Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order. View "RABADI V. USDEA" on Justia Law

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Charles Porter, a Yosemite National Park employee, was charged with various sexual assault offenses after attempting to anally rape T.D., another male park employee, in April 2020. T.D. testified that Porter, heavily intoxicated, forced himself on T.D. in his cabin. Neighbors corroborated T.D.'s account. Porter claimed T.D. was the aggressor. The district court allowed testimony from Porter’s ex-girlfriend, A.H., under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which permits evidence of prior sexual assaults. A.H. testified that Porter had previously engaged in nonconsensual sex with her.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California admitted A.H.'s testimony after evaluating its probative value against potential prejudice under Rule 403. The jury found Porter guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 148 months in prison. Porter appealed, arguing that Rule 413 violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by allowing propensity evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rule 413 is constitutional, referencing its decision in United States v. Lemay, which upheld the analogous Rule 414 for child molestation cases. The court emphasized that Rule 413, like Rule 414, is subject to Rule 403, which allows district courts to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence. The court found that the district court had properly applied Rule 403 and provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding A.H.'s testimony.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Porter’s conviction, concluding that the admission of A.H.'s testimony under Rule 413 did not violate due process. View "U.S. v. Porter" on Justia Law

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An Arizona state inmate, Michael Ray Fuqua, who identifies as a Christian-Israelite, requested a religious dietary accommodation to observe Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread. The prison chaplain, Jeffrey Lind, denied this request, arguing that Fuqua did not substantiate his request with appropriate documentation and that his beliefs were theologically inconsistent. Fuqua claimed that this denial forced him to either starve or spend significant money on commissary food, causing him physical and financial hardship.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of Lind on Fuqua’s First Amendment Free Exercise, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claims. The court found that Fuqua failed to show a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that Lind had legitimate reasons for denying the request. The court also held that RLUIPA only authorizes equitable relief, which was moot in Fuqua’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on Fuqua’s First Amendment and Equal Protection claims, finding that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Lind’s denial was based on his own theological assessment rather than a neutral procedural rule. This could constitute a substantial burden on Fuqua’s religious exercise and intentional discrimination. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim, citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wood v. Yordy, which precludes suits seeking monetary damages under RLUIPA against state officers, and Fuqua’s equitable claims were moot. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "FUQUA V. RAAK" on Justia Law

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The United States government initiated a civil forfeiture action to recover funds from Younes Nasri, a Canadian citizen residing in Dubai, alleging that the funds were ill-gotten gains from criminal activities. Nasri, who was indicted on racketeering and drug conspiracy charges, claimed innocent ownership of the assets held in foreign bank accounts. He argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the assets because neither he nor the assets had any ties to the United States.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted the government's motion to strike Nasri's claim under the fugitive disentitlement statute, finding that it had in rem jurisdiction over the assets. The court also determined that the fugitive disentitlement statute did not violate due process and that Nasri qualified as a fugitive under the statute. Nasri appealed the decision, challenging the court's jurisdiction and the application of the fugitive disentitlement statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that due process requires a court to have control or constructive control over the property in a forfeiture action to establish in rem jurisdiction. The court found that the district court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction over the foreign assets, without sufficient control or possession, violated due process principles. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for the lower court to assess whether it had control or constructive control over the assets to satisfy due process requirements when asserting in rem jurisdiction. View "USA V. NASRI" on Justia Law

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Dilesh Sharma pleaded guilty to attempted enticement of a minor for sexual purposes, distribution of child pornography, and receipt of child pornography. The district court calculated Sharma’s guideline sentence by starting with the base offense level for each crime and then applied enhancements, including a two-level enhancement for using a computer and a three-level enhancement for possessing at least 150 images. Sharma was sentenced to 288 months’ imprisonment for the enticement count and 240 months for each child pornography count, to run concurrently, along with a life term of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California rejected Sharma’s objections to the computer-usage and image-number enhancements, which he argued were arbitrary and violated the Due Process Clause. The court found that the enhancements were rationally related to legitimate interests and upheld their application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Sharma’s facial due-process challenges to the enhancements. The court held that the computer-usage enhancement was rational when enacted and remains rational today, as it punishes the faster transmission of child pornography via electronic means. Similarly, the image-number enhancement was found to be rationally related to the legitimate interest of punishing offenders with larger collections of child pornography. The court concluded that Sharma did not meet his burden to show that the enhancements were irrational due to changed circumstances. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that neither enhancement violates the Due Process Clause. View "U.S. v. Sharma" on Justia Law

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Orthodox Jewish families and schools challenged California's requirement that private schools be nonsectarian to provide special education under the IDEA. The families argued this requirement violated their Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements for their children with disabilities. The schools claimed the requirement barred them from certification solely due to their religious affiliation.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the case, ruling the schools and one family lacked standing and denying the families' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found the schools did not demonstrate they were "able and ready" to apply for certification and that the nonsectarian requirement did not affect the educational placement of one family's child. However, it held that another family had standing to challenge the requirement.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the schools' and one family's claims for lack of standing but reversed the dismissal of the other families' claims. The court held that the nonsectarian requirement burdened the families' free exercise rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements. It found the requirement was not neutral to religion and applied strict scrutiny, concluding the State failed to show the requirement was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The court vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further consideration of the injunction factors. View "LOFFMAN V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to Montana House Bill 702 (HB 702), which prohibits discrimination based on vaccination status. Plaintiffs, including health care providers and individuals with compromised immune systems, argued that HB 702 is preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSH Act) and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought to invalidate HB 702 in all health care settings, claiming it prevents employers from knowing employees' vaccination status, thus hindering ADA-required accommodations and OSH Act compliance.The United States District Court for the District of Montana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that HB 702 is preempted by the ADA and the OSH Act and violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of HB 702 in health care settings, reasoning that the law conflicts with federal requirements for reasonable accommodations and workplace safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and vacated the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that neither the ADA nor the OSH Act facially preempts HB 702 in health care settings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine conflict between HB 702 and the ADA or OSH Act in any specific case, much less in all health care settings. The court also held that HB 702 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification and differential treatment of facilities could rationally reflect Montana's interest in balancing personal privacy and public health.The Ninth Circuit reserved judgment on whether the ADA and the OSH Act could preempt HB 702 on a narrower, as-applied basis in future cases. The court deemed moot the portion of the district court's order related to interim CMS regulations, as those regulations have been rescinded. The court concluded that HB 702 is not facially invalid under the ADA, OSH Act, or Equal Protection Clause and vacated the district court's injunction in full. View "MONTANA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

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Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

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Cenious Brewster led officers on a high-speed chase, which was recorded on the officers’ dashcam. Brewster crashed into a building shortly after the chase began. He was arrested, and a firearm was found in his vehicle. Brewster pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to 46 months’ imprisonment. Brewster challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying the reckless endangerment during flight enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, misunderstood his request for a downward departure based on circumstances that allegedly justified his flight, and violated his due process rights by finding that data from the Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing INformation (JSIN) online tool was sufficiently reliable to consider at sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Brewster’s objections to the reckless endangerment enhancement, finding that his flight created a substantial risk of injury to at least one specific person. The court also rejected Brewster’s request for a downward departure or variance, characterizing it as a request for a variance only, which Brewster’s counsel confirmed. Additionally, the court found the JSIN data reliable and used it to determine Brewster’s sentence, noting that the data was consistent with information from another Sentencing Commission tool, the Interactive Data Analyzer (IDA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Brewster’s flight put at least one motorist at substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The court also found that Brewster forfeited his argument regarding the downward departure and failed to show plain error. Finally, the appellate court held that the district court did not err in finding the JSIN data reliable, as it came from a reliable source and was corroborated by other unchallenged evidence. The court denied Brewster’s motion for supplemental briefing on a Second Amendment challenge, as he could have raised it in the district court but did not. The sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. Brewster" on Justia Law

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Kate Adams, the former Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova, was forced to resign over allegations that she sent racist text messages while working for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office. The messages, sent in 2013, included offensive images forwarded to two friends during a private conversation. Adams claimed she was merely expressing disapproval of the images. After her resignation, the messages were publicized, leading to further professional and personal repercussions for Adams.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims, ruling that her speech did not address a matter of public concern. The court found that the private nature of the text messages and their content did not relate to broader societal issues or public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Adams’s private text messages, which were part of a casual conversation and not intended for public dissemination, did not constitute speech on a matter of public concern under the Pickering v. Board of Education standard. The court emphasized that the content, form, and context of the messages indicated they were of personal interest rather than public interest. Consequently, Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims were dismissed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved claims. View "ADAMS V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO" on Justia Law