Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Makhsous owned three Wisconsin residential care facilities. In 2015, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) found that two of Makhsous’s facilities did not comply with Wisconsin law. Daye is the supervisor of the Aging and Disability Resource Center (ADRC) of Marinette County, which makes recommendations to individuals who inquire about residential care facilities. It does not place individuals in care facilities, monitor care facilities, or issue citations or sanctions to care facilities. In 2016, the ADRC began publishing a “facility directory” for potential residents. Under Wisconsin’s ADRC Operational Practice Guidelines, the directory cannot include facilities that have been found in violation of law.Makhsous filed suit, alleging that Daye violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by failing to include Makhsous’s facilities in the ADRC directory and refusing to refer individuals to her facilities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Daye. Makhsous did not show that Daye harmed a constitutionally protected property interest or discriminated against her. The ADRC directory did not include Makhsous’s facilities because they were found deficient by DHS and because Makhsous failed to ask the ADRC to include them. Makhsous had no rebuttal evidence showing that Daye failed to include her facilities in the directory because of her race. View "Makhsous v. Daye" on Justia Law

Fields filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Chicago police officers, and former Cook County prosecutors. Fields alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights and state law by fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence in a criminal investigation that resulted in Fields’s conviction for a 1984 murder. A retrial resulted in an acquittal, 12 years after the original trial. The individual who had implicated Fields in the crimes eventually confessed to committing the murder. Fields sought a certificate of innocence, which was denied.After a third trial, the jury found in favor of Fields against Detectives O’Callaghan and Murphy on one of his section 1983 claims, against Chicago on Fields’s Monell liability claim, and against O’Callaghan on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and found for the defendants on the remaining claims. The jury awarded Fields $22 million in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $30,000 against O’Callaghan and $10,000 against Murphy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the detectives’ challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning wiretaps, character evidence, evidence of Fields’s 1972 murder conviction, and evidence concerning prison incidents. The evidence allowed a jury to conclude that the city had failed to take the necessary steps to address an unconstitutional practice of using street files and that there was a “systemic underproduction of exculpatory materials to prosecutors and defense counsel.” View "Fields v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Shuhaiber, who is confined to a wheelchair, sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. He alleged that the Stateville Center failed to accommodate his disability by confining him to a cell unsuited to the use of a wheelchair and that he was transported to physical therapy in vans that were not ADA-compliant, leaving him to depend on an officer to lift him. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that Shuhaiber failed to allege that he was deprived of access to facilities or services or that the vans caused him to miss medical appointments.Shuhaiber appealed and sought permission to proceed without prepaying the requisite filing fee. Meanwhile, Shuhaiber, a native of the United Arab Emirates, had been transferred to DHS custody for removal from the United States. Shuhaiber, as a frequent filer of federal lawsuits, had accumulated more than three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for filing frivolous lawsuits and would have had to prepay the filing fee to appeal the dismissal of his claims. Doubting that Shuhaiber was still a “prisoner,” the district court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the appellate filing-fee bar does not apply where the appellant is being held by immigration authorities and no longer is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. The district court was, nonetheless, right to dismiss his claims. View "Shuhaiber v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Calderone, a Chicago police communications operator, was off duty, driving her car when another motorist, Garcia, threw a drink into Calderone’s vehicle, then pulled to the side of the road. Calderone stopped behind Garcia’s car. The women exited their cars and argued. Garcia returned to her vehicle and tried to drive away. Calderone blocked Garcia’s exit. Garcia again got out of her vehicle, grabbed Calderone by the hair, and threw her to the ground. Calderone then shot Garcia with her handgun, which she was legally permitted to carry. The bullet lacerated Garcia's vital organs; she was hospitalized for several months.Calderone was indicted for attempted murder. The city administratively charged her with violations of Personnel Rules and, after a hearing, fired Calderone. Calderone asserts the city did not respond to her claim that the discharge was in self-defense. An Illinois state court acquitted Calderone of attempted murder based on self-defense. The city subsequently reinstated Calderone and held a hearing to determine her back pay.Calderone sued, arguing that her termination deprived her of her Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, that the city deprived her of property and liberty rights without due process, and that the Personnel Rules were vague. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Even if Calderone has a constitutional right to discharge her firearm in self-defense, qualified immunity shielded her supervisors from suit because precedent has not clearly established that right. View "Calderone v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Officers found Turner, a homeless Champaign man well-known to the police, on the ground, rolling around with his pants down, flailing his arms, and babbling unintelligibly, then walking back and forth across the street. Turner responded to the officers incoherently. They decided to detain Turner and send him to a hospital for mental health treatment. While waiting for the ambulance, Turner ran away. The officers gave chase. An officer grabbed Turner’s shoulder. A struggle ensued. Officers pulled Turner to the ground and turned him on his stomach. Struggling to restrain Turner, the officers determined that Turner was not breathing and rushed to get a portable defibrillator. Less than three minutes after the officers noticed that Turner was not breathing, the ambulance arrived. Paramedics rushed Turner to the hospital. He never regained a pulse. An autopsy later determined that Turner died from cardiac arrhythmia—his heart gave out after beating too fast during the encounter--likely caused by an underlying condition. Turner had an enlarged heart and insufficient blood supply to his heart’s chambers. There were no signs of suffocation or trauma to Turner’s body.The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that the officers acted legally to detain Turner and used reasonable force in response to his resistance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The question is not whether officers used best police practices but whether they violated Turner’s Fourth Amendment rights. The officers did not use excessive force. View "Turner v. City of Champaign" on Justia Law

Indiana law provides that state’s election polls open at 6 a.m. and close at 6 p.m. In 2019, Indiana enacted amendments: only a county election board has standing in an Indiana court to request the extension of the hours and only if the board’s members unanimously vote to file suit, IND. CODE 3- 11.7-7-2. Before a court may extend the poll hours, several findings must be made, including that the polls were substantially delayed in opening or subsequently closed during normal polling hours and any extension must be limited to not more than the duration of time the polls were closed and only for those polls whose opening was delayed.Common Cause challenged the amendments as burdening the fundamental right to vote, divesting state courts of jurisdiction to hear federal claims in violation of the Supremacy Clause, and depriving voters of procedural due process. On September 22, 2020, the district court granted a preliminary injunction.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Indiana may enforce the statutes as written. The court noted that no decision of the Supreme Court or any court of appeals has held that the Constitution requires a state to provide a private right of action to enforce any state law. To the extent that federal law will require Indiana to provide such an extension, voters can invoke their federal rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The amendments do not place a burden on the right to vote, View "Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury found Gage guilty of repeatedly sexually assaulting his daughter, H.R.G., when she was a child. Gage asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and present testimony from his son and mother, Josh and Nancy. Gage was living with Nancy at the time of the assaults and most of the assaults occurred on Nancy's property. The state appellate court concluded that Gage was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to call those witnesses because their testimony in post-conviction proceedings concerned only matters such as the layout of Nancy's house.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, despite its incorrect recitation of the "Strickland" prejudice standard. The state court’s analysis focused on the consistency between Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing and H.R.G.’s testimony at trial, which can reasonably be interpreted as “whether the proffered testimony could have affected the outcome,” or its likely impact on the verdict. The state court noted that Josh’s and Nancy’s testimony did not undermine H.R.G.’s testimony in any significant way. View "Gage v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In 2008, an Illinois jury convicted Brown of three counts of first-degree murder for shooting three people outside of the Champaign American Legion building. Brown subsequently filed two post-conviction motions, a direct appeal, and a federal habeas corpus petition. Brown’s only remaining claim is that the Illinois Court unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s Batson holding. Ware was one of two African-Americans in the 60-person venire gathered for Brown’s trial. The court asked whether anyone was familiar with the American Legion where the crime took place. Ware said yes: “Been on the outside. Not inside.” He denied that his familiarity with the site would affect his jury service. Ware was excused at the prosecutor's request. The court overruled a Batson objection, finding that Brown failed to make “a prima facie case that a discriminatory practice was being conducted” and did not ask the prosecution to provide “a race-neutral explanation” for its strike. The Illinois Appellate Court explained that there was no evidence of a pattern of striking African-Americans or of a disproportionate number of strikes used against African-Americans and that Ware meaningfully distinguished himself from other potential jurors by stating that he was familiar with the crime scene.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Illinois court correctly noted the prosecution’s apparent reason for striking Ware—that he had been to the crime scene—and found no circumstances giving rise to an inference that the prosecution engaged in racial discrimination. View "Brown v. Jones" on Justia Law

For several years Miller provided Dix with living space in her basement, without payment of rent. Miller told Dix to move out so she could sell the house. He refused; Miller called the police. Officers told Miller that she could not evict Dix without a court order. Miller called the police again the next day. Officers arrived, allegedly knowing that there had been no domestic disturbance. They prevented Dix from entering the house while Miller hauled Dix’s things outside. Dix protested and yelled insults. Officers threatened to arrest him for disorderly conduct. Eventually, Dix left and got a moving van. When he returned, the officers allowed him inside to retrieve his property but refused him access to certain rooms and took his keys.Dix a pro se suit, with 12 causes of action against nine defendants. The district court struck the pleading citing “redundant, impertinent, and scandalous allegations.” Dix amended his complaint. adding seven causes of action and five defendants, including Fourth Amendment claims against the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. With respect to the Fourth Amendment claims, the court noted that Dix was free to leave at any time and that Miller maintained complete possession and control over her home but had granted Dix a revocable license. When a license is revoked, the licensee becomes a trespasser. A seizure of property occurs when there is meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests; here there was none. Even if there were a seizure, it was reasonable. View "Dix v. Edelman Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Indiana counts an absentee ballot only if it is received by noon on Election Day. In September 2020, a district court found that rule unconstitutional, reasoning that the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which has led to more use of mail-in voting, creates a risk that ballots mailed close to Election Day will not be received on time.The Seventh Circuit reversed an injunction requiring the state to count all absentee ballots received by November 13, 2020. Difficulties attributable to the virus do not require changes in electoral rules. If it is possible to vote in person, the rules for absentee ballots are constitutionally valid if they are supported by a rational basis and do not discriminate based on a forbidden characteristic. It is rational to require absentee votes to be received by Election Day, just as in-person voting ends on Election Day. Counting the votes, and announcing the results, as soon as possible after the polls close serves a civic interest. People can protect themselves by using early in-person voting or posting their ballots early. Those who act at the last minute assume risks even without a pandemic. Federal judges should avoid changing electoral rules close to an election. In September, COVID-19 was not a last-minute event; the district court acted too close to the election. View "Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson" on Justia Law