Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Durham faced revocation of his supervised release. A magistrate found that Durham was “financially unable to retain counsel,” under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(b). Initially, Durham was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. Before the revocation hearing, that lawyer withdrew with court permission. At the hearing, Durham was represented by retained counsel, who was then allowed to withdraw. Durham sought pro se to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. His IFP status lapsed when appointed counsel withdrew. The court denied Durham’s motion, citing his incomplete financial affidavit. The Seventh Circuit appointed the Federal Defender’s Office for the limited purpose of re-filing a proper motion. The district court again denied IFP status, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1); because Durham had $750 in his prison account he could not show that he was “unable to pay the costs of commencing his appeal.” ($505 filing fee.), and ruling that Durham’s appeal was frivolous.The Seventh Circuit reversed, granting leave to appeal IFP. Durham is not trying to bring a civil appeal, which would be governed by the general IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915, but sought to proceed under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A, which asks only if the defendant is “financially unable” to obtain adequate representation. In determining the need for appointed counsel under the Act, the Seventh Circuit is not governed by a requirement of indigence but by financial inability to employ counsel. The Criminal Justice Act does not permit courts to appoint counsel only for defendants whose appeals the court deems not to be frivolous; Anders procedures are available, should counsel come to that conclusion. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

The Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE), a nonprofit organization, administers a certification program for forensic document examiners. The Board has certified about a dozen examiners. Vastrick, a forensic document examiner certified by another, much larger organization, the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners, published an article, Forensic Handwriting Comparison Examination in the Courtroom, in The Judges’ Journal, a peer-reviewed scholarly journal published by the ABA. Vastrick urged judges to look for experts certified by the American Board and warned judges to “be wary of other certifying bodies.” The article did not mention BFDE by name. BFDE submitted a rebuttal, but frustrated with the ABA’s suggested edits, BFDE filed suit, claiming defamation per se and invasion of privacy on behalf of its members. BFDE also asserted civil conspiracy, false advertising under the Lanham Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, ruling that the article contained only constitutionally-protected, non-actionable opinion. The Journal warned readers that “[a]rticles represent the opinions of the authors alone” and “provide opposing views” for readers to consider. Vastrick highlighted the subjective nature of his article, presenting his views as suggestions, not facts. Vastrick’s assertion that the American Board “is the only certification board recognized by the broader forensic science community, law enforcement, and courts,” reflects the expression of a viewpoint and is so broad as to lack objective, verifiable meaning. View "Board of Forensic Document Examiners, Inc. v. American Bar Association" on Justia Law

Goudy, convicted of a 1993 murder, obtained habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The state did not retry him. Goudy filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that state and local officials failed to comply with their “Brady” obligations to turn over material, exculpatory evidence and that he is entitled to damages for the years he spent in prison. The district court focused on allegations that the investigators violated his due process rights by subjecting him to an improper show‐up procedure, withholding a videotape showing a line‐up in which several witnesses identified a different person as the shooter, and withholding interview notes showing that the other suspect initially denied any involvement in the murder, but later switched his story. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Goudy presented enough evidence on the second and third arguments to move forward. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Cummings (initially an investigator, later a prosecutor) suppressed the lineup videotape and both investigators suppressed the interview notes. Even if the videotape were the only suppressed evidence, the jury could find it material, given the lack of definitive physical evidence, the state’s reliance on eyewitness testimony, inconsistencies among the testifying witnesses, and the utility of the video as both evidence of an exculpatory theory and impeachment. View "Goudy v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Carrillo was involved in an extramarital relationship with Noeller. Carrillo’s family reported that Noeller called Carrillo, accused her of seeing someone else, and threatened her life; Noeller later came to her mother’s Mexico City house, where he shot and killed her. Noeller maintains that he ended their relationship after finding out about her family’s affiliation with the Los Pepes gang and Zetas drug cartel. He says that after the murder, he received warnings that Carrillo’s mother had hired hitmen to kill him. Noeller fled for the U.S. with his wife and children, who are U.S. citizens. Noeller's family members provided affidavits describing incidents after he left, in which gang members came to their homes looking for Noeller, threatened them, and beat them. During removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), Noeller sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Immigration judges twice denied his applications. Noeller’s BIA appeal was pending when Mexico submitted its extradition request. Noeller challenged the warrant issued in Mexico by an “Amparo proceeding,” which is “similar to habeas corpus ... to review and annul unconstitutional judicial decisions.” Noeller claims that the court in Mexico suspended the warrant. Mexico’s government contends that the original arrest warrant remains enforceable. The district court granted extradition. Noeller sought habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Mexico submitted a valid request for extradition, which U.S. courts must honor. Noeller’s challenges to that request are “beyond the narrow role for courts in the extradition process.” View "Noeller v. Wojdylo" on Justia Law

GEFT began building a digital billboard on its Westfield, Indiana property without the requisite city sign permit. The ordinance prohibits “off-premise signs” directing attention to a specific business, product, service, entertainment, or any other activity offered, sold, or conducted elsewhere and prohibits “pole signs” that are not attached to or supported by any building. GEFT did obtain a state permit but believed Westfield’s sign standards ordinance contained unconstitutional content‐based speech restrictions. GEFT stopped installing the billboard when a contract attorney working for Westfield threatened to arrest GEFT’s representatives. The district court denied GEFT’s motion for an injunction and granted Westfield’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. GEFT had challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance under the First Amendment, but its preliminary injunction motion focused solely on its due process claim. There is no constitutional procedural due process right to state‐mandated procedures; the fact that the Stop Work Notices did not comply with ordinance procedures cannot support a procedural due process claim. Neither local nor state law authorizes the arrest of anyone violating a municipal ordinance; even if the attorney is considered an employee of Westfield, GEFT has no evidence Westfield authorized those threats or could have predicted he would make them. Although the threats of arrest were inappropriate, they “are a far cry from the type of conduct recognized as conscience‐shocking” for purposes of a substantive due process claim. View "GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. Westfield" on Justia Law

Indiana requires all inmates convicted of a sex offense to complete the Sex Offender Management and Monitoring (INSOMM) program. INSOMM requires inmates to identify which illegal sexual acts they committed and how often. Based on their offense history, participants are sorted into risk groups for group therapy sessions. Higher‐risk groups must complete more hours of therapy. In therapy, participants must fill out workbooks that require them to describe all past acts of sexual violence and abuse, regardless of whether they were ever charged for those offenses. Participants enjoy neither immunity nor confidentiality for the disclosures. Inmates may not opt out of any part of INSOMM and must respond fully to all questions. A counselor who suspects that a participant has been deceptive or less than forthcoming may order polygraph testing. Failure to participate satisfactorily in INSOMM is a Major Conduct disciplinary violation. For a first offense, inmates are denied the opportunity to accrue good‐time credits to which they would otherwise be entitled by statute. Continuing violations are punishable by revocation of already‐acquired good‐time credits. Lacy filed a class action under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the disclosures required by INSOMM and the penalties imposed for non‐participation, taken together, amount to a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self‐incrimination. View "Lacy v. Butts" on Justia Law

Convicted of bank robbery in 2015, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), Bonds was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The evidence against him included the testimony of an FBI Latent Print Operations Unit fingerprint examiner, Glass, that Bonds’s fingerprints appeared on the demand notes used in the robberies. In 2004 the Unit incorrectly identified Mayfield as a person whose fingerprints suggested involvement in a terrorist bombing in Spain. Bonds wanted to use this episode to illustrate the potential for mistakes in the “analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification” (ACE-V) method. The district judge permitted Bonds to cross-examine Glass about the reliability of the ACE-V method and to present other evidence suggesting that the approach is more error-prone than jurors might believe. Evidence about one particular error, the judge concluded, would be more distracting and time-consuming than its incremental value could justify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Confrontation Clause argument. Presenting jurors with details of one wrongful imprisonment (especially on a mistaken charge of terrorism) would appeal to emotion rather than to reason. Bonds had ample opportunity to supply the jury with evidence about the reliability of the ACE-V method, including changes made in the last decade. In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology concluded that changes in ACE-V have bolstered its accuracy. The summary provides the defense bar with paths to cross-examine witnesses who used the ACE-V approach. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

The Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act requires an applicant for a concealed-carry license to show that he is not a clear and present danger to himself or a threat to public safety and, within the past five years, has not been a patient in a mental hospital, convicted of a violent misdemeanor or two or more violations of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or participated in a residential or court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program, 430 ILCS 66/10(a)(4), 66/25(3), 66/25(5); 430 ILCS 65/4, 65/8. These standards are identical for residents and nonresidents. State police conduct an extensive background check for each applicant. During the five-year licensing period, state police check all resident licensees against the Illinois Criminal History Record Inquiry and Department of Human Services mental health system daily. The law mandates that physicians, law enforcement officials, and school administrators report persons suspected of posing a clear and present danger to themselves or others within 24 hours of that determination. Monitoring compliance of out-of-state residents is limited by Illinois’s inability to obtain complete, timely information about nonresidents, so Illinois issues licenses only to nonresidents living in states with licensing standards substantially similar to Illinois standards. The Seventh Circuit upheld the law in a challenge by nonresidents, as respecting the Second Amendment without offending the anti-discrimination principle at the heart of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. View "Culp v. Raoul" on Justia Law

Cherry drove into a Markham, Illinois parking lot to obtain cocaine that his supplier had just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to Cherry, his supplier had been arrested picking up the cocaine and was cooperating with DEA agents. Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and eventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Cherry’s arguments that the agents lacked probable cause to arrest him and search his vehicle and failed to preserve exculpatory evidence. The informant did not have any history of cooperation but was not an anonymous tipster. He was implicating himself in a drug deal and was motivated to cooperate. Agents obtained significant detailed information that was corroborated as events unfolded. With respect to the car search, the court upheld a finding that the drugs were in plain view after Cherry opened the door while trying to flee. In any case, agents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited protective sweep, so the drugs were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Regarding an officer’s sale of his personal camera, which had been used to photograph the evidence, the court noted that the defense never sought to inspect the camera or its metadata until long after the suppression hearing nor did Cherry ask the government to preserve the data. In any case, any debate about the order in which the photographs were taken and whether the bag was opened or closed was irrelevant. View "United States v. Cherry" on Justia Law

Officer Sweeney pulled Lewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a warning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in the squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised release for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a drug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. The dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found heroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officer had lawful grounds to initiate the traffic stop; it is irrelevant whether Lewis actually committed a traffic offense because Sweeney had a reasonable belief that he did so. Officer Sweeney did not unjustifiably prolong the traffic stop past the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a warning; any delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to sniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law