Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Muresanu began participating in an ATM skimming scheme when he was 17 years old and had recently arrived from his native Romania. Muresanu was charged with possession of counterfeit access devices and three counts of attempted aggravated identity theft. There is no such federal crime; the statutory definition of aggravated identity theft does not cover attempts. Muresanu’s attorney did not object to the defect in a pretrial motion but “strategically waited" and moved for acquittal on the identity-theft counts after the government rested its case. The judge ruled that Muresanu had waived the objection, then deleted the attempt language from the jury instructions and instructed the jury on the elements of the completed crime. The modified instruction conformed to the statutory offense but varied from the indictment. Convicted, Muresanu was sentenced to 34 months on count one and a consecutive mandatory 24-month sentence on the identity-theft counts.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judge correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines to count one. Defects in the indictment are not jurisdictional and must be raised by pretrial motion but the modification of the jury instructions led the jury to convict Muresanu of crimes not charged by the grand jury, violating his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on charges brought by indictment. That error is per se reversible. View "United States v. Muresanu" on Justia Law

While confined in the Cook County Jail, Koger accumulated books in his cell. Guards removed more than 30. Prisoners may not have more than three books or magazines at a time (excluding religious and legal materials). On remand, the judge granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that the policy is valid under the First Amendment and that it is irrelevant whether the guards asked Koger which books he wanted to keep or what the Jail did with the confiscated books.The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The court noted Cook County’s stated reasons for the policy: books can be used for coded messages among prisoners, making it necessary to leaf through pages when doing a property search; books may be used to hide drugs, weapons, and other forbidden items. Curtailing the need for labor-intensive searches is a good reason for limiting the number of books in a cell. The court remanded in part. Koger lost a possessory interest in the books but he did not automatically lose his property interest. He was entitled to sell or ship the books, or reclaim them after his confinement. In addition to ascertaining the Jail’s policy, the district court must decide what choices, if any, were offered to Koger concerning the excess books and what became of them. View "Koger v. Cook County" on Justia Law

The cause of Cory's 2006 death was undetermined. The police later reopened the investigation. A grand jury indicted her husband, Lovelace, an Illinois criminal defense lawyer. Lovelace's first trial resulted in a hung jury. In his 2017 retrial, a jury found him not guilty. In a suit against under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Lovelace claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence, coerced witnesses, and concealed exculpatory evidence. The case was assigned to Judge Myerscough. A year later, the case was reassigned to Judge Bruce. Months later, the plaintiffs successfully moved to disqualify Bruce. The case was reassigned back to Myerscough, who informed counsel about circumstances that might seem relevant to her impartiality, her usual practice. Myerscough's daughter had just been hired as an Exoneration Project attorney. The plaintiffs’ law firm funds the Project and donates the time of its attorneys. The plaintiffs’ attorney stated that she worked with the judge’s daughter at the Project but did not supervise her and was not responsible for her compensation. Screening was implemented. Myerscough had recently attended a fundraiser for Illinois Innocence Project, where her daughter previously worked. The fundraiser recognized “exonerees,” including Lovelace. Defendants unsuccessfully requested that Myerscough disqualify herself under 28 U.S.C. 455(a).The Seventh Circuit denied a mandamus petition. There was no reasonable question as to Myerscough’s impartiality; no “objective, disinterested observer” could “entertain a significant doubt that justice would be done” based on the fundraiser. Section 455(b) requires recusal only if a judge’s close relative is “acting as a lawyer in the proceeding” or is known “to have an interest that could be substantially affected.” Nothing beyond the bare fact of the daughter’s employment poses a risk of bias. View "Gibson v. Myerscough" on Justia Law

Bridges, a Cook County Department of Corrections pretrial detainee, fell out of the upper bunk to which he had been assigned and injured himself. He sued, asserting that his injuries were caused by the defendants’ practice of ignoring medically necessary lower bunk prescriptions. Bridges cited five lawsuits filed by detainees who alleged that, between 2005 and 2012, they were injured when using upper bunks after their lower bunk prescriptions were ignored. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. A local government may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents; it is when the execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the governmental entity is responsible under section 1983. The Department houses thousands of detainees, with hundreds entering and leaving on a daily basis; three or five incidents over a seven-year period is inadequate as a matter of law to demonstrate a widespread custom or practice. Nothing connected the incidents and they were not so common as to place the defendants on notice of a widespread practice. View "Bridges v. Dart" on Justia Law

Law enforcement learned that Lee was distributing large quantities of ice methamphetamine and arranged a controlled buy. The source purchased over 83 grams of ice methamphetamine. Days later, officers conducted a planned traffic stop. Lee consented to a K-9 walkaround. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Troopers searched the car and found over seven pounds of ice methamphetamine and $19,170 in cash, including $900 of marked money used in the controlled buy. Lee stated that he had been dealing ice methamphetamine in the area for three years. In the seven months before his arrest, Lee distributed approximately 100 pounds. Agents executed a search warrant at Lee’s residence and discovered ice methamphetamine, 12 firearms in close proximity to the drugs, scales, drug paraphernalia, and ammunition. Lee pled guilty to possessing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting Lee’s argument that he should not have received two extra criminal history points under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) for dealing methamphetamine while on supervision for a drunk driving offense. The court vacated a term of supervised release that would have prohibited him from interacting with known felons unless he receives the probation officer’s permission; that term violates the rule against delegating Article III power. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

As a result of a 2009 stroke, Perry, serving a long sentence for murder, suffers from aphasia, which impairs his ability to speak, write, and understand words. Perry pursued direct and collateral review in Indiana’s courts. On collateral attack, an appointed lawyer abandoned the case. Five months after dismissing the state proceeding in order to obtain assistance, he refiled it. The state judge dismissed the renewed application, ruling that the original dismissal was with prejudice. Perry then filed a federal petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which was summarily dismissed as untimely. Time during which a properly-filed state collateral attack is pending is excluded from the one year available to file in federal court, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), but the federal judge determined that Perry’s second state proceeding was not properly filed because a second or successive collateral attack in Indiana requires judicial permission that Perry did not seek. The court declined to apply equitable tolling: Perry displayed all of the diligence needed for tolling but did not encounter any extraordinary circumstance that blocked timely filing because aphasia is not an “external” obstacle, The Seventh Circuit vacated. The record does not permit a determination of whether Perry’s difficulties stem from a brain injury that left him unable to understand or use language well enough to protect his interests or from his failure to do enough legal research to understand which time in state court would be excluded under section 2244(d)(2). View "Perry v. Brown" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmate Glover sued prison medical staff and Department of Corrections officials for deliberate indifference and for violating his right to equal protection after they denied him medicine prescribed for post‐surgical erectile dysfunction, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Glover alleges that treatment of his erectile dysfunction following his prostate cancer surgery was necessary for penile rehabilitation and time-sensitive because he was at risk of suffering permanent loss of erectile function if his condition was left untreated for too long following surgery. Glover unsuccessfully moved to substitute the Department’s new medical director, Dr. Holzmacher, as a defendant. The court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court abused its discretion by not allowing Glover to amend his complaint: “It is difficult to see why, under these circumstances, it would not be in the interest of justice for Glover to be able to sue the person that all agree is responsible for denying him access to Cialis.” The defendants argued that, absent precedent specifically recognizing that erectile dysfunction is a serious medical need, it would not have been clear to Holzmacher that the prison was obligated to heed the advice of Glover’s off‐site urologist and prison physician and approve a Cialis prescription; the court declined to resolve the matter of qualified immunity. The answer to the question is not so obvious that permitting Glover to bring Holzmacher into the case would necessarily constitute a futile act. View "Glover v. Carr" on Justia Law

Pontiac inmate Robertson was held in isolation, allegedly in deplorable conditions, for several days before he attempted suicide. He filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a motion, seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). He claimed he had no assets other than $219 in his prison account and no income except an occasional allowance from his mother. The court granted the motion. Years later, days before trial, the state moved to dismiss his case because he had failed to disclose in his IFP affidavit that the state had agreed to pay him $4,000 to settle previous cases. Robertson actually received the money about a year after filing the affidavit. In addition, the prison never sent the required filing fee. The district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), requires only disclosure of assets that may currently be used to pay the filing fee, and in the alternative, even if expected payments should have been included, the affidavit is “untrue” only if the prisoner’s statement was a deliberate misrepresentation. View "Robertson v. French" on Justia Law

In 2011, Dotson was indicted for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The indictment listed six prior felony convictions and alleged that Dotson qualified for the 15-year minimum sentence mandated in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR identified three convictions as qualifying for ACCA enhancement (Indiana armed robbery, dealing in cocaine, and attempted robbery) but was silent on whether any of Dotson’s other convictions (Indiana burglary, marijuana possession, and theft and receipt of stolen property) qualified. Nobody raised the issue. The district court sentenced Dotson as a career offender to 188 months and denied his subsequent post-conviction petition, finding that Dotson had four qualifying ACCA predicates—the three originally designated as such in the PSR plus one for burglary. After the district court’s decision, one of the predicates the PSR originally determined qualified under ACCA (attempted robbery) was eliminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government can save the enhanced sentence by substituting another of Dotson’s convictions—one listed in the PSR as part of Dotson’s criminal history but not designated as or found to be an ACCA predicate at sentencing. The court reasoned that the substituted conviction included in the indictment and the PSR and Dotson recognized in legal filings and apparently believed that his burglary conviction had served as an ACCA predicate at his sentencing. View "Dotson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Martinez was shot dead. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Hartsfield's convictions for first-degree murder and home invasion. Hartsfield claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, insisting that he repeatedly told counsel that he wished to testify, that counsel asked his mother to “convince” him not to testify, and counsel told Hartsfield that he would “get his chance” when the judge admonished him about his right to testify, but the judge never did that. Hartsfield claims counsel “shushed” him. Hartsfield’s mother supported his statements. The Illinois court affirmed the dismissal of Hartsfield’s postconviction petition, applying the “Strickland” standard and finding that counsel made “a tactical decision,” that Hartsfield was aware that testifying was ultimately his decision, and that Hartsfield’s failure to contemporaneously assert his right barred his claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Hartsfield’s federal habeas petition, first agreeing that the “Strickland” standard applied to the allegation. Without clearly established federal law, it is not clear that the Illinois court unreasonably decided that Hartsfield did not meet his burden of proving that his attorney actually prohibited his testimony. It is not reasonably probable that his proposed testimony would have affected the verdict. Two eyewitnesses placed Hartsfield at the scene of the crime, armed with a weapon and a motive. Hartsfield’s comments later that night further implicated him. Hartsfield’s uncorroborated story, that he was alone, driving around during the time of the murder, is “little more than a generic denial of guilt," insufficient to establish prejudice. View "Hartsfield v. Dorethy" on Justia Law