Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Food manufacturer B&G sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Embry and her attorney violated B&G’s constitutional rights by suing B&G to enforce California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Proposition 65. Proposition 65 requires businesses to notify customers if their products contain chemicals known to the state to cause cancer. Acrylamide, the chemical allegedly found in B&G’s Cookie Cakes, is on a state list of such chemicals based solely on laboratory studies in which pure acrylamide was given to rats or mice.The district court dismissed B&G’s complaint based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides that those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. B&G’s section 1983 suit burdened Embry's petition activities; Embry's prelitigation communications and suit to enforce Proposition 65 were protected by the Petition Clause. B&G failed to show that any of the Noerr-Pennington sham exceptions applied. Even if Embry and her attorney were state actors, the suit was barred. The court remanded to allow B&G to amend its complaint. B&G proposed additional allegations concerning a sham exception that examines the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s suit and the defendant’s subjective motivation. View "B&G Foods North America, Inc. v. Embry" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of California the following question: Does California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which defines “employer” to include “any person acting as an agent of an employer,” Cal. Gov’t Code 12926(d), permit a business entity acting as an agent of an employer to be held directly liable for employment discrimination? View "Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal as untimely of a complaint brought by plaintiff, a former university student, alleging civil rights claims arising from on-campus incidents where he was issued a disciplinary warning, which was later removed. Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), plaintiff argues that his claims did not accrue until the university withdrew its disciplinary warning against him. However, the panel held that neither Heck nor a Heck-like rule of delayed accrual applies here. The court explained that there was no conviction or confinement here, and plaintiff's claims were not properly analogized to the tort of malicious prosecution, either factually or legally. In this case, plaintiff had complete and present causes of action by August 24, 2017, at the latest. But plaintiff did not file his complaint until January 20, 2020, more than two years later. Therefore, under traditional accrual principles, his action is untimely. View "Bonelli v. Grand Canyon University" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief in a putative class action brought by plaintiffs, two teenage transgender individuals who were born female, alleging that a provision of Arizona law, Arizona Administrative Code R9-22-205(B)(4), that precludes coverage for gender reassignment surgeries violates federal law and is unconstitutional. The panel agreed with the district court that plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction and noted that the standard for issuing a mandatory injunction is high. Based on the preliminary record, the panel concluded that the given facts specific to remaining plaintiff Doe and the irreversible nature of the surgery, Doe had not shown that the district court's findings were illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that could be drawn from the facts in the record. In this case, defendants had proffered competing expert testimony challenging plaintiffs' assertion that top surgery was for them medically necessary, safe and effective; Doe sought preliminary injunctive relief when he was a minor, which raised concerns as to whether he sufficiently appreciated the consequences of irreversible surgery; and Doe had serious psychiatric issues distinct from, or related to, his gender dysphoria and his expert psychiatrist had not opined as to whether Doe himself was a suitable candidate for surgery and had not met or examined Doe.The panel noted two additional points because there was ongoing litigation in the district court as to the constitutional and statutory challenges. In regard to Doe's claim under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, the panel noted that this court had already held in Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2019), that the level of scrutiny applicable to discrimination based on transgender status was more than rational basis but less than strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the district court's conclusion that the exclusion was not discriminatory as a threshold matter was based on an erroneous reading that Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), was limited to Title VII discrimination claims involving employment. View "Doe v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Nevada law against individual law enforcement officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from their arrest for chalking anti-police messages on sidewalks. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Detective Tucker.The panel affirmed the district court's holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence that Detective Tucker violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The panel reversed the district court's holding that Detective Tucker is entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established at the time of plaintiffs' arrests that an arrest supported by probable cause but made in retaliation for protected speech violates the First Amendment. The panel stated that plaintiffs have shown differential treatment of similarly situated individuals, satisfying the Nieves exception. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the anti-police content of plaintiffs' chalkings was a substantial or motivating factor for Detective Tucker's declarations of arrest. Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Detective Tucker violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Furthermore, a reasonable officer in Detective Tucker's position had fair notice that the First Amendment prohibited arresting plaintiffs for the content of their speech, notwithstanding probable cause. View "Ballentine v. Tucker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition where the district concluded that the petition was timely but denied petitioner's claim on the merits. Relying on Trigueros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2011), petitioner argues that the California Court of Appeal's silence on timeliness triggers an exception to the general "look through" rule under which the California Court of Appeal's one-line denial of his petition would presumptively be considered a tacit affirmation of the superior court's finding of untimeliness.The panel declined to extend Trigueros to new contexts, concluding that there are at least two materially important distinctions between this case and Trigueros. First, Trigueros centers around a ruling from the California Supreme Court, while the case at hand centers around a ruling from the California Court of Appeal. Second, the California Supreme Court in Trigueros ordered "an informal response on the merits," Trigueros, while the California Court of Appeal here merely requested a general "opposition to the petition." Therefore, the panel declined to apply Trigueros in this context and concluded that the government's failure to present certain additional arguments does not prevent it from addressing these matters in this appeal. View "Flemming v. Matteson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order, dismissing on ripeness grounds, an action brought by Twitter against the Attorney General of Texas, in his official capacity, alleging First Amendment retaliation. Specifically, Twitter alleged that the service of a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) by the OAG to Twitter after the company banned President Donald Trump for life following the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, was government retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment. Twitter asked the district court to enjoin the AG from enforcing the CID and from continuing his investigation, and to declare the investigation unconstitutional.The panel held that the case was not prudentially ripe because the issues were not yet fit for judicial decision where the OAG has not yet made an allegation against Twitter; where facts were not yet developed; and where Twitter need not comply with the CID, could challenge its enforcement, and could challenge the CID in state court. The panel stated that, while Twitter could suffer hardship from withholding consideration, adjudicating this case now would require determining whether Twitter has violated Texas's unfair trade practices law before OAG has a chance to complete its investigation. Furthermore, any hardship to Twitter from the alleged chill of its First Amendment rights was insufficient to overcome the uncertainty of the legal issue presented in the case in its current posture. View "Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff, a federal prisoner, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff alleged that a correctional officer labeled him a snitch to other prisoners, offered them a bounty to assault plaintiff, and failed to protect him from the predictable assault by another prisoner.The panel construed the pro se complaint liberally and held that plaintiff's complaint alleged conduct beyond deliberate indifference. The panel applied Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), explaining that if the Supreme Court allowed a guard who is aware of and deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that a prisoner will suffer medical harm from an asthma attack to be sued under Bivens, it was but a modest extension to allow a suit against a guard who creates the substantial risk of harm and then allows it to occur. The panel stated that, although this case represents a modest extension of Bivens, no special factors caution against extending the remedy to encompass this well-established claim, brought against a single rogue officer under the same constitutional provision applied in a well-recognized Supreme Court Bivens case. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Hoffman v. Preston" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of police officers in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiffs, alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights to companionship and familial association when they shot and killed Sergio Ochoa.Reviewing the district court's decision de novo and viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the panel concluded that the district court selected the correct legal test to assess whether the conduct here shocks the conscience, and it correctly concluded that it does not. In this case, the officers did not have time to deliberate before firing and the district court correctly applied the purpose-to-harm test in order to determine if the officers' conduct shocked the conscience. The panel explained that Ochoa had engaged in a domestic dispute that allegedly involved a gun while possibly under the influence of drugs, he had entered a stranger's home stating that he was armed with knives, he failed to yield to a police car, and drove erratically. Furthermore, Ochoa ignored repeated commands from the officers, refused to drop two kitchen knives, and then took a large step. Therefore, under the purpose-to-harm test, defendants did not violate plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rather, the officers' actions reflected their attempts to satisfy legitimate law enforcement objectives: apprehension of an armed, dangerous suspect and protection of the safety of the officers, the home’s inhabitants, and the public. View "Ochoa v. City of Mesa" on Justia Law

In 1989, Oliver went to a Los Angeles church during evening service and shot three people, two of whom died. During a jury selection at Oliver’s trial on two counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances and attempted murder, the defense made four unsuccessful “Batson” motions, alleging that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of race. Oliver argued that the prosecutor’s stated reason for striking V.H.—that V.H. acquitted in a rape case in his only prior jury service—was pretextual, as evidenced by the disparate treatment of S.P., who was allegedly similar to V.H. except for her race.The district court granted habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part. In substituting its own factual findings for those of the state court, the district court neglected to frame the relevant question as whether a fair-minded jurist could reach a different conclusion. The decision of the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable and did not "rubber-stamp” the prosecutor’s proffered explanations or otherwise misapply the law. No U.S. Supreme Court decision establishes that detailed factual findings are required before an appellate court may give deference to a trial court’s Batson ruling. If the trial court’s inquiry was deficient, it was cured by the California Supreme Court’s searching analysis, which included a de novo comparative juror analysis. The court remanded to allow the district court to assess the strikes of three other prospective jurors. View "Oliver v. Davis" on Justia Law