Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Fredrickson, in pre-trial federal custody, unsuccessfully sought release under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3142 asserting that conditions existed to ensure that he would not be a flight risk or a threat to the public. Five months later Fredrickson filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. Fredrickson then sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that the court wrongly denied him release on bond and that he was denied effective assistance by counsel who allowed his bail hearing to be delayed and then failed to appeal. He also challenged the determination that his notice of appeal was untimely, arguing that the Bail Reform Act permits him to appeal his detention at any time.The district court dismissed the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that in January 2020 Fredrickson was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child. His sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 2020; he faces a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The district court appropriately refused to entertain the request for pretrial release in his section 2241 petition. A federal detainee’s request for release pending trial can be considered under only the Bail Reform Act, which created a comprehensive scheme to control pretrial release or detention decisions. No authority allows a detainee to contest pretrial detention through a section 2241 petition simply because he missed the deadline to appeal. View "Fredrickson v. Terrill" on Justia Law

Officer Garrison encountered Gibson, a suspected drug trafficker, walking with a companion. Although initially a consensual encounter, Garrison questioned Gibson and his companion and briefly detained Gibson. After Gibson and his companion departed, Garrison spotted a methamphetamine pipe under his patrol vehicle. Local law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of Gibson’s vehicle in the curtilage of his driveway. A drug detection dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in the vehicle, though nothing was found. Earlier that day, Gibson’s wife had met with DEA agents to tell them about methamphetamine inside the home. Police used information Mrs. Gibson had provided to obtain a search warrant. The search of the home uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, currency, and AK-47 rifles, which led to Gibson’s arrest. Gibson moved to suppress all evidence seized during the search, alleging he was detained without reasonable suspicion, unlawfully frisked, arrested without probable cause, stopped without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and the traffic stop exceeded a permissible scope. Upon learning of his wife’s cooperation, Gibson also argued her statement was insufficiently attenuated to justify the search warrant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Mrs. Gibson’s voluntary statement with DEA agents was independently sufficient to sustain findings of probable cause and sufficiently attenuated from subsequent events to preclude suppression. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Following a 1992 fight that involved Johnson, Herron, and Walker, two shooters shot the three men. Johnson survived. In the hospital, Johnson described a shooter by the street name “Duke,” where Duke lived, and Duke's car. Johnson identified Duke and his accomplice from a photo array. Police pulled over a vehicle matching Johnson’s description and arrested the driver, Kirkman, and the passenger, who matched the general description of the second shooter. Kirkman had a tattoo of Duke on his arm. Police took additional photos and presented a second photo array to Johnson, who identified them as the shooters. At trial, Johnson identified Kirkman and his passenger as the shooters. There was disputed testimony about the cause of the fight. Convicted of murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, Kirkman was sentenced to life in prison.Johnson had a change of heart and submitted an affidavit, identifying Ford and an unknown man as the shooters. At Kirkman’s post-conviction hearing, Johnson testified that he and his family had been threatened. Other testimony was inconsistent with Johnson’s. Illinois courts denied post-conviction relief, finding that Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. Johnson later pleaded guilty for perjury but failed to specify which statement was false. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Illinois courts found Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. An evidentiary hearing satisfied Kirkman’s due process rights. The Illinois trial court’s determination defeated Kirkman’s innocence and perjured testimony claims. View "Kirkman v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In December 2012, Chicago Police officers responded to an anonymous call reporting a Hispanic man in a black sweater and black hat, carrying a bag, and climbing under a warehouse fence. They found someone who matched the description. After stopping and frisking him, they determined he was not engaged in any crime. Howell, walking toward the police, was white and wearing a black jacket and dark hat. When an officer approached to speak to him, Howell did not answer, looked panicked, and put his hands in his pockets. The officer patted Howell down and found a gun in his jacket. A federal gun charge followed. Howell unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of his suppression motion and vacated his conviction for possessing that gun. The court noted that the facts in the pretrial record differed significantly from those presented at trial, where the arresting officer testified that he decided to proceed with the pat-down only after Howell ignored a directive to remove his hands from his pockets. Viewing the pretrial record as a whole, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Howell. The court did not reverse Howell’s conviction on a second gun charge that resulted from the execution of a warrant to search Howell’s apartment three months after the initial stop and the ensuing discovery of more guns and ammunition. View "United States v. Howell" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Tuduj, having received extensive dental treatment, filed a “deliberate indifference” suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his dentists and prison officials. The court recruited counsel to assist Tuduj in filing an amended complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel defended against two summary judgment motions, one arguing that Tuduj had not exhausted his administrative remedies and another on the meritsWhile the motions were pending, Tuduj moved “for leave to represent himself,” stating that he was “concerned that his counsel has filed a structurally, technically and legally insufficient response doomed to be denied.” He asked to file his own brief, except “in the event this Honorable Court deems counsel’s response … legally sufficient and Grants same[,] Plaintiff would be open to continued effective representation.” A magistrate denied Tuduj’s motion, stating that Tuduj “varie[d] between saying he would like to" represent himself and "indicating that he is happy with counselʹs representation as long as he prevails.” The district judge granted the motions for summary judgment, citing professional judgment and finding “no competent evidence” of any policy that unlawfully influenced dental‐treatment decisions. The Seventh Circuit rejected Tuduj’s argument that the court wrongly denied his “unqualified” right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. 1654, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the Seventh Amendment. The district court permissibly denied his equivocal request. View "Tuduj v. Newbold" on Justia Law

In 2011, Illinois prisoner Williams was diagnosed with a left-eye cataract. He became completely blind in that eye and experienced dizziness, acute pain, photophobia, and the feeling that some foreign substance was in his eye. His doctors recommended cataract extraction surgery; without this common operation, they would be unable to detect other vision-threatening conditions. Wexford, which provides prison health services, refused to authorize the surgery, based on its “one good eye” policy. In February 2016, an optometrist diagnosed a right-eye cataract and a possible macular hole and vitreomacular traction. Weeks later, a specialist recommended cataract extraction. Doctors found no vision in Williams’s left eye and cataracts in both eyes. Still, he did not qualify for surgery.In February 2016, Williams filed a grievance form, checking a box indicating an emergency. Pontiac’s warden responded by checking a box: “an emergency is not substantiated. Offender should submit this grievance in the normal manner.” Williams asserts that the Administrative Review Board (ARB). denied his grievance. Williams filed a second grievance in August; the warden denied emergency status. The ARB returned the grievance to Williams without addressing the merits. It checked boxes indicating that Williams had not satisfied the requirements of the standard procedure; he was required to provide responses from his counselor and others. Williams filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, stating that Williams “did not file a standard grievance" after the denials of emergency status, thereby failing to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Williams did enough to satisfy the PLRA. View "Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Attorney General imposed conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG), 34 U.S.C.10151, which the primary source of federal criminal justice enforcement funding for state and local governments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction as to conditions that required that state or local officials honor requests to provide federal agents advance notice of the scheduled release of aliens in custody and that state or local correctional facilities give federal agents access to aliens in their custody. The Seventh Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction. The district court granted a permanent injunction and invalidated a condition requiring that state or local governments certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373, which prohibits them from restricting their officials from communicating information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual to the INS, was unconstitutional but stayed the injunction to the extent that it applied beyond Chicago.The Seventh Circuit again held that the Attorney General cannot pursue the executive branch's policy objectives through the power of the purse or the arm of local law enforcement, rejecting the Attorney General’s assertion that Congress itself provided that authority in the language of the statutes. Chicago has determined that effective law enforcement requires the cooperation of its undocumented residents; such cooperation cannot be accomplished if those residents fear immigration consequences should they communicate with the police; and, local law enforcement must remain independent from federal immigration enforcement. The Byrne JAG grant was enacted to support the needs of local law enforcement to help fight crime, but “is being used as a hammer to further a completely different policy of the executive branch.” States do not forfeit all autonomy over their own police power merely by accepting federal grants. There is no reason to stay the application of the injunction. View "City of Chicago v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2017-2018, FBI Child Exploitation Task Force Office Lynn was investigating the sharing of child pornography through online, peer‐to‐peer networks. His investigation led him to believe child pornography would be found in the college apartment, house, and pickup truck of 40‐year‐old Rees. Seeking warrants, Officer Lynn gave a magistrate a 17‐page probable‐cause affidavit, describing his training and experience, methods for tracking child pornography on peer‐to‐peer networks, and the specific investigation that steered him toward Rees’s residences and vehicle. When officers executed the resulting warrants they found thousands of still images and almost 200 videos of child pornography on Rees’s computer. Charged with receiving and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), (5)(B), Rees unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The district court accepted Rees’s conditional guilty plea and sentenced Rees to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant‐issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability evidence of child‐pornography crimes would be uncovered in the searches; even if the warrants were invalid, the officers executed them in objective good faith. View "United States v. Rees" on Justia Law

Kenosha Officer Torres, on patrol, received a call requesting assistance apprehending Siler. The dispatcher stated that Siler was wanted on a warrant for strangulation and suffocation, had taken a vehicle without consent, and was known to have violent tendencies. Siler did not actually have a warrant for strangulation and suffocation; he was wanted for violating probation. When Torres spotted Siler, he activated his lights and siren. Siler did not stop, resulting in a three-minute chase. Siler crashed his car and fled on foot. Torres followed him to an auto body shop. Bystanders indicated that Siler was in the back room. Siler again attempted to flee. Torres blocked the exit. Within seconds Torres and Siler were on opposite sides of an SUV and began to move in “cat and mouse” fashion. Torres pointed his service revolver at Siler, ordering him to the ground. Siler responded, “fuck you” and “shoot me.” Siler bent over and, when he stood up, Torres saw a black cylindrical object pressed against Siler’s forearm. Torres yelled “drop it.” Siler responded, “fuck you,” “no,” and “shoot me.” Torres still could not see Siler’s hands. Eventually, Torres fired his gun seven times successively. Siler died from gunshot wounds. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by Siler’s estate, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Torres, citing qualified immunity. Torres’s action conformed to constitutional standards. View "Siler v. City of Kenosha" on Justia Law

The doctor examined Chambers during the intake process at the Stateville Correctional Center. Chambers was housed there for a few weeks when he was processed into state custody. Chambers requested medication to treat a flare-up of a painful chronic condition, herpes. The doctor did not provide the medication. Chambers filed a grievance with the Stateville grievance office but was transferred to a different prison before the grievance was investigated. A grievance officer returned the grievance to Chambers unreviewed and invited him to take the matter to the Administrative Review Board (ARB), which normally serves in an appellate capacity reviewing decisions of grievance officers. ARB’s regulations also specify that grievances pertaining to problems at an earlier-assigned prison must be filed directly with ARB. Chambers skipped this step and instead sued the prison doctor under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners must pursue their complaints about prison conditions through all levels of the relevant administrative-review system before bringing a lawsuit in federal court. View "Chambers v. Sood" on Justia Law