Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Henry Underwood, had chosen to represent himself in a trial where he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. During the trial, Underwood refused to answer a question during cross-examination and was subsequently held in criminal contempt. He was convicted of the charged offense and appealed against the conviction, arguing that his pretrial waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary and that the criminal contempt finding was improper.The court rejected both arguments. First, it found that the defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. It took into consideration the extent of the court's formal inquiry into the defendant's waiver, evidence in the record showing the defendant understood the dangers of self-representation, the defendant's background and experience, and the context of the choice to proceed pro se.Secondly, the court found that the criminal contempt finding was appropriate because the defendant had improperly refused to testify on cross-examination in the judge’s presence, which met the literal requirements of Rule 42(b) that permits summary disposition of criminal contempt. Furthermore, the court held that by choosing to testify, the defendant had waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and could not refuse to answer questions relevant to his testimony.The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Underwood" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the constitutionality of Cook County, Illinois's use of cameras to record holding cell toilets in courthouses throughout the county. The plaintiffs, pretrial detainees, claimed that the cameras infringed upon their Fourth Amendment privacy interests and also constituted an intrusion upon seclusion under Illinois law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Cook County and Sheriff Thomas J. Dart, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using the toilets in courthouse holding cells. While it acknowledged that there are questions around the extent to which detainees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodies while in a holding cell, it found that any privacy rights are substantially diminished. The court further held that Cook County's use of cameras in courthouse holding cells was reasonable due to the security risks inherent in the setting. The court also determined that one of the plaintiffs, Alicea, had standing to sue, but the other plaintiffs did not.Furthermore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for intrusion upon seclusion. It held that the plaintiff had not met his burden on the fourth element of the claim, anguish and suffering.Lastly, the court affirmed the district court's decisions related to discovery and attorneys' fees. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in these decisions. Thus, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Alicea v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

In 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the disorderly conduct convictions of Jamison Krahenbuhl, an Air Force veteran. Krahenbuhl had been convicted following an incident at the Milo C. Huempfner Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic in Green Bay, Wisconsin. During a respiratory therapy appointment, Krahenbuhl became agitated and engaged in abusive language and disruptive behavior that led to the clinic staff summoning VA police. He was subsequently charged with two counts of disorderly conduct under 38 C.F.R. § 1.218(a)(5), (b)(11) and was found guilty on both counts.On appeal, Krahenbuhl argued that his convictions violated his First Amendment rights, and that the government failed to prove all the elements of the crimes. The appellate court, however, disagreed. It determined that the clinic was a nonpublic forum, where greater regulation of speech is permissible. The court found that the regulation under which Krahenbuhl was convicted was viewpoint neutral and reasonable, given the clinic's primary aim of providing medical care to veterans. The court also rejected Krahenbuhl's argument that the government failed to prove that the clinic was under the charge and control of the VA and not under the charge and control of the General Services Administration, finding that this was an invited error. Consequently, Krahenbuhl's convictions were affirmed. View "USA v. Krahenbuhl" on Justia Law

Inmate Chadrick Fulks filed a lawsuit against several prison officials at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, alleging constitutionally deficient medical care, the use of excessive force, and a sexual assault. The district court concluded that he had successfully exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to only two claims. During the course of the litigation, the court found that Fulks had knowingly submitted a forged document and provided perjured testimony. As a sanction for this misconduct, the court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court noted that even though dismissal prevented Fulks from litigating his allegation of sexual assault, there were other remedies available to him, such as through the Bureau's Office of Internal Affairs or under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003. The court concluded that while the district court's decision was severe, it was not unreasonable given the circumstances. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the entire action as a sanction for Fulks's submission of a forged document and perjured testimony. View "Fulks v. Watson" on Justia Law

Federal prisoner Sargeant filed a grievance against a prison official, Cruze, after she commented on his sexual preferences and refused to give him books that he had ordered. When Sargeant's case manager, Barfield, showed Sargeant the prison’s response, Sargeant noticed that it was signed by Cruze and pointed out that, under the prison’s rules, Cruze should not have seen a grievance lodged against her. Barfield then told others about the grievance. Sargeant filed a separate grievance against Barfield. In retaliation, Barfield “repeatedly” put Sargeant, who had cooperated with the government, in cells with prisoners known to be violent. This led to fights until Sargeant was transferred to another prison.Sargeant sued seeking monetary damages, alleging that Barfield retaliated against him for filing grievances. He did not identify which of his constitutional rights she had allegedly violated. In screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the judge decided that Sargeant could proceed only on a First Amendment retaliation claim and did not discuss any possible Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Under the Bivens doctrine, a federal prisoner cannot recover damages for a violation of First Amendment rights. Recognizing a failure-to-protect claim in this context would risk intrusion with the federal prison system; the claim presents separation-of-powers concerns and special factors not accounted for by any of the Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents. View "Sargeant v. Barfield" on Justia Law

Escorted by an officer who had followed him from the scene of a shooting, Hudson entered the Medical Center seeking emergency treatment for a gunshot wound. The officer stood outside Hudson’s hospital room. Medical staff discovered Hudson was concealing “something plastic” in his mouth and spent nearly 20 minutes admonishing Hudson to spit it out before he finally complied, revealing a device used to convert a firearm into a fully automatic weapon. Hudson moved to suppress the device, arguing that the medical staff acted as government agents in conducting a warrantless search.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Knowledge and inaction alone are insufficient to establish an agency relationship. There must be some evidence of government participation in or affirmative encouragement of the private search before a court will hold it unconstitutional. Viewed in context, the officer answered questions but did not direct the medical staff to act in any particular way. The facts supported a finding that medical staff acted with the purpose of providing medical treatment, not assisting law enforcement. The court noted that both the officer and the medical staff apparently assumed that Hudson was concealing drugs, voicing concerns that the suspected drugs could cause him to overdose. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, section 26, protects the right to hunt. Since 1990, Wisconsin has had a special statute making it a crime to harass hunters in various ways; a 2016 amendment makes it a crime to interfere intentionally with a hunter by “maintaining a visual or physical proximity” to the hunter, by “approaching or confronting” the hunter, or by photographing, videotaping, audiotaping, or otherwise recording the hunter's activity. The plaintiffs oppose hunting. They have observed hunters on public land, have sometimes approached and confronted them, have photographed and filmed hunters’ activities, and intend to continue all those activities.The plaintiffs assert that the prohibitions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In a pre-enforcement challenge, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the law and that their facial constitutional challenges failed on the merits.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, first holding that the plaintiffs have standing to bring both their as-applied and facial challenges before formal enforcement efforts because the statute has been used to harass and intimidate them and has caused them to refrain from engaging in activity protected by the First Amendment. Certain clauses of the law are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The statute discriminates against speech and expressive activity based on viewpoint and the defendants have not offered justifications for the provision that satisfy strict scrutiny. View "Brown v. Kemp" on Justia Law

The Protect Illinois Communities Act, Pub. Act 102-1116 (effective January 2023) and three municipal laws regulate assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the Act, which makes it unlawful for any person within Illinois knowingly to “manufacture, deliver, sell, import, or purchase … an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge,” without reaching Second Amendment issues. The Act includes exceptions for “trained professionals” and “grandfathered individuals.”The Seventh Circuit upheld denials of injunctions, concluding that the state and the municipalities have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation. There is a long tradition, unchanged from when the Second Amendment was added to the Constitution, supporting a distinction between weapons and accessories designed for military or law-enforcement use, and weapons designed for personal use. The Act respects and relies on that distinction. “From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” The fact that many people own assault weapons does not insulate them from regulation. View "Herrera v. Raoul" on Justia Law

Vidal-Martinez, a non-citizen, was arrested three times for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. DHS detained him and initiated deportation. Vidal-Martinez filed a habeas petition, arguing that his detention was unconstitutional because it impeded his ability to defend himself against the drunk-driving charges. ICE transferred Vidal-Martinez to county custody “until the completion of [the] criminal matter, then released to his ICE detainer.” Vidal-Martinez was convicted of DUI and sentenced to 236 days in jail. He was then returned to ICE custody. Due to a lack of evidence that he posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, the district court granted Vidal-Martinez’s habeas petition and ordered his release.Vidal-Martinez filed a FOIA request, 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking disclosure from ICE of documents related to his custody transfer. ICE produced 561 pages of responsive documents, some of which contained redactions. Vidal-Martinez challenged ICE’s redactions. ICE submitted a Vaughn index and a declaration from its FOIA officer explaining the legal justification for each redaction, citing attorney-client, work product, deliberative process privileges, and identifying information of government employees. Vidal-Martinez responded that ICE committed criminal conduct by transferring him to Indiana, so the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied. The district court granted ICE summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no factual foundation in the record for criminal conduct or misconduct by ICE. The district court had an adequate factual basis to evaluate ICE’s withholdings. View "Vidal-Martinez v. United States Department Of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Fieste was charged with threatening to assault and murder two federal judges, three former U.S. presidents, and the current President. She is currently incompetent to stand trial. Fieste's mental illness causes her to experience delusions. In custody, Fieste refused the antipsychotic medication that experts believe will restore her competence. The government obtained permission to involuntarily medicate her to render her competent to stand trial. The order was stayed pending appeal.The Seventh Circuit affirmed but remanded. Fieste’s pretrial detention is insufficient to overcome the government’s interest in prosecution although Fieste’s anticipated Guidelines range is 12-18 months and she will “likely face a sentence of time served” if convicted. The district court properly conducted a holistic assessment to conclude that the proposed treatment plan is substantially likely to render Fieste competent and that the side effects are substantially unlikely to significantly interfere with her ability to participate in the proceedings. The order permitted Fieste to be medicated with “long-acting injectable anti-psychotic medication, along with other medications” suggesting impermissible flexibility to administer unspecified medications. The district court must provide a dosage range based on the expert’s recommendation or some other appropriate evidence, whether directly in its order or by incorporating a sufficiently detailed treatment plan. View "United States v. Fieste" on Justia Law