Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a transgender woman with gender dysphoria, spent six months incarcerated in the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center. Though prison deputies initially assigned her to women’s housing, they quickly moved her to men’s housing when they learned that she was transgender. There, she experienced delays in medical treatment for her gender dysphoria, harassment by other inmates, and persistent and intentional misgendering and harassment by prison deputies. Following her release from the detention center, Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 action against the Sheriff of Fairfax County, a prison deputy, and a prison nurse alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Constitution, and state common law. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the complaint failed to state grounds for relief with respect to some claims and that the statute of limitations barred others.The Fourth Circuit reversed the remanded the district court’s ruling. The court held that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that gender dysphoria does not fall within the ADA’s exclusion for “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.” In addition, the court held that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint relates back to her Original Complaint and that she has stated claims of gross negligence against the Sheriff and Deputy. View "Kesha Williams v. Stacey Kincaid" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During his state post-conviction relief (PCR) and federal habeas proceedings, Petitioner argued that the State of South Carolina’s failure to produce three pieces of evidence violated his due process rights because he could have used that evidence to impeach prosecution witnesses. Considering the entire record and the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, every court to address this argument has deemed the undisclosed evidence not material.The Fourth Circuit agreed and denied Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus. The court explained that having granted every permissible assumption in Petitioner’s favor and having carefully considered all the undisclosed evidence in light of the entire record at trial, the court concluded that Petitioner has not carried his burden to prove a reasonable probability that, had he received the undisclosed evidence, the jury would not have convicted him of murder or recommended a sentence of death. View "Marion Bowman, Jr. v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. The court held that the BIA failed to address whether Petitioner’s case should be remanded to a new immigration judge (“IJ”) under Matter of Y-S-L-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 688 (BIA 2015).The court explained that while Petitioner’s s brief to the BIA makes clear that his primary focus was to persuade the BIA to reverse the IJ’s decision, the court noted that it also shows he presented an alternative argument seeking remand before a new IJ under Matter of Y-S-L-C-. Accordingly the court found that Petitioner sufficiently exhausted his claim that this case should be remanded to a new IJ under Matter of Y-S-L-C-.The court further found that the government’s analysis glosses over one key point: the BIA in Matter of Y-S-L-C- never definitively concluded that—or fully analyzed whether— the IJ’s actions constituted a due process violation. Therefore, the BIA’s decision not to state that the IJ’s conduct prejudiced the fifteen-year-old applicant supports Petitioner’s interpretation of the Matter of Y-S-L-C- holding as independent of a due process violation. View "Rodolfo Tinoco Acevedo v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff s an inmate at United States Penitentiary (“USP”) Hazelton who filed a pro se civil action in United States district court alleging violations under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for denied and delayed medical care of his chronic illnesses. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Following the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the district court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion on the grounds that he did not meet the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception.Plaintiff appealed and the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court explained that a plain reading of the statute requires that litigants allege sufficient specific facts to demonstrate a nexus between the claims presented and the imminent danger alleged. Here, both parties agree that it is a “commonsense requirement that a prisoner’s allegation of imminent danger must relate to their underlying claims.” Moreover, the Government concedes that “a fairly traceable relationship exists between Plaintiff’s alleged imminent danger and the claims set forth in his FTCA complaint, as they both arise from his allegations of delay and denial of medical treatment.” Plaintiff has passed this threshold because he alleged that the prison’s continued denial and delay in providing medical treatment are directly causing his worsening physical and medical conditions which present an imminent danger of serious physical injury.Finally, since the district court did not have access to Defendant’s medical records and, thus, did not have a complete record to determine whether Defendant satisfied the “imminent danger” exception based on the court's clarified standard, the court remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Marc Hall v. US" on Justia Law

The United States Government seized $69,940.50 in cash from Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff and his girlfriend challenged the seizure, claiming that the cash was not subject to forfeiture. To forfeit the seized cash, the Government bore the burden of establishing a connection between the cash and the illegal activity—in this case, illegal drug trafficking. The district court, in granting summary judgment, found that the facts painted a picture that definitively established that the cash was drug money.   The Fourth Circuit reversed finding that the record is unclear regarding whether a reasonable jury might well decide that the painting of these facts shows the cash came from drug trafficking. The court explained that summary judgment in a forfeiture proceeding is like summary judgment in any other civil case. Applying those standards correctly ensures that the Government must prove its case before depriving citizens of their private property based on an allegation of wrongdoing. Here, the Government has the burden of proof. The Government lacks any direct evidence of a drug transaction or involvement in the drug trade beyond Plaintiff’s possession of a single marijuana blunt and medical marijuana cards. The Government would have the court rely on its own inferences from its circumstantial evidence, which the court may not do. View "US v. Dereck McClellan" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), but reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his vehicle after officers visually observed a glass stem pipe in the console of his car. Appellant now makes that appeal, arguing the stem pipe was insufficient to trigger the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches.   In finding neither clear factual error nor an error of law in the district court’s reasoning the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that for the plain view exception to apply, the government must show that: “(1) the officer [was] lawfully in a place from which the object [could] be plainly viewed; (2) the officer ha[d] a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object’s incriminating character [wa]s immediately apparent.” United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1997).   Here, even though a glass stem pipe may be put to innocent uses—uses that continue to expand and should be taken into consideration—here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and in its totality, the plain view exception applies, and the search of the vehicle was lawful. View "US v. Ricky Runner" on Justia Law

Justice 360 offers post-conviction representation to South Carolina’s death-row inmates. In the current matter, Justice 360 acts solely on its own behalf. The organization’s Amended Complaint alleges that South Carolina Code Section 24-3-580 (“Identity Statute”)— which protects against the disclosure of certain information related to the State’s execution protocols—violates its First Amendment right to counsel clients and to participate in public debate about the death penalty.The district court rejected those assertions, and Justice 360 timely appealed, challenging only the dismissal of its claims against the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC” or the “Department”) and its director. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Justice 360 lacks standing. The court explained that granting Justice 360 the relief it seeks in its Amended Complaint would amount to no more than an impermissible advisory opinion, as the organization’s alleged injuries would remain unredressed. View "Justice 360 v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency alleging religious discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that because the alleged discrimination and retaliation arose from Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy additional security requirements and would require the court to review the merits of the security-authorization decision, the court is bound by the decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), to affirm the district court’s dismissal of this matter for lack of jurisdiction.   The court explained that it agrees that courts must exercise caution in expanding the reach of Egan. Nevertheless, the court declined to adopt the hardline position, urged by Plaintiff, that Egan’s rationale may only ever apply to determinations explicitly labeled “security clearances.” Rather, as in Foote and Sanchez, this case requires a more detailed analysis of whether the judgment at issue is of the type that Egan intended to shield from judicial review. Furhter, the court held that the CIA’s decision to stop Plaintiff’s assignee-security authorization processing is the kind of discretionary predictive judgment shielded from judicial review by Egan. View "Nathan Mowery v. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of two capital murders and sentenced to death in a South Carolina state court. During the penalty phase, the government and defense experts agreed that Petitioner suffered persistent childhood abuse; they also agreed that he had at least one mental illness—rumination disorder—and disagreed as to another—schizophrenia. Yet, the sentencing judge concluded that Petitioner was not conclusively diagnosed as mentally ill and found no “conclusive proof of mitigating circumstances.” Petitioner filed the instant federal petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, raising several claims. The district court dismissed his petition, and Petitioner appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions that the district court issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the State of South Carolina grants Petitioner a new sentencing hearing within a reasonable time. The court concluded that the state court’s conclusion that the sentencing judge “considered Petitioner’s mitigation evidence as presented” was an unreasonable determination of the facts and its conclusion that the sentencing judge gave “proper” consideration was contrary to clearly established federal law. The court wrote it has grave doubt that the state court’s errors did not have a substantial and injurious effect. View "Quincy Allen v. Michael Stephan" on Justia Law

On appeal, prisoner Plaintiff raised constitutional and state-law claims against numerous prison officials arising from a physical altercation at Red Onion State Prison in Virginia. As part of his evidentiary showing, Plaintiff repeatedly sought the production of videos recording the encounter. When he learned that some of the videos were not preserved, Plaintiff moved for spoliation sanctions.   After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge denied Plaintiff’s spoliation motion and recommended entering judgment against him on all claims and counterclaims. The district court substantially adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations without explicitly addressing Plaintiff’s objections to the order denying spoliation sanctions.The Fourth Circuit vacated the order of the district court entering judgment to Defendants and remand for a hearing on Plaintiff’s objections to the denial of spoliation sanctions, and for any other proceedings, the district court deems appropriate. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by implicitly overruling Plaintiff’s spoliation objections when several critical issues were left unresolved by the magistrate judge.   Specifically, the court explained that the magistrate judge erred in requiring Plaintiff to produce evidence that “the defendants purposefully disposed of any video recordings in an effort to prevent their use at trial.” Under Rule 37(e), when “electronically stored information that should have been preserved . . . is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it,” then “upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information,” the court “may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.” Accordingly, only a finding of prejudice is required for such not-greater-than-necessary sanctions. View "Gary Wall v. E. Rasnick" on Justia Law