Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Inmate Chadrick Fulks filed a lawsuit against several prison officials at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging constitutionally deficient medical care, the use of excessive force, and a sexual assault. The district court concluded that he had successfully exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to only two claims. During the course of the litigation, the court found that Fulks had knowingly submitted a forged document and provided perjured testimony. As a sanction for this misconduct, the court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court noted that even though dismissal prevented Fulks from litigating his allegation of sexual assault, there were other remedies available to him, such as through the Bureau's Office of Internal Affairs or under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. The court concluded that while the district court's decision was severe, it was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the entire action as a sanction for Fulks's submission of a forged document and perjured testimony. View "Fulks v. Watson" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner Sargeant filed a grievance against a prison official, Cruze, after she commented on his sexual preferences and refused to give him books that he had ordered. When Sargeant's case manager, Barfield, showed Sargeant the prison’s response, Sargeant noticed that it was signed by Cruze and pointed out that, under the prison’s rules, Cruze should not have seen a grievance lodged against her. Barfield then told others about the grievance. Sargeant filed a separate grievance against Barfield. In retaliation, Barfield “repeatedly” put Sargeant, who had cooperated with the government, in cells with prisoners known to be violent. This led to fights until Sargeant was transferred to another prison.Sargeant sued seeking monetary damages, alleging that Barfield retaliated against him for filing grievances. He did not identify which of his constitutional rights she had allegedly violated. In screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the judge decided that Sargeant could proceed only on a First Amendment retaliation claim and did not discuss any possible Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Under the Bivens doctrine, a federal prisoner cannot recover damages for a violation of First Amendment rights. Recognizing a failure-to-protect claim in this context would risk intrusion with the federal prison system; the claim presents separation-of-powers concerns and special factors not accounted for by any of the Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents. View "Sargeant v. Barfield" on Justia Law

Escorted by an officer who had followed him from the scene of a shooting, Hudson entered the Medical Center seeking emergency treatment for a gunshot wound. The officer stood outside Hudson’s hospital room. Medical staff discovered Hudson was concealing “something plastic” in his mouth and spent nearly 20 minutes admonishing Hudson to spit it out before he finally complied, revealing a device used to convert a firearm into a fully automatic weapon. Hudson moved to suppress the device, arguing that the medical staff acted as government agents in conducting a warrantless search.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Knowledge and inaction alone are insufficient to establish an agency relationship. There must be some evidence of government participation in or affirmative encouragement of the private search before a court will hold it unconstitutional. Viewed in context, the officer answered questions but did not direct the medical staff to act in any particular way. The facts supported a finding that medical staff acted with the purpose of providing medical treatment, not assisting law enforcement. The court noted that both the officer and the medical staff apparently assumed that Hudson was concealing drugs, voicing concerns that the suspected drugs could cause him to overdose. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, section 26, protects the right to hunt. Since 1990, Wisconsin has had a special statute making it a crime to harass hunters in various ways; a 2016 amendment makes it a crime to interfere intentionally with a hunter by “maintaining a visual or physical proximity” to the hunter, by “approaching or confronting” the hunter, or by photographing, videotaping, audiotaping, or otherwise recording the hunter's activity. The plaintiffs oppose hunting. They have observed hunters on public land, have sometimes approached and confronted them, have photographed and filmed hunters’ activities, and intend to continue all those activities.The plaintiffs assert that the prohibitions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In a pre-enforcement challenge, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the law and that their facial constitutional challenges failed on the merits.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, first holding that the plaintiffs have standing to bring both their as-applied and facial challenges before formal enforcement efforts because the statute has been used to harass and intimidate them and has caused them to refrain from engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment. Certain clauses of the law are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The statute discriminates against speech and expressive activity based on viewpoint and the defendants have not offered justifications for the provision that satisfy strict scrutiny. View "Brown v. Kemp" on Justia Law

The Protect Illinois Communities Act, Pub. Act 102-1116 (effective January 2023) and three municipal laws regulate assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the Act, which makes it unlawful for any person within Illinois knowingly to “manufacture, deliver, sell, import, or purchase … an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge,” without reaching Second Amendment issues. The Act includes exceptions for “trained professionals” and “grandfathered individuals.”The Seventh Circuit upheld denials of injunctions, concluding that the state and the municipalities have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation. There is a long tradition, unchanged from when the Second Amendment was added to the Constitution, supporting a distinction between weapons and accessories designed for military or law-enforcement use, and weapons designed for personal use. The Act respects and relies on that distinction. “From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” The fact that many people own assault weapons does not insulate them from regulation. View "Herrera v. Raoul" on Justia Law

Vidal-Martinez, a non-citizen, was arrested three times for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. DHS detained him and initiated deportation. Vidal-Martinez filed a habeas petition, arguing that his detention was unconstitutional because it impeded his ability to defend himself against the drunk-driving charges. ICE transferred Vidal-Martinez to county custody “until the completion of [the] criminal matter, then released to his ICE detainer.” Vidal-Martinez was convicted of DUI and sentenced to 236 days in jail. He was then returned to ICE custody. Due to a lack of evidence that he posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, the district court granted Vidal-Martinez’s habeas petition and ordered his release.Vidal-Martinez filed a FOIA request, 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking disclosure from ICE of documents related to his custody transfer. ICE produced 561 pages of responsive documents, some of which contained redactions. Vidal-Martinez challenged ICE’s redactions. ICE submitted a Vaughn index and a declaration from its FOIA officer explaining the legal justification for each redaction, citing attorney-client, work product, deliberative process privileges, and identifying information of government employees. Vidal-Martinez responded that ICE committed criminal conduct by transferring him to Indiana, so the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied. The district court granted ICE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no factual foundation in the record for criminal conduct or misconduct by ICE. The district court had an adequate factual basis to evaluate ICE’s withholdings. View "Vidal-Martinez v. United States Department Of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Fieste was charged with threatening to assault and murder two federal judges, three former U.S. presidents, and the current President. She is currently incompetent to stand trial. Fieste's mental illness causes her to experience delusions. In custody, Fieste refused the antipsychotic medication that experts believe will restore her competence. The government obtained permission to involuntarily medicate her to render her competent to stand trial. The order was stayed pending appeal.The Seventh Circuit affirmed but remanded. Fieste’s pretrial detention is insufficient to overcome the government’s interest in prosecution although Fieste’s anticipated Guidelines range is 12-18 months and she will “likely face a sentence of time served” if convicted. The district court properly conducted a holistic assessment to conclude that the proposed treatment plan is substantially likely to render Fieste competent and that the side effects are substantially unlikely to significantly interfere with her ability to participate in the proceedings. The order permitted Fieste to be medicated with “long-acting injectable anti-psychotic medication, along with other medications” suggesting impermissible flexibility to administer unspecified medications. The district court must provide a dosage range based on the expert’s recommendation or some other appropriate evidence, whether directly in its order or by incorporating a sufficiently detailed treatment plan. View "United States v. Fieste" on Justia Law

The DEA placed a tracking device on Tousis’s car. On June 2, agents believed that Tousis would go to Turner’s Aurora home to procure drugs. They watched Tousis enter Turner’s garage carrying a bag, and then leave carrying the bag, which had changed in appearance, suggesting a drug transaction. The Sheriff’s Department attempted a traffic stop. Tousis fled; the tracking device showed 115.2 miles per hour on I-88. Agent Billiot, driving an unmarked car, followed Tousis off the highway. Tousis was then driving at normal speeds, but taking evasive actions. At a red light, Billiot activated his emergency lights and siren, and pulled in front of Tousis’s car, 10-25 feet away. Billiot grabbed his firearm, exited his car wearing a DEA vest, and ran toward Tousis’s car, shouting commands.As Tousis moved the car forward, with nothing between Billiot and Tousis’s car, Billiot fired a single shot. The bullet struck the steering wheel; a fragment hit Tousis in the neck as he was maneuvering his vehicle away from Billiot. Tousis’s car then accelerated and struck a light pole. Tousis died. Officers recovered 300 grams of cocaine from Tousis’s car.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Billiot qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The material undisputed facts demonstrate that Billiot fired the fatal shot fearing for his own safety and for that of the public if Tousis resumed his reckless flight. There was no precedent warning Billiot that his actions amounted to excessive force. View "Tousis v. Billiot" on Justia Law

Storme faced multiple charges of cyberstalking and unauthorized intrusion into a cell phone. He was ordered released on bond into the custody of his mother subject to conditions. He immediately attempted suicide. Months later, Pretrial Services reported that Storme had violated his curfew over 30 times and had been arrested for allegedly stalking a fourth woman. Storme was abusing alcohol and expressing suicidal ideation. The court did not his revoke release. Storme's mother moved to Virginia. The court did not appoint a new custodian. Months later, the court received a report from Storme’s therapist, expressing concern that Storme would kill himself if he thought the court might deny his motion to dismiss. Storme then began transferring assets to his mother and appeared multiple times in court to watch unrelated proceedings before his assigned judge.The district court heard arguments, then, without advance notice, revoked Storme’s pretrial release and ordered him detained, without making supporting findings. Storme began slamming his head to the floor and urging the marshals to kill him. In a holding cell, he tried to hang himself. After review by the Seventh Circuit, the government filed a motion to revoke. The district court granted its motion, finding probable cause to believe that, while on release, Storme committed crimes and otherwise violated his release conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the court reached the correct conclusion, based on the ongoing threat to the community, despite procedural irregularities under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. 3142(d)). View "United States v. Storme" on Justia Law

Lumar caused a disturbance at a Chicago clinic. Called to the scene, police discovered that Lumar was wanted on an arrest warrant and took him into custody. About 19 hours later he committed suicide. His estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 argued that Lumar should have been released without a bond hearing, and, had he been released swiftly, Lumar would not have killed himself.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit. While the warrant set bond at an amount Lumar could have posted, it had been issued in Lee County, so a local order required a local bond hearing. Even if the order is inconsistent with state law, in denying arrestees the right to waive local bond hearings, a violation of state law does not permit an award under section 1983. Federal law does not prohibit presenting the arrestee to a local judge, within a reasonable time not to exceed 48 hours. The time Lumar spent in custody, including six hours in a hospital to address breathing problems, and the discovery of 12 rocks of crack cocaine in his cell and ensuing return to the Police Department, was reasonable under the standard set by the Supreme Court. Lumar was screened for suicide risk shortly after his arrest and again at the hospital. Illinois law offers a remedy for suicide during custody only if the jailers do something that makes suicide foreseeable. View "Alcorn v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law