Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss an action challenging a Connecticut law imposing recycling fees on electronics manufacturers. VIZIO alleged that Connecticut's E-Waste Law effectively regulated interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The court analyzed the claim through a "well-worn path," N.Y. Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2017), and held that VIZIO failed to articulate entitlement to relief under this familiar rubric. The court declined to extend the extraterritoriality doctrine in such a way as to prohibit laws that merely consider out‐of‐state activity, did not apply the user fee analysis to VIZIO's case, and found no burden on interstate commerce that was clearly excessive to the considerable public benefits conferred by Connecticut's E‐Waste Law. View "VIZIO, Inc. v. Klee" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a claim alleging that the New York State Thruway Authority violated the Dormant Commerce Clause when it used surplus revenue from highway tolls to fund the State of New York's canal system. The court held that Congress evinced an "unmistakably clear" intent to authorize the Thruway Authority to depart from the strictures of the Dormant Commerce Clause by allocating surplus highway toll revenues to New York's Canal System. The court explained that Congress placed no limits on the amount of such surplus highway toll revenue that the Thruway Authority could allocate to the Canal System. Finally, the court held that the district court had discretion to reach the merits of the Thruway Authority's defense that Congress had authorized it to devote surplus highway toll revenues to the Canal System. View "American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Authority" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a claim alleging that the New York State Thruway Authority violated the Dormant Commerce Clause when it used surplus revenue from highway tolls to fund the State of New York's canal system. The court held that Congress evinced an "unmistakably clear" intent to authorize the Thruway Authority to depart from the strictures of the Dormant Commerce Clause by allocating surplus highway toll revenues to New York's Canal System. The court explained that Congress placed no limits on the amount of such surplus highway toll revenue that the Thruway Authority could allocate to the Canal System. Finally, the court held that the district court had discretion to reach the merits of the Thruway Authority's defense that Congress had authorized it to devote surplus highway toll revenues to the Canal System. View "American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Authority" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for a jury instruction concerning punitive damages for pregnancy discrimination claims arising under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The court certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of the appropriate standard for determining whether a defendant may be liable for damages under the NYCHRL. The Court of Appeals resolved the certified question by holding that the standard for determining damages under the NYCHRL was whether the wrongdoer has engaged in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard. In doing so, the Court of Appeals expressly rejected the application of the federal standard for punitive damages. Therefore, after hearing from the Court of Appeals, the court held that the district court erred in applying the test for whether punitive damages are available under substantive federal law. View "Chauca v. Abraham" on Justia Law

Defendants Brenda Halpin and the State of Connecticut appealed a district court judgment denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff Virginia Brown’s claims of First Amendment retaliation and violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 31–51q. Halpin argued on appeal to the Second Circuit she was entitled to qualified immunity, and the State argued that it was guarded from liability pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff?appellee Virginia Brown was hired by defendant?appellant the State of Connecticut in September 2012 as a “staff attorney II” in its Retirement Services Division (the “Division”). In October 2012, approximately one month after her hiring, Brown began making complaints that program was being improperly administered. Brown was responsible for providing legal services to the Comptroller and Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission (the “Commission”); Brown prepared written materials for the Commission explaining that an incorrect standard was being applied. Brown alleged that members of the Division and Comptroller subsequently retaliated against her by systematically stripping her of job responsibilities. Brown filed a whistleblower complaint with the Auditors under Connecticut General Statutes in December 2013; by December 2014, her position in the Division was eliminated. Although Brown then transferred to another state agency, she lost two credited years of service for the purpose of eligibility for compensation and benefits. After review, the Second Circuit determined Halpin’s appeal was premature because her qualified immunity defense rested on disputed factual allegations. Although the Court found it had jurisdiction to hear the State’s sovereign immunity defense, it found Brown had alleged misconduct falling within the scope of 31–51q, which provided a limited waiver to the State’s sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Halpin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court denying the State’s motion to dismiss Brown’s claims under 31– 51q. View "Brown v. Halpin" on Justia Law

Defendants Brenda Halpin and the State of Connecticut appealed a district court judgment denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff Virginia Brown’s claims of First Amendment retaliation and violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 31–51q. Halpin argued on appeal to the Second Circuit she was entitled to qualified immunity, and the State argued that it was guarded from liability pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff?appellee Virginia Brown was hired by defendant?appellant the State of Connecticut in September 2012 as a “staff attorney II” in its Retirement Services Division (the “Division”). In October 2012, approximately one month after her hiring, Brown began making complaints that program was being improperly administered. Brown was responsible for providing legal services to the Comptroller and Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission (the “Commission”); Brown prepared written materials for the Commission explaining that an incorrect standard was being applied. Brown alleged that members of the Division and Comptroller subsequently retaliated against her by systematically stripping her of job responsibilities. Brown filed a whistleblower complaint with the Auditors under Connecticut General Statutes in December 2013; by December 2014, her position in the Division was eliminated. Although Brown then transferred to another state agency, she lost two credited years of service for the purpose of eligibility for compensation and benefits. After review, the Second Circuit determined Halpin’s appeal was premature because her qualified immunity defense rested on disputed factual allegations. Although the Court found it had jurisdiction to hear the State’s sovereign immunity defense, it found Brown had alleged misconduct falling within the scope of 31–51q, which provided a limited waiver to the State’s sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Halpin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court denying the State’s motion to dismiss Brown’s claims under 31– 51q. View "Brown v. Halpin" on Justia Law

Three defendants found by a jury to have engaged in a criminal conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) challenged their convictions, contending that venue did not properly lie in the Southern District of New York, the place of their prosecutions. The Second Circuit affirmed their convictions, finding that, although the bulk of their joint criminal activity took place in the U.S. Virgin Islands and in Florida, the defendants’ activities and knowledge of the related travel to New York by one of the conspirators, who had left Florida with drugs obtained through the conspiracy and traveled to the New York area with plans to sell the drugs there, sufficed to support venue in the Southern District as to each defendant. The court upheld the denial of three suppression motions, which were based on searches resulting from DEA wiretaps, a protective sweep search of the master bedroom in the Florida residence in which a defendant was arrested, and a search of that defendant’s business, pursuant to a warrant. The court rejected a contention that the government failed adequately to disclose impeachment evidence regarding its lead witness and arguments that the court improperly calculated the defendants’ Guidelines ranges. View "United States v. Yuk" on Justia Law

Three defendants found by a jury to have engaged in a criminal conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) challenged their convictions, contending that venue did not properly lie in the Southern District of New York, the place of their prosecutions. The Second Circuit affirmed their convictions, finding that, although the bulk of their joint criminal activity took place in the U.S. Virgin Islands and in Florida, the defendants’ activities and knowledge of the related travel to New York by one of the conspirators, who had left Florida with drugs obtained through the conspiracy and traveled to the New York area with plans to sell the drugs there, sufficed to support venue in the Southern District as to each defendant. The court upheld the denial of three suppression motions, which were based on searches resulting from DEA wiretaps, a protective sweep search of the master bedroom in the Florida residence in which a defendant was arrested, and a search of that defendant’s business, pursuant to a warrant. The court rejected a contention that the government failed adequately to disclose impeachment evidence regarding its lead witness and arguments that the court improperly calculated the defendants’ Guidelines ranges. View "United States v. Yuk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference and seeking to hold defendant Michael Allen, a police officer, responsible for excessive use of force. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City on plaintiff's municipal liability claims where the evidence proffered by plaintiff was insufficient to permit an inference of deliberate indifference. The court held that the cross-appeal by Allen was without merit given that as to an affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the burden was on the defendant to prove the necessary factual predicates by a preponderance of the evidence; that in order to avoid having the district court instruct the jury that he had that burden, Allen chose not to have submitted to the jury the fact questions as to which he now wants favorable answers presumed; and that the pertinent factual findings made by the district court were not inconsistent with the jury's answers to the questions that were posed. View "Outlaw v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference and seeking to hold defendant Michael Allen, a police officer, responsible for excessive use of force. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the City on plaintiff's municipal liability claims where the evidence proffered by plaintiff was insufficient to permit an inference of deliberate indifference. The court held that the cross-appeal by Allen was without merit given that as to an affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the burden was on the defendant to prove the necessary factual predicates by a preponderance of the evidence; that in order to avoid having the district court instruct the jury that he had that burden, Allen chose not to have submitted to the jury the fact questions as to which he now wants favorable answers presumed; and that the pertinent factual findings made by the district court were not inconsistent with the jury's answers to the questions that were posed. View "Outlaw v. Allen" on Justia Law