Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

On December 5, 2013, individuals burglarized a closed Ann Arbor, Michigan, store, taking 24 firearms and other goods. Officers discovered that a caller, using the *67 code, had placed multiple calls to the store after it closed. Under the Stored Communications Act, officers can obtain cell‐site location information by voluntary disclosure, or “exigent request,” 18 U.S.C. 2702(c), or by court order, section 2703(d). The officers made an exigent request to Comcast, the store’s telephone service provider. After Comcast voluntarily disclosed the caller's number, officers determined that Sprint was that caller’s provider and made another exigent request. Sprint voluntarily provided cell‐site location information, which indicated that on December 3-4, the phone had pinged off Illinois cell towers. On December 4, at 11:14 p.m., the phone pinged off of an Ann Arbor tower; it pinged off Ann Arbor towers until 6:37 p.m. on December 5, then returned to Illinois. Officers discovered that the phone number had been provided to a hotel under Rosario’s name, then obtained court orders (2703(d)) to obtain the store’s phone records and the cell‐site location information.Applying then-law (prior to “Carpenter” (2018)), the court denied Rosario’s motion to suppress, holding that the acquisition of cell‐site location information from third‐party service providers did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Rosario’s convictions for transporting stolen goods in interstate commerce and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Officers relied on section 2702(c)(4) in good faith; their emergency request form stated that “the number of stolen handguns, pose[d] a significant community risk.” The inevitable discovery doctrine also supported the district court’s decision. View "United States v. Rosario" on Justia Law

Fulks pleaded guilty to eight federal charges—including two death-eligible offenses—arising from the 2002 carjacking, kidnapping, and death of Alice Donovan. Fulks had escaped from a Kentucky jail. Fulks’s attorneys, the court observed, “painted a compelling and empathetic picture" of Fulks "growing up in poor, crowded, filthy, and deplorable living conditions, raised by violently abusive, sexually deviant, emotionally neglectful, and alcoholic parents.” They hired or consulted at least 11 experts, six of whom testified that Fulks suffered from borderline intelligence with IQ scores ranging from 75-79, plus moderate brain and cognitive impairments. Fulks did not argue that he was intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia. The district court imposed, two death sentences.In 2008 Fulks moved to vacate his death sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call additional mental health experts; again, Fulks did not raise an Atkins claim nor assert that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise such claims. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. In 2015 he filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The probability that Fulks would not have prevailed on his Atkins claim in 2008 does not mean that section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective. Updates to the legal and diagnostic standards, which may now provide Fulks a stronger basis to prove an intellectual disability, do not expose any structural defect in section 2255. View "Fulks v. Watson" on Justia Law

Brautigam, Jimenez, and two children were parked in a van when a man shot at Brautigam through his open window. Both men identified Corral as the shooter. Brautigam had known Corral for 15 years; both were members of the Latin Kings gang. Corral’s counsel argued that those identifications, the only evidence tying Corral to the crime, were unreliable. He insinuated that both men were drug addicts trying to buy heroin and that they made inconsistent statements about the shooting. Corral’s counsel argued that the real shooter was a juvenile, "Kenny," who was with Corral during the shooting, wearing the same color clothing and the same hat. Kenny alternated between implicating himself and Corral. Kenny did not appear before the jury. During deliberations, the jury asked “Do we know the height, weight[,] and race of [Kenny]?” Because the parties had not submitted any evidence of Kenny’s appearance, the court answered that “the jury is required to rely on their collective recollections.” Corral was convicted for attempted homicide, three counts of recklessly endangering the safety of others, recklessly using a firearm, and bail-jumping.State courts rejected his post-conviction argument that his attorney was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Corral and Kenny’s likeness. Counsel testified that he did not present evidence of Kenny’s appearance because, after seeing them both, he thought that Kenny did not look like Corral, who was 10 years older. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Corral failed to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably applied federal law in determining that his counsel made a sound strategic decision not to present appearance evidence. View "Corral v. Foster" on Justia Law

Bebris sent child pornography over Facebook’s private user-to-user messaging system. Facebook licenses a “hashing” image recognition technology, PhotoDNA, developed by Microsoft. PhotoDNA provides the capability to scan images uploaded onto a company’s platform and compares the “hash” (or essence) of a photo with a database of known images of child pornography. Three of Bebris’s messages were flagged by PhotoDNA. Facebook employees reviewed the images and reported them to the CyberTipline of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, as required by 18 U.S.C. 2258A(a), which then reported the images to Wisconsin law enforcement. Those officials obtained a warrant and searched Bebris’s residence, where they found a computer containing numerous child pornography files.Bebris, charged federally with possessing and distributing child pornography., argued that the evidence should be suppressed, contending that Facebook took on the role of a government agent (subject to Fourth Amendment requirements) by monitoring its platform for child pornography and reporting that content. The district court denied his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a) subpoena seeking pre-trial testimony from a Facebook employee with knowledge of Facebook’s use of PhotoDNA.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The subpoena sought cumulative testimony. The record included a written declaration from Microsoft and Facebook and live testimony from an executive at NCMEC, which administers the federal reporting system. Facebook did not act as a government agent in this case. View "United States v. Bebris" on Justia Law

Thacker committed several armed robberies in 2002, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1951 (commercial robbery) with two accompanying violations of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court sentenced Thacker to 400 months’ imprisonment; seven years were attributable to Thacker’s first 924(c) violation. A consecutive 25 years followed for the second 924(c) violation. Those sentences reflected the mandatory minimum and consecutive terms of imprisonment at the time of Thacker’s sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.In August 2020, after exhausting his remedies within the Bureau of Prisons, Thacker sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the First Step Act’s change to 924(c)’s penalty structure and added health-related considerations amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Thacker has Type-2 diabetes and hypertension.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Thacker’s motion. The discretion in section 3582(c)(1)(A) to reduce a sentence upon finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” does not include the authority to reduce 924(c) sentences lawfully imposed before the effective date of the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment. The First Step Act’s change to 924(c) applies only prospectively; the amendment, whether considered alone or in connection with other facts and circumstances, cannot constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to authorize a sentencing reduction. View "United States v. Thacker" on Justia Law

During a 2009 drug purchase, Rabe and his dealer, Powell, got into a fight. Powell jumped into his truck and sped away, running over Rabe. Ryckman, who had been waiting in Rabe’s car, dialed 911. Powell returned. Ryckman and Powell struggled over the phone; the phone was broken in half. Powell returned to his truck and sped away. When police arrived, they found a knife on the ground. Rabe had several serious injuries and was bleeding from a deep gash on his neck. He survived. At trial, Powell argued that the entire incident was an accident and that Rabe attacked him first. Powell was convicted of first‐degree reckless injury but acquitted of attempted first-degree murder.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Powell’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting an argument that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in approving a supplemental jury instruction about the reckless injury charge. There is no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state appellate court’s conclusion that the instruction was an accurate response to a question from the jury about the definition of “utter disregard for human life.” Powell’s trial counsel had reasonable and strategic reasons for not objecting; by focusing on the injury-producing conduct, he hoped to minimize the chance that the jury would convict Powell based on the severity of Rabe’s injuries. View "Powell v. Fuchs" on Justia Law

In 2013-2016, law enforcement investigated a large methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, installing three cameras on utility poles on public property that viewed Tuggle’s home and a shed owned by Tuggle’s coconspirator, Vaultonburg. The cameras recorded around the clock. Rudimentary lighting technology improved the quality of overnight footage; agents could remotely zoom, pan, and tilt the cameras and review the camera footage in real-time or later. Officers tallied over 100 instances of what they suspected were deliveries of methamphetamine to Tuggle’s residence. After these alleged “drops,” different individuals would arrive, enter the home, and purportedly buy methamphetamine. Several witnesses corroborated these activities. Relying heavily on the video evidence, officers secured and executed search warrants on several locations, including Tuggle’s house.After the denial of his motions to suppress, Tuggle pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) to conspiring to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of methamphetamine and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, and 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1) for maintaining a drug-involved premises. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government used commonplace technology, located where officers were lawfully entitled to be, and captured events observable to any ordinary passerby; it did not invade an expectation of privacy that society would be prepared to accept as reasonable. The prolonged, uninterrupted use of pole cameras did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. View "United States v. Tuggle" on Justia Law

Gaetjens bred cats in her Loves Park home.. Her doctor told her to go to the hospital because of high blood pressure. Later that day, the doctor couldn’t locate Gaetjens and phoned Eads, Gaetjens’s neighbor. Eads could not locate Gaetjens. The next day, Gaetjens was still missing. Eads called the police, stating that Gaetjens might be experiencing a medical emergency. Officers went to Gaetjens’s home but could not see anyone inside. They saw packages on the porch, untended garbage, and a full mailbox. . Eads provided a key. The police went into the home but immediately left because of intense odors, "urine, feces, and maybe a decomposing body." The police called the Fire Department to enter with breathing devices. The Fire Chief temporarily condemned the home as not fit for habitation. Firefighters went inside to look for Gaetjens but found 37 cats. They summoned Animal Services to round up the cats because Gaetjens was not allowed inside the condemned house. The cats were impounded for nine days. Four cats died.Gaetjens, who had been in the hospital, sued under section 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily prohibits such conduct without a warrant but emergencies breed exceptions. The defendants had reason to believe that Gaetjens was experiencing a medical emergency and found her home so noxious that it posed a public safety risk. View "Gaetjens v. Winnebago County" on Justia Law

Coscia used electronic exchanges for futures trading and implemented high-frequency trading programs. High-frequency trading, called “spoofing,” and defined as bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution, became illegal in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5). Coscia was convicted of commodities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, and spoofing, After an unsuccessful appeal, Coscia sought a new trial, citing new evidence that data discovered after trial establishes that there were errors in the data presented to the jury and that subsequent indictments for similar spoofing activities undercut the government’s characterization of Coscia as a trading “outlier.” He also claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, having an undisclosed conflict of interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that Coscia’s new evidence could not have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence, Coscia failed to explain how that evidence or the subsequent indictments seriously called the verdict into question. Coscia has not established that his attorneys learned of relevant and confidential information from its cited unrelated representations. Coscia’s counsel faced “the common situation” where the client stands a better chance of success by admitting the underlying actions and arguing that the actions do not constitute a crime. That the jury did not accept his defense does not render it constitutionally deficient. View "Coscia v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago officers responded to a 911 call and found Jones bleeding from a gunshot wound. Jones stated, “Damon shot me” and that Damon was wearing a “black hoodie.” About 90 seconds later, officers encountered Damon Goodloe, wearing a black hoodie but unarmed. They took Goodloe to the scene, where Jones stated, “he’s the one that shot me.” Jones died at a hospital.The prosecution introduced Jones’s statements to the officers. Goodloe’s hands tested positive for gunshot residue. Lovett testified that she saw Goodloe (whom she knew) and another man, both in black hoodies, heard several gunshots but ducked before she could see who fired a gun, called 911, and identified Goodloe in a line-up. Loggins testified that he was purchasing cocaine from Jones when he observed two men in black hoodies. When the shots were fired, he fled. A jury convicted Goodloe of first-degree murder without finding that he personally discharged a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Goodloe’s habeas petition, first upholding the admission of Jones’s identification of Goodloe. Statements are nontestimonial when made during police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to meet an ongoing emergency. The state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that the emergency was ongoing when Goodloe was taken to the ambulance in handcuffs. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses who could have provided an innocent explanation for Goodloe's presence near the shooting; their testimony was unlikely to create a reasonable probability of a different result. View "Goodloe v. Brannon" on Justia Law