Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against various correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the four years that he spent in solitary confinement in prison. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish a protected liberty interest.The Fourth Circuit vacated and held that plaintiff has presented evidence demonstrating that his confinement conditions were severe in comparison to those that exist in general population and that his segregation status may have had collateral consequences relating to the length of his sentence. Furthermore, although the duration of plaintiff's segregated confinement is not as long as the substantial periods of segregated confinement that this court has found sufficient to support a protected liberty interest in the past, prisoners need not languish in solitary confinement for decades on end in order to possess a cognizable liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the four-plus years that plaintiff spent in administrative segregation is significant enough to tip the scales in his favor, particularly in light of the other evidence of indefiniteness that he relies upon in this case. Therefore, the court held that there is at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff's conditions of confinement imposed a significant and atypical hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Collins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two unaffiliated candidates and one voter seeking to cast votes for write-in candidates, filed suit alleging that North Carolina's qualification requirements for candidates not affiliated with a political party and for candidates whose names are not printed on the ballot violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the requirement that an unaffiliated candidate be a "qualified voter" and that a write-in candidate submit a certain number of signatures before votes cast for that write-in candidate will be counted. Furthermore, although two plaintiffs have standing to challenge North Carolina's signature requirements and filing deadline for unaffiliated candidates, the court agreed with the district court that these election laws impose only a modest burden that is justified by the state's interest in regulating elections. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, relying in part on different reasons than those expressed by the district court. View "Buscemi v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment entered in favor of Rand in an action brought by plaintiff, a former employee, alleging that Rand unlawfully fired her for taking leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The court affirmed and agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Rand's justification for the termination was false and merely a pretext for retaliation. In this case, Rand presented a lawful explanation for firing plaintiff: performance problems. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a former employee's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. View "Fry v. Rand Construction Corp." on Justia Law

MSI filed suit challenging Maryland Senate Bill 707 banning "rapid fire trigger activators" - devices that, when attached to a firearm, increase its rate of fire or trigger activation -- as violating the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution as well as Maryland's takings provisions. MSI also alleged that the statute is void for vagueness.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint based on MSI's lack of standing. The court held that MSI lacked organizational standing; the district court properly dismissed the pre-enforcement vagueness challenge for lack of standing; appellants failed to state a claim that the statute violates the Takings Clause; and the district court properly determined that SB-707 does not violate Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court explained that, although SB-707 may make the personal property economically worthless, owners are aware of that possibility in areas where the State has a traditionally high degree of control. In this case, SB-707 does not alter the rights appellants possessed when they purchased their rapid fire trigger activators, nor does it impose new liability back to the date of purchase. Rather, appellants had fair notice of the change in law, because SB-707 was passed six months before it first went into effect. View "Maryland Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Charleston's Tour Guide Licensing Ordinance, which requires that a prospective tour guide must obtain a license by passing a 200 question written examination on the city's history, architecture, and historic preservation efforts. The district court declared the Ordinance unconstitutional.The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that, although the city has a significant interest in protecting its tourism industry, the Ordinance failed intermediate scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the city's interest. Because the city failed to provide evidence that it attempted to use less intrusive tools readily available to it or that it ever seriously considered different methods that other jurisdictions have found effective, the court held that the city has not established that the Ordinance is narrowly tailored. Therefore, the district court correctly declared the Ordinance unconstitutional. View "Billups v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

After the Boards of Directors filed lawsuits raising claims related to a residential community, a resident filed a derivative action alleging similar claims against nearly identical defendants. The district court dismissed the derivative action and the Boards settled the lawsuits in the meantime.The Fourth Circuit held that the settlements mooted the resident's claims insofar as they were related to the ones asserted by the Boards. Therefore, the court dismissed his appeal as to those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent the resident asserted claims falling outside the scope of those asserted by the Boards' complaints, the court concluded that those claims were either also rendered moot by the settlement agreements or were otherwise properly dismissed by the district court. View "Star v. TI Oldfield Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The Estate of Wayne Jones filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against police officers and the City after officers fired 22 bullets at Jones, a black man experiencing homelessness, and killed him. In this case, Jones, although armed with a knife, had been secured by the officers immediately before he was released and shot. Jones was also incapacitated at the time he was shot. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants.Although the Fourth Circuit agreed that the City is insulated from Monell liability premised on one incident of excessive force, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the officers on qualified immunity grounds. The court held that it was clearly established at the time that officers may not shoot a secured or incapacitated person and a reasonable jury could find that Jones was both secured and incapacitated in the final moments before his death.The court recognized that police officers are often asked to make split-second decisions, but expected them to do so with respect for the dignity and worth of black lives. The court noted yet another death of a black man at the hands of the police, the recent killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The court stated that this has to stop. To award qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage in this case would signal absolute immunity for fear-based use of deadly force, which the court cannot accept. View "Estate of Wayne A. Jones v. City of Martinsburg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that prison officials opened, copied, misdirected, and otherwise interfered with his mail to and from his lawyer. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants.The Fourth Circuit considered the Turner factors and concluded that they weighed in favor of plaintiff, holding that defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech by opening his mail outside of his presence. However, the court held that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff's unreasonable search and seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment where, defendants have met their burden to show that their actions did not violate clearly established law. Finally, the court held that plaintiff forfeited his claims regarding his First Amendment right of access to the courts and his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to raise them in his informal brief. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Haze v. Harrison" on Justia Law

CSX argued that SCVA impermissibly discriminates against railroads in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that South Carolina had provided sufficient justification for the discriminatory tax. The court held that CSX has made a prima facie showing of discriminatory tax treatment based on the appropriate comparison class of other commercial and industrial real property taxpayers in South Carolina. Furthermore, the state's three justifications -- the equalization factor applied to railroad assessments, the combined effect of other tax exemptions applied to rail carriers, and assessable transfers of interest which trigger new appraisals -- were insufficient to justify the discriminatory tax scheme. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit pro se against Brivo, alleging discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII. In this case, within an hour of starting orientation at Brivo, Brivo's security architect approached plaintiff and confronted him about a newspaper article that he had found after running a Google search on plaintiff. The article reported plaintiff's tangential involvement in a shooting for which he faced no charges. Nonetheless, the security architect berated plaintiff about the incident, declared plaintiff unfit for employment at Brivo, and terminated him on the spot. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, because plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to plausibly support a claim of discrimination.The Fourth Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction despite the district court's dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. Under Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1993), the order is appealable because the district court held that the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's termination did not expose Brivo to legal liability, and plaintiff has no additional facts that could be added to his complaint; under Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 2005), the order is appealable because the district court dismissed the complaint and directed that the case be closed; and the order is likewise appealable under Chao and In re GNC Corp., 789 F.3d at 511, because plaintiff has elected to stand on his complaint as filed.On the merits, the court held that the district court did not err by dismissing the Title VII claims at this point in the proceedings. The court held that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to plausibly claim his termination or the Google search that lead to it was racially motivated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bing v. Brivo Systems, LLC" on Justia Law