Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved a group of firearm and ammunition dealers and a business organization who appealed a decision by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The appellants claimed that New York's commercial regulations on the sale of firearms and ammunition violated their customers' Second Amendment rights and that several provisions of New York law conflicted with federal law. Additionally, they claimed they lacked standing to challenge New York’s licensing scheme for semiautomatic rifles, its background-check requirement for ammunition purchases, and its firearm training requirement for concealed-carry licenses. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the appellants failed to present evidence to support their claims. The court also affirmed that the appellants lacked standing to challenge the regulations as individuals. View "Gazzola v. Hochul" on Justia Law

In a consolidated case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, plaintiffs Ivan Antonyuk, Corey Johnson, Alfred Terrille, Joseph Mann, Leslie Leman, Lawrence Sloane, Jimmie Hardaway Jr., Larry A. Boyd, Firearms Policy Coalition Inc., Second Amendment Foundation Inc., Brett Christian, Micheal Spencer, and His Tabernacle Family Church Inc., sought to challenge certain provisions of New York's Concealed Carry Improvement Act ("CCIA"). The CCIA regulates the public carriage of firearms and includes licensing requirements and prohibitions on carrying firearms in "sensitive" and "restricted" locations. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions violated their First and Second Amendment rights.The court affirmed the preliminary injunction against the enforcement of certain provisions of the CCIA, but vacated the injunction in other respects. Specifically, the court upheld district court's injunctions with respect to the social media disclosure requirement, the application of restricted locations provision to private property open to the general public, and the application of the same provision to Pastor Spencer, the Tabernacle Family Church, its members, or their agents and licensees.However, the court vacated the injunctions in all other respects, concluding that either the district court lacked jurisdiction or that the challenged laws do not violate the Constitution on their face. The court rejected the plaintiffs' challenges to the CCIA's licensing requirements and sensitive locations provisions, holding that the laws did not infringe on the plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights.The court also held that the CCIA's restricted locations provision, which makes it a crime to possess firearms in a "restricted location", did not violate the plaintiffs' First and Second Amendment rights. Instead, the court found the provision to be a reasonable regulation consistent with the Second Amendment's protection of the right to keep and bear arms.The court's decision affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands the case for further proceedings. View "Antonyuk v. Chiumento" on Justia Law

Anthony Christopher Mendonca was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for one count of possession of child pornography. He appealed, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated due to the public being excluded from substantial portions of his jury selection due to restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. He also argued that his inculpatory statements were coerced by law enforcement’s suggestion that he had “failed” a polygraph exam. Both challenges were not properly preserved in the lower court and therefore the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a plain-error review, ultimately affirming the judgment of the district court. The court emphasized the unique challenges posed by the pandemic and the effort made by the lower court to conduct a fair trial under these constraints. The court also found no clear or obvious error in the lower court's decision to admit Mendonca's incriminatory statements. View "United States of America v. Mendonca" on Justia Law

In the case between Vans, Inc., VF Outdoor, LLC (collectively "Vans") and MSCHF Product Studio, Inc. ("MSCHF"), the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against MSCHF. MSCHF had created a sneaker, the Wavy Baby, which appeared to mimic Vans' Old Skool shoe. Vans sued MSCHF for trademark and trade dress infringement. MSCHF argued that its use of Vans' marks was protected by the First Amendment. However, the Court of Appeals applied the recent Supreme Court decision in Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, which held that special First Amendment protections do not apply when trademarks are used as source identifiers. The Court of Appeals concluded that Vans was likely to prevail in arguing that MSCHF's Wavy Baby shoes used Vans' marks and trade dress as source identifiers, and that there was a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the Wavy Baby shoes. The court also affirmed the district court's decisions requiring MSCHF to escrow its revenues from Wavy Baby sales and not requiring a bond determination because MSCHF never requested security. View "Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Product Studio, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of financial institution bribery in violation of Section 215(a)(2) and one count of conspiracy to commit financial institution bribery. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of 366 days’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ supervised release, and imposed a $1.25 million fine. On appeal, Defendant raiseed four challenges. First, Defendant challenged (a) what constitutes “corrupt” conduct under Section 215(a); (b) what constitutes a “thing of value” under Section 215(a); and (c) how to determine the monetary value of a “thing of value” under Section 215(a), all elements of the crime. Second, Defendant argued that there is insufficient evidence in the record to uphold his convictions. Third, Defendant argued that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous. Fourth, Defendant claimed that the district court failed to exclude prejudicial testimony that the prosecution allegedly procured through the improper use of a grand jury subpoena.   The Second Circuit affirmed and concluded that Defendant’s challenges are without merit. First the court explained that “corrupt” conduct describes actions motivated by an improper purpose, even if such actions (a) did not entail a breach of duty, and (b) were motivated in part by a neutral or proper purpose, as well as by an improper purpose. Second, that a “thing of value” may cover subjectively valuable intangibles, such as political assistance, including endorsements, guidance, and referrals. Third, that the “thing of value” may be measured by its value to the parties, by the value of what it is exchanged for, or by its market value. View "United States v. Calk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was formerly incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the officers for violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Plaintiff named as defendants additional corrections officers. He alleged that the officers violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by preventing him from observing the Jewish holiday of Shavuot on two consecutive evenings. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers because (1) some named officers were not personally involved in the alleged violation on the first night of Shavuot, and (2) Plaintiff’s observance of the second night of the holiday was only shortened, not denied entirely, which did not rise to the level of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court. The court wrote that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff could not prevail on his claim because he did not make the threshold showing of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs. Such a showing is not required. Rather, because Plaintiff has shown a burden on his sincere religious beliefs, he has established a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The court vacated the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment because of a purported “substantial burden” requirement, and affirmed the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment to those officers for whom there was no evidence of personal involvement. View "Kravitz v. Purcell" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from the denial of his successive Section 2255 motion challenging his conviction and accompanying sentence for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). In his motion, Petitioner argued that his  924(c) conviction was invalid in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). The district court denied the motion because it determined that Petitioner’s Section 924(c) conviction rested on the valid predicate crime of murder. The district court further held that its Pinkerton instruction—which permits a jury to convict a defendant of a substantive offense committed by his co-conspirators—did not undermine the validity of the Section 924(c) predicate.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that intentional murder under New York law, even when the conviction is based on a Pinkerton theory of liability, qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning of Section 924(c). Under a Pinkerton theory, the defendant is convicted of the substantive offense—not of conspiring to commit the offense—so he has committed a crime of violence if the substantive offense is a crime of violence. Because Pinkerton does not transform a substantive offense into a conspiracy offense, it does not implicate Davis. View "Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action alleging that he received constitutionally inadequate medical care as an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction. But before the district court could proceed with his case, Plaintiff, like all civil litigants in federal court, was required to pay a filing fee of $402. Plaintiff believed he could not pay the fee while also paying for the necessities of life. So, he moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 23 U.S.C. Section 1915, which would allow Plaintiff to bring his suit without having to prepay the full filing fee. The Second Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding that the prison provided Plaintiff’s necessities of life. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, and the district court again denied his motion. On reconsideration, the district court found that Plaintiff had the resources to pay for both the necessities of life and the filing fee but had instead chosen to prioritize contributions to his family members for their necessities. Plaintiff argued that both conclusions are the result of legal error.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the rest of Section 1915’s requirements. The court concluded that Plaintiff demonstrated that he lacks the resources to pay the costs of the lawsuit and for his own necessities of life and those of his dependents. The court explained that Plaintiff would not be immediately destitute if required to pay the $402 filing fee; he has nonetheless established that he cannot pay the costs associated with this suit and still provide the necessities of life for himself and his dependents. View "Rosa v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a practicing Baptist, was incarcerated in the Green Haven Correctional Facility from 2002 until 2018. After prison officials failed to update the Protestant services “call-out list,” Wiggins was excluded from all religious services for over five months. He sued Green Haven officials Thomas Griffin, M. Kopp, D. Howard, and Dr. G. Jebamani under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that (1) Defendants did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion, (2) Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) if there were a constitutional violation, Kopp was not personally involved in it.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. First, the court concluded that Defendants’ failure to update the Protestant services call-out list, which prevented Plaintiff from attending worship services for over five months, substantially burdened his religious exercise. Second, because disputed issues of material fact remain, qualified immunity cannot shield Defendants from liability at this juncture. Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Kopp’s personal involvement in a First Amendment violation by pleading that Kopp took no action even after she was informed that Plaintiff’s rights were being infringed. Finally, the court held that a Section 1983 free exercise claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights. View "Wiggins v. Griffin, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment of conviction entered by the district court convicting him on his plea of guilty to possession and receipt of child pornography, and (b)(1), and obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2), contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a probation officer’s search of his cell phone and a further search by New York State Police and that the trial court erred in failing to allow him allocution at sentencing.   The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction but rejected the government’s argument and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that Defendant argued that resentencing is required because he was not afforded his right to allocute. He argued that the court’s failure to provide allocution calls for automatic resentencing, even under plain error review, given that he made no objection during the sentencing proceeding. The government’s brief focuses on enforcement of his waiver of appeal and advances no argument against ordering resentencing in the event we do not enforce the appeal waiver. The court concluded that it should remand for resentencing, as Defendant has made a reasonable argument that he is entitled to resentencing, and the government has made no argument to the contrary. Because the government makes no argument to the contrary, the court explained that it does so without ruling as to the appropriate standard of review for an unpreserved claim of failure to grant allocution. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate his sentence and resentence, affording him the right of allocution. View "United States v. Lajeunesse" on Justia Law