Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1999, a Virginia state court jury convicted Askari Lumumba of second-degree murder and other related charges, sentencing him to fifty-eight years in prison. While serving his sentence, Lumumba engaged in communications that led to disciplinary action. He spoke on the phone about organizing inmates and sent emails discussing potential group actions within the prison. As a result, he was charged with attempting to garner support for a group demonstration, violating Disciplinary Offense Code 128, which prohibits participating in or encouraging work stoppages or group demonstrations.Lumumba's disciplinary hearing concluded with a finding of guilt, resulting in 30 days of disciplinary segregation and a loss of 180 days of good-conduct sentence credits. His appeals to the Warden and Regional Director were denied. He then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Subsequently, Lumumba filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Offense Code 128 was void for vagueness and violated the First Amendment. The district court dismissed his petition, finding the regulation clear and reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Offense Code 128 is not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as it reasonably relates to maintaining order and security in prisons. The court also found that the regulation is not void for vagueness, as it provides sufficient notice of prohibited conduct and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Lumumba's petition. View "Lumumba v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of North Carolina’s sex offender registration statute, arguing that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution by retroactively imposing new punishments for crimes committed in the past. The statute requires offenders to report personal information to law enforcement and restricts where they can live, work, and visit. The plaintiffs, including two nonprofit organizations and two individuals, sought to bar the retroactive application of certain amendments to the statute.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina held a bench trial and found that the statute was nonpunitive and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court concluded that the legislature intended to create a civil, nonpunitive scheme and that the plaintiffs failed to show by the clearest proof that the statute’s effects were punitive.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed that the legislature intended to enact a civil, nonpunitive scheme aimed at protecting public safety. The court also found that the statute was rationally connected to this nonpunitive purpose and was not excessive in relation to its goal. Although the statute imposed significant burdens on registrants, the court concluded that these burdens did not amount to punishment. The court held that the plaintiffs did not provide the clearest proof that the statute’s effects were so punitive as to override the legislature’s intent.Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the constitutionality of North Carolina’s sex offender registration statute under the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "National Assoc. For Rational Sexual Offense Laws v. Stein" on Justia Law

Randy Price was charged with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number and possession of a firearm by a felon. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Price moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes were facially unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion regarding the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge, finding that the analysis required under Bruen rendered the statute an impermissible restriction on the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Price's motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge. The court concluded that the conduct prohibited by the statute was protected by the Second Amendment and that there was no historical tradition of firearm regulation consistent with the statute. The Government appealed the dismissal of the obliterated serial number charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the conduct regulated by the statute does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment because a firearm with a removed, obliterated, or altered serial number is not a weapon in common use for lawful purposes. The court concluded that there is no compelling reason for a law-abiding citizen to possess such a firearm, and such weapons are primarily used for illicit purposes. Therefore, the statute's regulation of these firearms does not violate the Second Amendment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Maryland's Firearms Safety Act of 2013, which prohibits the sale and possession of certain military-style assault weapons, including the AR-15, AK-47, and Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifle. The plaintiffs, consisting of individual Maryland residents, gun rights organizations, and a firearms dealer, argued that the Act violates the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, citing the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in Kolbe v. Hogan, which upheld the same Maryland statute. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs' acknowledgment that their argument was foreclosed by Kolbe. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that a panel could not reconsider an en banc holding. The plaintiffs then petitioned the Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, upon reconsideration, upheld the district court's judgment. The court held that the assault weapons regulated by Maryland's statute fall outside the protection of the Second Amendment because they are military-style weapons designed for combat, not self-defense. The court also found that the Maryland law aligns with the nation's tradition of regulating excessively dangerous weapons. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge to the statute. View "Bianchi v. Brown" on Justia Law

Ahmad Hashimi was indicted on four counts in the Eastern District of Virginia, including drug-related charges and charges involving violence against his ex-girlfriend. Hashimi and his court-appointed lawyer, Bruce Johnson, had a contentious relationship, with Hashimi repeatedly complaining about poor communication and the lack of a plea deal. Despite these issues, the district court did not replace Johnson. During the trial, Johnson attempted to negotiate a plea deal for the violence charges, but the court rejected it, and the case proceeded to the jury. In his closing argument, Johnson conceded Hashimi's guilt on the violence charges without Hashimi's explicit consent, focusing his defense on the drug charges. The jury found Hashimi guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 300 months in prison.Hashimi appealed his conviction, arguing that Johnson's concession of guilt without his consent violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit initially affirmed the conviction but reconsidered after the Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, which established a defendant's right to maintain innocence. On remand, the Fourth Circuit again affirmed but allowed Hashimi to raise his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Hashimi filed the motion, presenting evidence that he did not consent to the concession and highlighting his poor communication with Johnson.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Hashimi's § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that Hashimi did not explicitly object to the concession. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in denying the motion without a hearing. The appellate court held that the record did not conclusively show that Hashimi was informed of and consented to the concession, as required by McCoy. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further factual development. View "US v. Hashimi" on Justia Law

A retired Navy chaplain, Allen Lancaster, sued several Navy officials in their official capacities, alleging discrimination in the Navy’s promotion practices. Lancaster claimed he was not promoted due to retaliation based on personal hostility and denominational prejudice. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including orders to remedy the harm to his career and to hold new promotion boards. Lancaster also challenged the six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States and the constitutionality of a statutory privilege for selection board proceedings.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Lancaster’s amended complaint with prejudice on res judicata grounds, referring to several prior decisions in the longstanding dispute over the Navy’s promotion procedures for chaplains. After Lancaster’s death, his widow, Darlene Lancaster, sought to reopen the case, substitute herself as the plaintiff, and amend the dismissed complaint. The district court denied these requests, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Lancaster’s death mooted his claims for prospective relief, as he could no longer benefit from the requested declarations and orders. The court also found that any potential claims for retrospective relief were barred by sovereign immunity, as the Lancasters failed to demonstrate an unequivocal waiver of this immunity. Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the case on res judicata grounds or to rule on the widow’s post-dismissal motion. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Lancaster v. Secretary of the Navy" on Justia Law

On June 7, 2019, around 4:20 a.m., two police officers detained Anthry Milla, who was sitting in his car in his driveway. The officers were investigating a nearby stabbing but had no description of a suspect. Milla was cooperative but closed his car door when the officers approached. The officers, suspecting involvement in the stabbing, detained Milla at gunpoint, searched his car, and found no evidence. Milla's parents confirmed his identity, and he was released after about eight minutes.Milla filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the officers, finding their actions justified under the totality of the circumstances. The court also held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as they did not violate Milla's constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and vacated the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the officers lacked reasonable, particularized suspicion to detain Milla. The court emphasized that proximity to a crime scene and Milla's actions, such as closing his car door, did not constitute reasonable suspicion. The court also vacated the district court's award of qualified immunity, as the officers' actions were not justified under established Fourth Amendment standards. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Milla v. Brown" on Justia Law

An elderly couple in Greenville, North Carolina, reported a breaking-and-entering at their residence around 4:00 a.m., hearing glass break and a male voice yelling. Officer David Johnson, who was nearby, responded to the call. Upon arrival, Johnson heard loud yelling and saw Sean Rambert running towards him while yelling. Johnson commanded Rambert to get on the ground eight times, but Rambert did not comply and continued to charge at Johnson. Johnson fired multiple shots at Rambert, who continued to advance even after being shot. Rambert eventually fell and later died from his injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of Johnson’s conduct and concluded that a jury could determine that Johnson violated Rambert’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. The court also denied summary judgment on the remaining federal and state law claims against Johnson and the City of Greenville.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. The court found that Johnson’s use of deadly force was not objectively unreasonable given the circumstances, including Rambert’s aggressive behavior and failure to comply with commands. The court also determined that the law did not clearly establish that Johnson’s conduct was unconstitutional at the time of the incident. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against Johnson. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the related state and federal claims and claims against the City of Greenville, remanding those issues for further proceedings. View "Rambert v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

The case involves Zackary Sanders, who was convicted for violating federal child pornography laws. Sanders had engaged in communications with underage boys, some as young as 13 years old, through various social media and communication applications. He had the minors send him explicit videos and pictures of themselves, some of which he later used as blackmail. Sanders stored these videos and photos, as well as other depictions of child pornography downloaded from the Internet, on the same electronic devices that he used to communicate with the minors. Sanders was indicted in 12 counts for the production, receipt, and possession of child pornography.The district court ordered the forfeiture of nine electronic devices on which Sanders stored child pornography and with which he committed the crimes. Sanders objected to the forfeiture, contending that the forfeiture statute did not reach so broadly as to require the forfeiture of non-contraband items that were also stored on the electronic devices. He requested that the district court order the government to allow his forensic expert to segregate and make digital copies of non-contraband items. The district court refused his request.On appeal, Sanders challenged the district court’s reading of the forfeiture statute. He also claimed, for the first time on appeal, that the forfeiture order’s inclusion of his non-contraband items was “plainly excessive under the Eighth Amendment.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the forfeiture statute required the forfeiture of electronic devices that contain visual depictions of child pornography. The court also concluded that the forfeiture of the nine electronic devices, with the data contained on them at the time of forfeiture, was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offenses for which Sanders was convicted. View "U.S. v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Willie Slocum, Jr. appealed the denial of his motion to correct, vacate, or set aside his convictions and sentences based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Slocum was indicted on two counts of drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, but argued that the two charged conspiracies were actually one. He claimed that he was punished twice for the same conspiracy in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge before the trial court. The district court denied his motion without ordering a response from the government or holding an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in its decision. The appellate court determined that Slocum was indeed punished twice for a single conspiracy in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the court noted that it was unclear whether trial counsel had a strategic reason for failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge. The court concluded that Slocum was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) where the performance of his trial counsel could be assessed. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Slocum’s § 2255 motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Slocum’s ineffective assistance claim. View "United States v. Slocum" on Justia Law