Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Jones was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend’s mother. After the California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence and denied his state habeas petition, Jones filed a federal habeas petition, raising multiple challenges to both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted relief on Jones’s claim that the state trial court violated his right to present a complete defense; Jones should have been permitted to testify during the guilt phase about events from his childhood and his mental health history, and the trial court erred by conditioning such testimony on the presentation of a psychiatric expert who would explain the testimony’s relevance to Jones’s mental state during the murder.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The condition the trial court imposed on Jones’s testimony was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the valid purposes served by its ruling. The court remanded for the district court to consider Jones’s remaining claims. View "Jones v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1982, a court-martial convicted Hubbard of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. He previously filed unsuccessful federal habeas petitions and, in 2019, sought DNA testing under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 U.S.C. 3600(a), to prove his innocence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court was not the court that entered the judgment of conviction; Hubbard’s conviction was entered by a general court-martial, which has since dissolved, not in federal court. The court rejected Hubbard’s contentions that the district court had the power to grant his petition for DNA testing under the IPA or that the IPA should nonetheless be construed to allow him to petition for DNA testing in the district court because he would otherwise have no forum in which to seek his relief. The IPA, unlike the federal habeas statutes, does not provide a procedural mechanism for prisoners convicted by courts-martial to seek collateral relief in federal court. View "Hubbard v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in which petitioner challenged two sentencing enhancements—one under 18 U.S.C. 2251(e), another under 18 U.S.C. 3559(e)(1)—applied after his conviction on multiple counts of federal sex offenses.The panel held that petitioner's claim is foreclosed because the legal basis for his claim arose before he had exhausted his section 2255 motion, so he cannot show that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his challenge to the section 3559(e)(1) sentencing enhancement. The panel rejected petitioner's request for an extension of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), concluding that an extension of Martinez would make little sense. The panel explained that it would open the door for every unsuccessful pro se petitioner under section 2255 to argue that his lack of counsel in his original section 2255 petition meant that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his claim and is therefore entitled to bring an escape hatch petition under section 2241. The panel noted that other circuits have similarly held that prisoners may not utilize Martinez to bring a section 2241 petition. Because petitioner cannot show that he lacked an unobstructed procedural shot with respect to the section 3559(e)(1) mandatory life sentencing enhancement, the panel did not need to reach the actual innocence prong for that enhancement or either prong for the section 2251(e) enhancement. View "Pavulak v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit previously affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for failure to state a claim under either the Fifth or Fourth Amendments. After plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the access regulation, California Code of Regulations, Title 8, 20900(e), appropriates a right to invade the growers' property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking, and that plaintiffs' complaint thus states a claim for an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.In light of the Supreme Court's decision, the panel reversed the district court's judgment relating to the Fifth Amendment claim. For the reasons stated in Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F.3d at 534–36, the judgment of the district court dismissing the Fourth Amendment claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is affirmed. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict awarding "loss of life" damages to the family of Fermin Valenzuela, Jr., who died after an encounter with the police. The jury awarded the Valenzuela family a total of $13.2 million in damages on multiple theories of liability, including $3.6 million for Valenzuela's loss of life, which was independent of any pain and suffering that he endured during and after the struggle with the officers. Defendants argue that because California state law did not recognize loss of life damages, neither should 42 U.S.C. 1983.The panel reviewed the relevant in- and out-of circuit case law, including Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014), and concluded that section 1983 permitted the recovery of loss of life damages and that California state law to the contrary was inconsistent with the federal statute's goals. As the court recognized, to hold otherwise "would undermine the vital constitutional right against excessive force—perversely, it would incentivize officers to aim to kill a suspect, rather than just harm him." The panel saw no meaningful way to distinguish Chaudhry from this case. The panel resolved the remaining issues on appeal, including qualified immunity, in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

The previous opinion is withdrawn and replaced by the following opinion concurrently filed with this order. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's bench trial judgment upholding Alaska's political party-to-party candidate limit; (2) reversed the district court's judgment as to the individual-to-candidate limit, the individual-to-group limit, and the nonresident aggregate limit; and (3) remanded.In this case, at issue are Alaska's limits on contributions made by individuals to candidates, individuals to election-related groups, and political parties to candidates, and also its limit on the total funds a candidate may receive from out-of-state residents. On remand, the court's resolution of the challenges to the political party-to-candidate and nonresident limits remains the same, affirming the district court's decision upholding the former but reversing the decision upholding the latter. However, the panel reversed the district court's decision upholding the individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group limits, applying the five-factor Randall test and concluding that Alaska failed to meet its burden of showing that its individual contribution limit was closely drawn to meet its objectives. The panel explained that, on top of its danger signs, the limit significantly restricts the amount of funds available to challengers to run competitively against incumbents, and the already-low limit is not indexed for inflation. Furthermore, Alaska has not established a special justification for such a low limit. The panel also concluded that, similarly, Alaska has not met its burden of showing that the $500 individual-to-group limit is closely drawn to restrict contributors from circumventing the individual-to-candidate limit. View "Thompson v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim of an action filed by the Council, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that California's Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause in banning the sale of whole pork meat (no matter where produced) from animals confined in a manner inconsistent with California standards.The panel concluded that, under its precedent, a state law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only in narrow circumstances. The panel explained that the complaint does not plausibly allege that such narrow circumstances apply to Proposition 12, and thus the district court did not err in dismissing the Council's complaint for failure to state a claim. In this case, even though the Council has plausibly alleged that Proposition 12 will have dramatic upstream effects and require pervasive changes to the pork production industry nationwide, the panel concluded hat it has not stated a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause under existing precedent. The panel stated that alleged cost increases to market participants and customers did not qualify as a substantial burden to interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. View "National Pork Producers Council v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 imposes a $1 assessment, or “checkoff,” on each head of cattle sold in the U.S. to fund beef consumption promotional activities. The Secretary of Agriculture oversees the program. The Montana Beef Council and other qualified state beef councils (QSBCs), receive a portion of the checkoff assessments to fund promotional activities and may direct a portion of these funds to third parties for the production of advertisements and other promotional materials. R-CALF's members include cattle producers who object to their QSBCs’ advertising campaigns. In 2016, the Secretary entered into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with QSBCs which granted the Secretary preapproval authority over promotions and allowed the Secretary to decertify noncompliant QSBCs, terminating their access to checkoff funds. The Secretary must preapprove all contracts to third parties and any resulting plans. QSBCs can make noncontractual transfers of checkoff funds to third parties for promotional materials which do not need to be pre-approved. Plaintiffs contend that the distribution of funds under these arrangements is an unconstitutional compelled subsidy of private speech.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants after holding that R-CALF had associational standing and direct standing to sue QSBCs. The speech generated by the third parties for promotional materials was government speech, exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. Given the breadth of the Secretary's authority, third-party speech not subject to pre-approval was effectively controlled by the government. View "Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

After Mathew Gordon died within 30 hours of being admitted as a pretrial detainee, his mother filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging claims of inadequate medical care under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a previous appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that inadequate medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees require a showing of objective, not subjective, deliberate indifference (Gordon I). The district court, on remand, granted summary judgment for the individual defendants based on qualified immunity and for the entity defendant on the ground that plaintiff could not establish a custom or practice sufficient under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).The Ninth Circuit affirmed as to plaintiff's Monell claim and individual defendants Deputy Robert Denney, Nurse Brianna Garcia, and Sergeant Brian Tunque. However, the panel reversed and remanded as to individual defendant Nurse Debbie Finley. In regard to Finley and Denney, the panel concluded that the district court committed legal error by using a subjective standard in analyzing the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity test. Furthermore, in regard to Finely, the panel concluded that summary judgment was not proper because the available law at the time of the incident clearly established Gordon's constitutional rights to proper medical screening to ensure the medically appropriate protocol was initiated. However, in regards to Denney, the panel concluded that although it now holds that Gordon had a constitutional right to direct-view safety checks, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gordon v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in an action brought by parents and a student challenging the State of California's extended prohibition on in-person schooling during the Covid-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that, despite recent changes to the State's Covid-related regulations, this case is not moot.On the merits, the panel held that the district court properly rejected the substantive due process claims of those plaintiffs who challenge California's decision to temporarily provide public education in an almost exclusively online format. The panel explained that both it and the Supreme Court have repeatedly declined to recognize a federal constitutional right to have the State affirmatively provide an education in any particular manner, and plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing that the panel can or should recognize such a right in this case.However, in regard to the State's interference in the in-person provision of private education to the children of five of the plaintiffs in this case, the panel concluded that the State's forced closure of their private schools implicates a right that has long been considered fundamental under the applicable caselaw—the right of parents to control their children's education and to choose their children's educational forum. The panel explained that California's ban on in-person schooling abridges a fundamental liberty of these five plaintiffs that is protected by the Due Process Clause, and thus that prohibition can be upheld only if it withstands strict scrutiny. Given the State's closure order's lack of narrow tailoring, the panel cannot say that, as a matter of law, it survives such scrutiny. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to these five plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings.In regard to plaintiffs' claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the panel concluded that the public-school plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The panel explained that the challenged distinctions that the State has drawn between public schools and other facilities are subject only to rational-basis scrutiny, and these distinctions readily survive that lenient review. In regard to the private-school plaintiffs, the panel vacated the district court's judgment rejecting their Equal Protection claims and remanded for further consideration in light of the conclusion that the State's actions implicate a fundamental right of those plaintiffs. View "Brach v. Newsom" on Justia Law