Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Cowick’s informant informed Cowick that she believed that Gholston was about to pick up large quantities of methamphetamine using his green pickup truck. At least three months later, Cowick spotted Gholston’s green pickup truck, followed Gholston, and activated his lights when Gholston turned without using a signal. Gholston parked and was walking away, which heightened Cowick’s suspicions but eventually returned. Cowick handcuffed Gholston at 12:18 am and began writing a ticket. Dispatch informed Cowick that Gholston’s ID was valid but that he had a Notice of Violation for improperly parking over a year earlier. At 12:24:23 am, Cowick called for a K9 officer, Saalborn, and requested assistance in delivering the Notice to the traffic stop. Sargent Elbus responded that he could bring the Notice. Cowick told Elbus, “take your time!!” because he was “trying to get” Saalborn While completing the ticket, Cowick continued to urge Elbus to move slowly and to urge Saalborn to “drive fast.” Cowick printed Gholston’s ticket at 12:32:27, then realized that he had not asked Gholston for insurance information. Gholston did not have proof of insurance. Cowick returned to his car to write another ticket. As Cowick was finishing that ticket, Saalborn arrived; his drug-sniffing dog alerted as the ticket was printing. The officers searched the truck and discovered nine grams of methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Gholston’s motion to suppress. Cowick did not unreasonably extend the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment; his failure to request Gholston’s insurance information at the start of the stop was a good-faith blunder. View "United States v. Gholston" on Justia Law

Inmate Robinson was offered new medication. Unaware of any prescription, he questioned the officer who gave it to him and followed up with the health services manager and others. Despite learning that there was no record of any new prescription for him, Robinson took the medication. Days later, Robinson passed out. A nurse advised him to keep taking the medication. Robinson then was sent to an outside hospital, where doctors surmised that he might be allergic to the medication. The prescription was meant for a different inmate. Robinson sued. The defendants moved for summary judgment; 20 days after his deadline for filing a brief in opposition, Robinson filed a brief to support his own request for summary judgment, supplemented by a proposed statement of facts. He did not respond to the defendants’ statement of facts. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court permissibly applied Eastern District of Wisconsin Local Rule 56(b)(4) to deem the defendants’ facts unopposed, regardless of Robinson’s later filings. Based on those facts, no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference to a serious medical risk. Nor could a jury conclude that the health‐services manager violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene. Robinson’s state‐law negligence claims were barred by Wisconsin’s notice‐of‐claim statute. The defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based only on Robinson's failure to timely respond. View "Robinson v. Waterman" on Justia Law

During heavy snow, Lieutenant McAuly approached a car that was far off the roadway. Lao lowered the driver's window and stated that a tow truck was on its way. According to McAuly, Lao displayed nervousness and was acting as though he wanted McAuly to leave while speaking sharply to his passenger, Chang. Their driver’s licenses revealed extensive recent felony criminal histories. Both were under supervised release for methamphetamine convictions.Both consented to pat-down searches. McAuly discovered that under her shirt Chang was carrying a locked, portable gun safe. Chang denied both ownership of the safe and knowledge of its contents. Through the car windows, McAuly saw a razor blade and a piece of cardboard that he associated with dividing drugs. Wisconsin Act 79 authorizes an officer, without consent, a warrant, or probable cause, to search any property under the control of a person who is under court supervision if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. McAuly found the key, opened the gun safe, and found what was determined to be 75.6 grams of methamphetamine and a digital scale. A later search revealed a firearm and ammunition. After receiving Miranda warnings, Chang declared that everything in the safe belonged to her, although she was unable to describe its contents. Both were charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Lao was also charged as a felon in possession of a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denials of the defendants’ motion to suppress. Although the officer’s hunch alone was not sufficient justification for the seizure, other factors provided the reasonable suspicion necessary. Chang’s statements did not fall within any hearsay exception and could not be admitted if Chang chose to invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. View "United States v. Lao" on Justia Law

Danville Officer Crawley sought a warrant to search Woodfork’s home. Crawley testified under oath, identifying Woodfork as the target of the request, stating that Woodfork had sold crystal methamphetamine in a controlled buy to a confidential source (CS) that day. Officers had searched the SC before and after that buy and surveilled the transaction, which was recorded. Crawley had relied on the CS “multiple times” and found him “reliable.” The officers attempted to set up a second controlled buy, using another reliable CS. Woodfork had insisted that the CS come to Woodfork’s home, which was described by naming an intersection, understood to be 1220 North Franklin Street.The judge issued a search warrant for Woodfork’s North Franklin home. Officers discovered methamphetamine and a firearm. Woodfork moved to quash the warrant and or to suppress the evidence, arguing that he was entitled to a "Franks" hearing and suppression because Crawley misled the county judge regarding the identification of his home and by omitting details about the CS's criminal histories.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Woodfork’s motion. Crawley and the judge were not simply relying on the uncorroborated word of the CS; a controlled buy, properly executed, is generally a reliable indicator of the presence of illegal drug activity. The omission of information about the sources’ backgrounds, criminal histories, or motives does not change the probable cause determination. Crawley testified; the court could assess his credibility and ask questions. View "United States v. Woodfork" on Justia Law

Huerta was shot and killed in a parking lot in 2009. Huerta had been drinking with his uncle, Rojas, when a car pulled up, an occupant fired at Huerta, and the car sped away. Officers focused on Villavicencio‐Serna; his girlfriend’s father had reported her missing the morning of Huerta’s murder. The girlfriend eventually stated that she was with Villavicencio‐Serna on that night, that when she woke up, Villavicencio‐Serna stated that he “took care of business,” and that Villavicencio‐Serna had previously stated that he was prepared to shoot Huerta. She later changed her story, claiming that she was in the car with Villavicencio‐Serna’s friends, Daddio and Rogers, when Villavicencio‐Serna leaned out the window and shot Huerta. She later said that Villavicencio‐Serna reached over her to shoot. Daddio recounted that the four drove around the parking lot before Villavicencio‐Serna shouted at Huerta then fired shots. Rogers repeatedly stated that he knew nothing about the shooting, then changed his story, stating that Villavicencio‐Serna shot Huerta. Their stories were somewhat inconsistent.All three recanted at trial, insisting that the officers scared them into implicating Villavicencio‐Serna; the officers’ version of the events was fed to them while the recording equipment was off. Allegedly unprompted, Rojas had identified Daddio’s car, a silver Cadillac, although his original story referred to a dark car.Villavicencio‐Serna was convicted of first‐degree murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal petition for habeas corpus relief while expressing concerns about the “troubling” inconsistencies and lack of physical evidence. View "Villavicencio-Serna v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Taylor was fired from his job as a Cook County Sheriff’s officer. He sued the Sheriff’s Office under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ways, Whittler, and Ernst under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants maintain that Taylor was terminated for having fired pellets with an air rifle at his neighbor, a charge that Taylor denies. Ernst was the lead investigator assigned to Taylor’s case. Taylor offered evidence that Ernst engineered his firing based on racial animosity. Taylor also asserted that Ways and Whittler, Sheriff’s Office officials, are liable because they reviewed Ernst’s final report and endorsed his recommendation of termination.On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of qualified immunity as to Ernst. Taylor presented evidence of Ernst’s significant role in the investigative and disciplinary proceedings that brought about Taylor’s termination. Any reasonable official in Ernst’s position would have known that intentional racial discrimination toward another employee was unconstitutional and what Taylor alleges against Ernst is textbook racial discrimination: the word “n****r,” used by Ernst, a white man, aimed at Taylor on several occasions. The court reversed the denials of qualified immunity to Ways and Whittler; evidence that they played key roles in approving Ernst’s termination does not signal that either harbored any racial animus or that they knew or suspected that Ernst was motivated by race. Taylor’s Title VII claim remains pending. View "Taylor v. Ernst" on Justia Law

Ademiju immigrated to the U.S. in 2001 and had a green card. In 2011, he became involved in a scheme to defraud Medicare. He pled guilty to healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, and stipulated to a $1.5 million loss amount, acknowledging that “pleading guilty may have consequences with respect to his immigration status” and that he “affirms that he wants to plead guilty … even if the consequence is his automatic removal.” At sentencing, Ademiju personally acknowledged that his ability to stay in this country was not assured. His counsel told the court, “I’m not an immigration specialist … But it’s my understanding that … any sentence of less than one year … he would be at least eligible for a waiver.” Apparently, no one knew that statement was incorrect. The district court sentenced Ademiju to 11 months’ imprisonment plus $1.5 million in restitution.Ademiju was released from federal prison and transferred into ICE custody; he retained an immigration attorney who informed him that his offense of conviction and the stipulated loss amount subjected him to mandatory deportation. Ademiju filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction because his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled because he received incorrect advice from an attorney about his options for recourse within the limitations period and could not have discovered the problem himself due to the inadequacy of his prison’s law library. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his motion; Ademiju has not met the high standard for equitable tolling. View "Ademiju v. United States" on Justia Law

Jones spent more than 10 years in prison before the Seventh Circuit granted his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, finding that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. After Jones was freed, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Madison County, Indiana deputy prosecutors Koester and Kopp, in their individual capacities, arguing that they maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his due process rights when they filed an untimely amendment to his charges and secured a conviction. He also alleged that Madison County Prosecutor Cummings, an elected official, adopted and followed an official policy of flouting state-law limitations on amendments to charges. He requested $50 million in general damages for his confinement, compensatory damages for past and future physical and emotional injuries, and attorneys’ fees.The district court dismissed the action, finding that Cummings was a state official, so the suit against him was in substance one against the state. The state is not a “person” that can be sued under section 1983. Jones’s suit against the prosecutors failed because of the absolute immunity prosecutors enjoy when they are acting as advocates. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Jones was undoubtedly injured by his wrongful imprisonment but that does not mean that he has a remedy against any particular actor. View "Jones v. Cummings" on Justia Law

In 1982, Thompson was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to commit burglary for his role in the home invasion and killing of the Hilborns. After a remand for resentencing, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his sentence of two consecutive 60-year terms for the murders and a consecutive 30-year term for the conspiracy to commit burglary. Thompson filed a post-conviction petition that languished until 2015; the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief.Thompson filed a federal habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress Thompson’s request for a lawyer and his post-request statements, failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument remarks referencing Thompson’s request for a lawyer, and failing to present the prosecutor’s remarks in Thompson’s direct appeal. Following a remand, the district court dismissed the petition.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not “substantially” likely that the result of Thompson’s trial or appeal would have been different but for his counsel’s actions. The physical evidence and eyewitness testimony were consistent with testimony by his co-conspirator, Dillon, implicating Thompson, including blood on Thompson’s jeans and gloves that law enforcement recovered from his closet shortly after the murders; the hunting knife found in Thompson’s trunk, freshly cleaned and oiled; Thompson’s presence with Dillon at a laundromat just after the murders; and the forensic pathologist’s testimony about the Hillborns's stab wounds. The evidence against Thompson was “overwhelming.” View "Thompson v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

In 2006, Reyes was convicted of several federal crimes stemming from the armed robbery of a credit union, including brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), He was sentenced as a career offender based on his prior convictions for burglary, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted murder under Illinois state law. After Reyes was convicted, the Supreme Court issued decisions interpreting statutory definitions of “crime of violence,” holding that “residual clauses” in several statutes are unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Reyes brought a second collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting that this emerging case law rendered his conviction and sentence unconstitutional. The district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability concerning the conviction for brandishing a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury was properly instructed. The instruction did not treat Reyes’ conspiracy conviction as a predicate for his colleagues’ brandishing of the firearm. That the brandishing (and robbery) occurred in furtherance of the conspiracy was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Reyes’ conviction under section 924(c). The instruction explained that the government still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes’ colleague brandished the gun in furtherance of a crime of violence--the robbery. View "Reyes v. United States" on Justia Law