Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) inmate Palmer has a nub which terminates at his left wrist and does not have functional fingers. Before arriving at NRC, Palmer was at Shawnee Correctional Center, where the medical director issued Palmer a low bunk pass. When Palmer arrived at NRC, Franz conducted a routine intake screening. Franz noted his missing hand but ignored Palmer’s request for a low bunk permit and took no other steps in conjunction with Palmer’s deformity. Palmer had to use the top bunk. Palmer made two requests to see a doctor to get a low bunk pass; neither was acknowledged. Palmer fell while attempting to climb down from the upper bunk. He landed on his knee, sustaining a severe injury. Palmer then received a low bunk permit. Palmer filed grievances with IDOC based on the incident. With no response to his grievances, Palmer appealed to the Administrative Review Board, which also went unanswered. Palmer filed suit, alleging that Franz was deliberately indifferent to Palmer’s serious medical need. The district court granted Franz summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The evidence is enough to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that: Palmer suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, Franz knew of the heightened risk of harm, and Franz deliberately failed to act in the face of that harm. View "Palmer v. Franz" on Justia Law

In 2009, Beason pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a 15‐year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his Wisconsin juvenile adjudication for armed robbery and two Wisconsin drug offenses. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Beason’s appeal in 2012, reasoning that it was enough that his drug offense carried a maximum penalty of at least 10 years and that Beason’s juvenile adjudication was a “violent felony” although Wisconsin armed robbery could be committed without a gun, knife, or explosive. In 2013 he unsuccessfully challenged his juvenile adjudication as a qualifying violent felony (28 U.S.C. 2255), making no arguments about the drug offenses. Four years later, Beason filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that neither of his drug offenses carried a sentence long enough to qualify as a “serious drug offense” and that his juvenile adjudication could not count as a “violent felony.” The district court agreed with Beason on the merits but concluded that Beason's section 2255 petition precluded section 2241 relief because he could have raised the exact arguments in his earlier petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Beason’s argument about his drug convictions was foreclosed to him at the time of his section 2255 motion; the Seventh Circuit subsequently addressed Wisconsin’s bifurcated sentencing system and held that only the term of initial confinement—not the term of extended supervision—counted towards ACCA’s threshold of 10‐years’ imprisonment for a “serious drug offense.” View "Beason v. Marske" on Justia Law

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), provides for an enhanced sentence for an ex-felon who possesses a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), if that person has “three previous convictions … for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both … .” ACCA defines a “violent felony” to include a federal or state crime punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” In 2019, the Supreme Court decided in "Stokeling," that a prior conviction could qualify if the statute of conviction requires “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” In six cases, the Seventh Circuit previously concluded that the ACCA enhancement applied, On remand, for reconsideration in light of Stokeling, the Seventh Circuit examined Illinois statutes prohibiting robbery and armed robbery, 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a), 5/18-2, which provide that a person commits robbery when he takes property “from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force,” and again concluded that the defendants qualified for the enhancement. Illinois cases require that force be used as part of the action of taking or immediately leaving the scene. This can reasonably be characterized as force necessary to overcome the victim’s resistance, and is compatible with Stokeling’s definition of force. View "Van Sach v. United States" on Justia Law

Three-month-old J.J. was left in the care of his father, Felton, for the first time. Others visited during the day. That night, J.J. was rushed to the hospital. Doctors discovered that J.J. had a skull fracture, bleeding in his brain, and retinal hemorrhages. J.J. died. Felton was taken to jail on a probation hold. Felton told police that J.J. had hit his head in the bathtub. Another inmate, House, testified that Felton said he had swung J.J. into a bathroom door. Two treating physicians testified that J.J.’s death was, in part, due to shaking. The medical examiner concluded that blunt force trauma was the cause of death. Felton was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Felton unsuccessfully sought post‐conviction relief in Wisconsin state courts based on ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument statement that House could not receive a sentence modification for his testimony, and the attorney’s failure to secure medical expert testimony. At the post‐conviction hearing, three medical experts testified J.J. had not been shaken and J.J.’s injuries were consistent with a fall of two to four feet. The district court and Seventh Circuit denied Felton’s petition for habeas relief. The state court was not unreasonable in concluding that Felton was not prejudiced; there was no substantial likelihood of a different result had counsel objected to the closing argument statement. The habeas medical testimony would not have supported the claim that J.J.’s death was caused by his bathtub fall. View "Felton v. Bartow" on Justia Law

While serving a prison sentence at the Lawrence Correctional Center in Illinois, Gabb experienced severe back pain whenever he stood too long (15-20 minutes). After treatments he received did not relieve his pain, Gabb sued two members of Lawrence’s medical staff, Dr. Coe and Nurse Kimmel, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his back pain in violation of his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. Gabb also sued Wexford, the private company that provided medical services at Lawrence. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gabb has not presented any evidence showing the defendants caused him any harm. The lack of evidence of what the “better” treatments were and whether they would have been effective would leave a jury entirely to its own imagination about what could have been done. View "Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Williams sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by providing inadequate nutrition through a “brunch” program that served only two meals a day. Williams had filed multiple grievances complaining that the prison’s food was making him ill. He mainly objected to the use of soy protein, asserting that it caused him stomach pain, constipation, diarrhea, migraine headaches, and excessive gas; he sometimes claimed that he received only 1600 calories per day or fewer than 2800 calories per day, and requested that he be served breakfast. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record establishes without dispute that the brunch program was adequate as designed by a licensed dietician to provide 2200-2400 calories per day, including a minimum of six ounces of protein per day. Williams lacks evidence that any of the defendants knew that he was allegedly not receiving adequate nutrition. For persons having special dietary needs, the Department allows therapeutic dietary trays as prescribed by physicians. View "Williams v. Shah" on Justia Law

A person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is forbidden to possess a firearm, 18 U.S.C.922(g)(1). Kanter was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, for bilking the Medicare program, and was sentenced to 366 days in prison. After release, he contended that section 922(g)(1) was invalid, as applied to him because fraud is not a violent crime. Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit upheld section 922(g)(1), The Supreme Court has specifically upheld “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” and fraud is a thought‐out crime that demonstrates disdain for the rights of others and disrespect for the law. Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a felon convicted of fraud, whose maximum sentence exceeded a year, even if the actual punishment was less. The court noted that it is not possible to separate persons with felony convictions into two categories: dangerous and harmless and rejected an argument that the section was invalid because Congress has declined to fund a statutory (18 U.S.C. 925(c)) program that would permit the Attorney General to lift the prohibition for persons who demonstrate that they would not present a danger to others. View "Hatfield v. Barr" on Justia Law

Arrested on drug conspiracy charges, Hardy led DEA agents to his drugs and guns and provided information that Hardy purchased methamphetamine from Huskisson six times over the preceding five months, for $8,000 per pound, at Huskisson’s house and at his car lot. Huskisson had stated that Huskisson’s source expected a shipment of methamphetamine the next day. Hardy called Huskisson. Agents recorded that conversation. Huskisson agreed to deliver 10-12 pounds of methamphetamine. The next day, the two agreed during additional recorded calls that the deal was to occur at Huskisson’s home that night. Agent Cline followed Hardy to Huskisson’s house; watched Hardy enter, with an entry team on standby; and saw a car pull into the driveway. Two men exited the car with a cooler and entered the house. Minutes later, Hardy walked outside and gave a prearranged signal to indicate he had seen methamphetamine in the house. No search warrant had yet been issued.The entry team entered the house and arrested Huskisson, who refused to consent to a search of his residence, and the other men. Officers saw in plain sight an open cooler with 10 saran-wrapped packages of a substance which field tested positive for methamphetamine. DEA agents then filed the warrant application, which stated: “The law enforcement officers observed an open cooler with ten saran wrapped packages that contained suspected methamphetamine. The suspected methamphetamine later field tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.” The warrant issued four hours after the initial entry. The Seventh Circuit upheld denial of a motion to suppress. The entry was unlawful. Ordinarily, the evidence would be excluded but because the government had so much other evidence of probable cause, and had already planned to apply for a warrant, the evidence is admissible. Though the government should not profit from its bad behavior, neither should it be placed in a worse position. View "United States v. Huskisson" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, potential candidates for public office must file a nominating petition to gain a place on a political party’s primary ballot. Within a 90-day window, candidates for statewide offices must collect 5,000 signatures from voters in the jurisdiction where the candidate seeks election. Candidates for Cook County offices must collect a number of signatures equal to 0.5% of the qualified voters of the candidate’s party who voted in the most recent general election in Cook County. Applying that formula, Acevedo had to gather 8,236 signatures to appear on the 2018 Democratic primary ballot for Cook County Sheriff. He gathered only 5,654 and was denied a place on the ballot. Acevedo filed suit, alleging violations of his freedom of association and equal protection rights, arguing that the statewide requirement reflects Illinois’s judgment that making candidates collect 5,000 signatures is sufficient to protect the state’s interest in ballot management. Acevedo argued that Illinois could not impose a heightened burden unless doing so furthered a compelling state interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Strict scrutiny is not triggered by the existence of a less burdensome restriction—it is triggered only when the challenged regulation itself imposes a severe burden. Acevedo failed to allege that requiring candidates to gather 8,236 signatures is a constitutionally significant burden. View "Acevedo v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board" on Justia Law

Shipman pleaded guilty in 2003 to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846. His presentence report used the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines, which then required courts to increase the offense level of a “career offender.” Shipman had three prior Arkansas convictions for residential burglary in 1986 and 1987. The district court sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment as a “career offender.” Neither the presentence report nor the court explained whether Shipman’s career-offender designation rested on the enumerated-offenses clause or the residual clause. In 2005, the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines “effectively advisory.” In 2015, the Court’s Johnson decision struck down the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, subsequently holding that the change applied retroactively on collateral review. Within one year of the Johnson decision, Shipman sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit remanded the denial of his petition. While the Guidelines’ residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, the record does not conclusively show whether Shipman was sentenced under the residual clause or the enumerated-offenses clause. All viable bases for Shipman to attack a career-offender designation under the enumerated-offenses clause were available at sentencing and within the one-year limitations period of section 2255(f)(1); there has been no change in the law since then. View "Shipman v. United States" on Justia Law