Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Riley worked for the Kokomo Housing Authority (KHA) for eight years before she was terminated in 2014. During her employment, Riley suffered from seizures, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression, which required her to take leaves of absence. She claims that KHA improperly denied her requests for medical leave and retaliated against her for these requests by disciplining and terminating her, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601; that KHA failed to make reasonable accommodations and discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101; and that she was subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in KHA's favor. Five months elapsed between the end of Riley’s FMLA leave and a written warning; although Riley had requested leave for medical appointments and was told that her leave had been exhausted, she was allowed time off for her appointments nonetheless. Riley alleged that she had been terminated because of her disability, but, in her EEOC complaint, she omitted any allegation that KHA had denied her a reasonable accommodation. Rejecting Riley’s retaliation and FHA claims, the court noted that there is no evidence that she called HUD to report a discriminatory housing practice. View "Riley v. City of Kokomo, Indiana, Housing Authority" on Justia Law

An FBI investigation into Indianapolis drug‐trafficking included judicial authorization to intercept calls from 10 cell phones. During its authorized surveillance, the government intercepted calls between the apparent head of the drug‐trafficking conspiracy and his brother, Zamudio. The government obtained a search warrant to search 34 locations, including Zamudio’s residence. Agent Bates prepared the application and 84‐page affidavit, including three specific instances of Zamudio’s participation in the drug‐trafficking conspiracy. The affidavit identified Zamudio’s address, that he paid utilities at this address, and that his vehicle was routinely parked there overnight, but did not include information that drug‐trafficking activity actually took place at Zamudio’s residence. Bates stated that based on his experience and training, drug traffickers generally store their drug‐related paraphernalia and maintain records relating to drug-trafficking in the residences or the curtilage of their residences, and typically possess dangerous weapons at their residence to protect their profits, supply of drugs, and themselves. The search yielded approximately 11 kilograms of methamphetamine, a loaded gun, and a cell phone used to make intercepted calls. Zamudio was charged with participating in a drug‐trafficking conspiracy. The district court granted Zamudio’s motion to suppress the seized items. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The issuing judge reasonably drew the inference that indicia of drug‐trafficking would be found at Zamudio’s home; the evidence was enough to create a fair probability that Zamudio’s home contained evidence of a crime. View "United States v. Zamudio" on Justia Law

Thomas, an Illinois prisoner formerly confined at Hill Correctional Center, alleged that prison guards attacked him with excessive force and that the beating and subsequent disciplinary proceedings were in retaliation for lawsuits and grievances he filed. He sued the guards and other prison officials seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In the course of pretrial proceedings, the district judge required the parties to stipulate to the events preceding the attack and ruled that certain inmate witnesses must appear, if at all, by video conference. The judge also declined Thomas’s request for recruited counsel, determining that he was competent to litigate the suit pro se. At trial, the judge entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants on all claims except those asserting excessive force by two officers. The jury decided those claims against Thomas. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Because Thomas’s trial testimony allowed for a permissible inference of retaliation, the judge should not have taken the retaliation claims from the jury. The court rejected other challenges to evidentiary rulings and to the refusal to recruit counsel. View "Thomas v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Courthouse News Service (CNS) sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the First Amendment requires the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to release newly filed complaints to the press at the moment of receipt by her office—not after processing. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction and ordered the action dismissed without prejudice, noting that neither the Seventh Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court provides the press with such instant access to court filings, but undertake certain administrative processing before a filing is made publicly available. Adhering to the principles of equity, comity, and federalism, the district court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction over this case. The court noted that the procedures at issue involve a delay of no more than one business day in access to the vast majority of electronically filed complaints and stated that the state courts deserve the first opportunity to hear such a constitutional challenge to their internal procedures. View "Courthouse News Services v. Brown" on Justia Law

Strand, a truck driver, stopped to take a mandatory drug screening test and received permission to park his rig outside a nearby Planned Parenthood office. Officer Minchuk, working security at Planned Parenthood, in uniform, reported to work, noticed the truck, and wrote parking tickets. Strand found the tickets and tried to explain that he did not see any no‐parking signs and had received permission. Minchuk allegedly solicited a bribe. Strand used his cell phone to take pictures to contest the tickets. Minchuk ordered Strand to leave. Strand said he would leave when he finished. Minchuk admonished, “I told you to get the f*** outta here,” and slapped Strand’s cell phone to the ground. Minchuk demanded Strand’s identification; Strand refused. Minchuk grabbed Strand, resulting in Strand’s shirt tearing off his body. Minchuk attempted to push Strand, with Strand holding Minchuk’s arm. Both fell to the ground. Strand punched Minchuk in the face and placed his hands on Minchuk’s throat. Minchuk testified that this caused him to fear for his life. Strand then stood up, backed away, put his hands up, and said, “I surrender, I’m done.” Minchuk removed his gun and fired a shot, striking Strand in the abdomen. Strand was convicted of committing felony battery of a police officer. Strand sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Minchuk’s motion for qualified immunity. A material question of fact exists as to whether Strand continued to pose a threat at the exact moment Minchuk fired the shot. View "Strand v. Minchuk" on Justia Law

Snapchat user “Snappyschrader” identified himself as a 31-year-old male and agreed to assist a 14-year-old female in purchasing undergarments. He was actually communicating with Altoona Detective Baumgarten. After agreeing to meet at a supermarket, officers identified “Snappyschrader,” actually, Brixen, arrested him, and seized his phone. To illustrate to Brixen that he had been communicating with an undercover detective, Baumgarten sent a message to Brixen’s phone from the undercover Snapchat account. Brixen witnessed the notification appear on his phone screen. Brixen moved to suppress this evidence arguing it constituted an unreasonable search of his cell phone. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, noting that Brixen conceded that evidence recovered under a subsequent search warrant remains admissible because even after excision of the tainted evidence from the supporting affidavit, it still establishes probable cause. Upon arrest, Brixen no longer had a right to keep his phone in his pocket; once the phone was seized the notification projected on the screen was plain to see. Disabling notifications that automatically appear on the phone would have preserved the message as private but Brixen simply had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a conspicuous notification once his phone was seized. View "United States v. Brixen" on Justia Law

DEA task force members lawfully found drugs in a traffic stop and seized several garage openers and keys they found in the car. An agent took the garage openers and drove around downtown Chicago pushing their buttons to look for a suspected stash house. He found the right building when the door of a shared garage opened. The agent then used a seized key fob and mailbox key to enter the building’s locked lobby and pinpoint the target condominium. Another agent sought and obtained the arrestee’s consent to search the target condo. The search turned up extensive evidence of drug trafficking. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to suppress the drug trafficking evidence. While the use of the garage door opener was a search and was "close to the edge," it did not violate the Fourth Amendment, which does not forbid this technique to identify the building or door associated with the opener, at least where the search discloses no further information. Use of the key fob and mailbox key in the lobby was not unlawful because the defendants had no right to exclude people from the lobby area. At all other stages of the investigation, the agents also complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Correa" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Jolliff’s confidential informant, “Doe,” reported buying heroin from “Fred.” Jolliff’s warrant affidavit stated that Doe had bought heroin from Fred for a couple of months; Fred sold heroin from a particular home's basement; and Doe had bought heroin from Fred that day and saw Fred with over 100 baggies of heroin. Jolliff showed Doe a photo of the Edwards home, which Doe confirmed was the location. Jolliff drove Doe to the location, where Doe confirmed that identification. Jolliff used a database to obtain a photograph of Freddy Sutton, who Doe identified as “Fred.” Jolliff’s supervisor and an assistant state’s attorney approved the warrant application. Aware of Doe’s criminal history, the judge questioned Doe under oath and issued the warrant. Officers conducted the search four days later. Edwards and his daughter were outside and prevented from entering their home during the search, which took about two hours and uncovered no illegal drugs. Nor did the police find Sutton. The Edwardses had minor property damage. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Monell claim against the city because the Edwardses did not plausibly allege the existence of any policy or practice permitting searches without probable cause and summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. The officers were also entitled to qualified immunity based on their reasonable reliance on the warrant. View "Edwards v. Jolliff-Blake" on Justia Law

Lake County, Indiana, Sheriff's Department (LCSD) Deputy Orlich, in uniform, and carrying a gun, responded to Zander’s husband’s call, reporting a domestic disturbance. Arriving at the scene, Orlich ordered Zander to leave the home and go to her other house on White Oak Avenue. Zander stated that she could not go there because the electric panel had been dismantled. Orlich's supervisor gave Orlich permission to take Zander to White Oak Avenue, where Orlich turned on the electricity. Orlich told Zander that she could not return to the other house for several hours. About 10-15 minutes after Orlich left, Zander found Orlich standing naked in the house. He attacked Zander sexually and said that he could make Zander’s life difficult if she reported him. Zander filed negligence claims against the Sheriff and intentional tort and civil rights claims against Orlich. The district court granted the Sheriff summary judgment on Zander’s respondeat superior claim and on Zander’s negligent hiring, training, and retention claim because Zander presented no evidence that Buncich knew of the necessity of exerting control to prevent Orlich's sexual misconduct. On Zander’s claims against Orlich, a jury awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, $275,000 in punitive damages, and attorneys fees and costs totaling $97,267.80. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Zander’s respondeat superior claim and affirmed as to the negligent hiring claim. Orlich exploited “unique institutional prerogatives of his police employment.” Whether Orlich’s employment gave rise to the abuse of that power is a question of fact for the jury. View "Zander v. Orlich" on Justia Law

After being arrested for DUI, Martin was booked by Clay County Officers Herbert and Overton and was placed in a cell with bunk beds, rather than the padded cell or the “drunk tank,” which did not contain bunk beds. The other inmate in the cell had recently had surgery and required the bottom bunk. Martin stated that he could not get to the upper bunk. Officer Herbert says he told Martin to remove the mattress and put it on the floor. Martin climbed onto the upper bunk and fell while attempting to climb down, hitting his head on a table on the opposite wall, damaging his spinal cord and paralyzing him permanently. He died months later. Martin’s Estate sued Officers Herbert and Overton. The district court denied their motion for qualified immunity, The Seventh Circuit reversed. Drawing all factual inferences in its favor, the Estate failed to show that the officers’ conduct violated clearly established law. There were several intervening events: Martin decided to climb into the bunk rather than sitting or sleeping on the floor; Martin attempted to climb down before he was sufficiently sober; Martin fell and hit his head. None of these events was so obviously foreseeable that the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonable conduct would have given notice that the officers' actions violated that standard. View "Lovett v. Herbert" on Justia Law