defendant with possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress his statement to his probation officer, admitting that he possessed child pornography and that the child pornography was at his home.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the special condition did not indicate invoking the Fifth Amendment would lead to the revocation of Defendant’s supervised release. Nor did Defendant demonstrate a reasonable belief that he would be punished for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. The court explained that the government did not expressly or implicitly assert that it would revoke Defendant’s supervised release if he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. And even if Defendant believed invoking the Fifth Amendment would have risked revocation, his belief was not reasonable. View "US v. Eugene Linville" on Justia Law