Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In July 2010, Fieldman climbed into a truck in a Walmart parking lot and told a hitman that he wanted his ex-wife and her boyfriend killed. The hitman was actually an undercover police officer who videotaped their conversation. Fieldman was convicted in Illinois state court for solicitation of murder for hire. Fieldman contested his intent, a necessary element of the offense, and sought to testify about his interactions with the informant during the weeks before his conversation with the hitman. Fieldman believed this testimony would provide critical contextual information about his state of mind and demonstrate that his meeting with the hitman was a charade. The trial court did not allow the jury to hear this testimony because the court concluded it was irrelevant. Fieldman unsuccessfully appealed his convictions.In his federal habeas petition, Fieldman successfully argued that the court’s exclusion of his testimony deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Seventh Circuit held that exclusion of the testimony was contrary to clearly established federal law confirming a defendant’s right to testify, on his own behalf, about circumstances bearing directly on his guilt or innocence or the jury’s ascertainment of guilt. The exclusion of material portions of his testimony had a detrimental effect on his interests because it undercut his entire defense and effectively prevented him from challenging the state’s strongest evidence. View "Fieldman v. Brannon" on Justia Law

A certified class claimed that during 2011 female inmates at an Illinois prison were strip-searched as part of a training exercise for cadet guards; the inmates were required to stand naked, nearly shoulder to shoulder, in a room where they could be seen by others not conducting the searches, including male officers. Menstruating inmates had to remove their sanitary protection in front of others, were not given replacements, and many got blood on their bodies, clothing, and the floor. The naked inmates had to stand barefoot on a floor dirty with menstrual blood and raise their breasts, lift their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough.The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth Amendment theory; a jury returned a defense verdict on the Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed but, on rehearing, reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment protects a right to bodily privacy for convicted prisoners, albeit in a significantly limited way, including during visual inspections. The court remanded for the district court to assess whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that an issue of fact exists as to the reasonableness of the strip and body cavity searches. View "Henry v. Hulett" on Justia Law

In 2000, Indiana University student Jill Behrman went for a bike ride but never returned. The police later found her bicycle less than a mile from the home of Myers, on the north side of Bloomington. Two years later a woman (Owings) confessed to the murder. The case was reopened when a hunter came upon Behrman’s remains far from the location Owings described. Recognizing her story no longer added up, Owings recanted her confession and admitted to lying about the murder in hopes of leniency on other charges. A renewed investigation led the authorities to Myers, who was eventually charged with the murder. Multiple Indiana courts affirmed his conviction.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of his application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Myers’s trial counsel was plainly deficient by promising to prove that Behrman was killed by someone else although he had to know he could not follow through on that promise and by failing to object to testimony about a bloodhound tracking Behrman’s scent. However, given the strength of the state’s case against him, including many self‐incriminating statements that Myers made to many different people, combined with other evidence, his counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice him. View "Myers v. Neal" on Justia Law

Adams, superintendent of the school district in 2013-2016, requested a forensic audit of the district’s expenditures and subsequently had disputes with board members that involved Adams filing a police complaint. The Board of Education revoked an offer to extend her three-year contract. Adams suspended the district’s business manager for financial irregularities. The Board blocked her email and told state education officials that Adams was no longer superintendent. Adams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury awarded $400,000 in damages.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the police report was not a personal grievance, but a matter of public concern within the scope of the First Amendment. The potential for physical altercations between public officials implies that an important public institution was not working properly, particularly given that a proposed forensic audit “seems to have unsettled at least one" Board member. The police report and the controversy more generally could have affected the outcome of elections and the daily management of the school system. The record permitted a reasonable jury to find that an ordinary employee in Adams’s position would be deterred from speaking by the prospect of losing her job and was permitted to consider the possibility that Adams would have remained on the job longer had she kept silent. Damages for a First Amendment violation are not limited by the duration of contracts. View "Adams v. Board of Education Harvey School District 152" on Justia Law

Biegert texted his mother that he had taken pills in an apparent suicide attempt; she called the Green Bay police and requested a welfare check. She stated that Biegert was depressed, had a history of suicide attempts, was alone, and had no weapons nor vehicles. Officers were dispatched to Biegert’s apartment. As they approached, Biegert called police dispatch, expressing concern that there were strangers outside his door. While Biegert was on the call, the officers knocked and announced themselves. The officers did not know that Biegert had called dispatch and grew suspicious when they heard him walk away from the door, rummage for something, and return to open the door. Biegert opened the door, confirmed his identity and that he was depressed, and allowed both officers into the apartment. Biegert initially cooperated. He began resisting when the officers tried to pat him down. The officers used fists, Tasers, and batons. Biegert armed himself with a kitchen knife. When he began to stab an officer, they shot him. He died at the scene. In rejecting a suit alleging excessive force, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the officers reasonably restrained Biegert and reasonably resorted to lethal force when Biegert threatened them with a knife. View "Estate of Biegert v. Molitor" on Justia Law

Speech First challenged University of Illinois policies that allegedly impermissibly chill the speech of its student members. The Bias Assessment and Response Team (BART) responds to reports of bias-motivated incidents. Most students contacted by BART either do not respond or decline to meet; they suffer no consequences. If a student agrees to meet, BART staff explains that the student's conduct drew attention and gives the student an opportunity to reflect upon her behavior. BART’s reports are not referred to the University Police. The University Housing Bias Incident Protocol addresses bias-motivated incidents committed within University housing. There are no sanctions or discipline associated with a reported incident. When a student breaches his housing contract or violates University policy, there is a separate disciplinary process. Expression of the views described in the complaint would not contravene housing contracts nor violate any University policies. Individuals subject to student discipline may be subject to “No Contact Directives” (NCDs) and prohibited from communication with identified parties. NCDs do not constitute disciplinary findings and are not part of the students’ official disciplinary records. An NCD does not prohibit the student from talking or writing about the other. The University has not investigated or punished any members of Speech First under any of the challenged policies.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction. Speech First failed to demonstrate that its members face a credible fear that they will face discipline on the basis of their speech as a result of the policies. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen" on Justia Law

Kizart was driving alone when Officer Russell stopped him for speeding. As they talked, Russell smelled burnt marijuana coming from Kizart’s car. Kizart explained that his brother had smoked marijuana in the car earlier. Russell stated he would search the vehicle, had Kizart step out of the car, patted him down, and found no drugs or weapons. Russell searched the passenger compartment, including areas not in plain view, for several minutes. Russell asked Kizart how to open the trunk. Kizart did not respond and “looked sort of shocked” for about five seconds, making Russell “suspicious.” Russell removed the keys from the ignition and used them to open the trunk. Toward the back of the trunk, he found a backpack with a garbage bag inside, which contained three smaller bags of what appeared to be raw marijuana and a “white, vacuum-packed brick ” that turned out to be methamphetamine. The backpack contained approximately three pounds of marijuana and three pounds of methamphetamine.Charged with possessing marijuana and methamphetamine, each with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(D). Kizart unsuccessfully moved to suppress the drugs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the circumstances, including the smell of burnt marijuana and Kizart’s reaction and behavior when Russell asked Kizart about the trunk, provided probable cause to search his car’s trunk. View "United States v. Kizart" on Justia Law

For nearly a week Lentz feigned ignorance as she pretended to help investigators locate her missing father. Officers soon discovered the father’s decaying body hidden at the office building the two shared. All signs pointed to Lentz as the murderer. Lentz, with her young daughter, voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station under the pretense of follow-up questioning for the investigation. For the first hour and a half, officers asked general questions, like when and where she last saw her father, to commit Lentz to her story. They then took a cigarette break. When the interview resumed, officers read Lentz her Miranda rights and confronted her with the mounting evidence against her. Over the next four hours, Lentz slowly confessed to shooting her father. In the state trial court, Lentz unsuccessfully moved to suppress her videotaped confession. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed her first-degree murder conviction; state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court’s decisions that Lentz was not in custody during the pre-Miranda portion of the questioning and that her confession was not involuntary, despite officers’ comments about her daughter, were not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Lentz v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Cook County, Illinois revised its policies in favor of broader access to pretrial release. The plaintiffs are nine black Chicago residents, arrested and charged with felonies, whom the county trial courts admitted to bail subject to electronic monitoring supervised by the Sheriff. They allege that Cook County Sheriff Dart disagreed with the revised policies, independently reviewed their bail orders, and decided they should not be released on those conditions. They were neither released on monitoring nor left at liberty but remained in jail for about two weeks. Motions for rules to show cause were filed. Two plaintiffs were released in the dead of night, hours before the motion hearings. The district court dismissed most of the plaintiff's civil rights claims.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to proceed on federal constitutional claims for wrongful pretrial detention and denial of equal protection, and on state-law claims for contempt of court. A core function of the Fourth Amendment is to put neutral decision-makers between unchecked official discretion and invasions of private liberty by search or seizure. Once the plaintiffs appeared before the court, probable cause ceased to be a justification for the Sheriff’s unilateral seizure. View "Williams v. Dart" on Justia Law

Sommerfield was born in Germany, where some of his family members had died in concentration camps. He emigrated, settled in Chicago, and joined the police department. His supervisor was Sergeant Knasiak. For years, Sommerfield endured vicious anti-Semitic abuse from Knasiak. After Knasiak insulted the Mexican ethnicity of Sommerfield’s girlfriend, Sommerfield filed a formal complaint register (CR). Two days later, Knasiak accused Sommerfield of insubordination for an unrelated incident, recommending suspension. This was the only CR Knasiak had ever issued. Sommerfield’s five-day suspension was unprecedented for the minor infraction of “failure to report location.” Later Sommerfield was denied a promotion, although he was rated “well-qualified.” Sommerfield sued. The court dismissed Knasiak. Sommerfield won a jury verdict of $30,000 against Chicago.Sommerfield again sued Knasiak and the city in 2008, alleging harassment, discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin, and retaliation based on protected activities. The district court dismissed the claims against the city but awarded Sommerfield $540,000 in punitive damages, $8,703.96 in pre-judgment interest, plus another $54,315.24 in economic damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the evidence was not “overwhelming,” there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Knasiak filed the CR out of discriminatory animus and that Knasiak was the real decision-maker with respect to the adverse actions taken against Sommerfield. Upholding the award of punitive damages, the court stated that, although Knasiak’s harassment never turned physically violent, his conduct was “extremely reprehensible.” View "Sommerfield v. Knasiak" on Justia Law