Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Heishman was high on amphetamines and running naked in the street. Indianapolis police tried to subdue him. A paramedic administered a sedative to Heishman so he could be moved to an ambulance to be taken to a hospital. Soon, Heishman’s heart and breathing stopped. Despite efforts to revive him, he died days later. Heishman’s estate sued, asserting federal Fourth Amendment claims and state-law tort claims. The district court denied the paramedic qualified immunity on the excessive force claim and allowed all but one of the state-law claims to proceed against the paramedic and the hospital without requiring the plaintiff to comply with the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed as to both issues. Case law does not clearly establish that a paramedic can violate a patient-arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights by exercising medical judgment to administer a sedative in a medical emergency. All of the state-law claims are subject to the substantive terms of Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, including damage caps and the requirement to submit the claim to a medical review panel before suit is filed. The undisputed facts show that the paramedic was exercising medical judgment in dealing with a patient in a medical emergency. View "Thompson v. Cope" on Justia Law

Portalatin allegedly owed $1,330.75 in consumer debt. The Blatt law firm, on behalf of Midland, filed a debt‐collection suit against Portalatin in the Circuit Court of Cook County’s First Municipal District (Chicago). Seventh Circuit precedent under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) then allowed Blatt to sue Portalatin in that forum even though she lived in the Fourth Municipal District (15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2)). The Seventh Circuit subsequently overruled that precedent and held the FDCPA requires debt collectors to file suits in the smallest venue‐relevant geographic unit where the debtor signed the contract or resides. Blatt complied, but the ruling was retroactive. Portalatin sued Blatt and Midland for violating the FDCPA. Portalatin settled with Midland and expressly abandoned all claims against Blatt except her claim for FDCPA statutory damages. Blatt argued that Portalatin’s settlement with Midland mooted her claim for FDCPA statutory damages against Blatt. The district court denied Blatt's motions. The jury awarded Portalatin $200 in statutory damages against Blatt; the court awarded Portalatin $69,393.75 in attorney’s fees and $772.95 in costs against Blatt. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The settlement with Midland mooted Portalatin’s claim for FDCPA statutory damages against Blatt. Portalatin is not entitled to attorney’s fees or costs from Blatt. View "Portalatin v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC" on Justia Law

The warrant application was supported by statements from “Doe,” that for the previous six months she regularly bought heroin from T (Doe only knew him by sight and street name) in a house, which she identified while driving with the police. A judge questioned Doe under oath and issued the warrant. Executing the warrant, officers found Walker in a house that looked like a drug house. Walker stated that she had a gun but could not remember where it was. The search took 90-120 minutes. Officers left without drugs or evidence of T’s whereabouts. Walker sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted defendants summary judgment; more than 16 months passed before the judge released her opinion. Walker appealed that day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii), a judgment is deemed to be entered on the earlier of the Rule 58 judgment or 150 days after a dispositive order is entered. “Deferring the opinion until after the time allowed by Rule. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) is never appropriate, as it can spell disaster for a litigant not versed in the appellate rules.” Addressing the merits, the court stated that Walker’s goal was to have a jury decide whether the state judge should have issued the warrant but with the benefit of “great deference” the state judge’s probable-cause evaluation must prevail. Nothing was concealed from the judge and, under the circumstances, a two-hour search was not unreasonable. View "Walker v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

On October 12, Gomes, a 52-year-old Indian national, was arrested for failing to appear for jury duty. A non-citizen, Gomes, was actually ineligible for jury duty. Gomes pulled away from the officer and was charged with resisting arrest. At Lake County Jail, Gomes was placed on suicide watch. On October 14, Gomes was transferred to ICE custody. She was released within days. On December 14, after failing to appear on the resisting-arrest charge, Gomes was back in the Jail. Her physical and mental health were deteriorating. She refused to eat and drink. Medical providers did little other than monitoring. Gomes died. The administrator of Gomes’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Lake County, Jail officials, and CCS, the Jail’s contract medical provider, and its employees. The court dismissed the County defendants and granted the medical defendants FRCP 50(a) judgment on some claims. The Estate prevailed on another claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Nothing in the record justifies a finding of personal liability against the County defendants, who received assurances that CCS staff were regularly monitoring Gomes. Medical providers stated that Gomes was stable and promised to send her to the hospital if necessary. The Estate presented no evidence that some feature in the Jail’s policy caused Gomes’s death. Rule 50(a) judgment, however, was premature. The record contains ample evidence from which a jury could infer that the doctors’ inaction diminished Gomes’s chances of survival. View "Miranda v. County of Lake" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Frano obtained the approval of the state’s attorney’s office and obtained a search warrant based on a tip from a confidential informant, who claimed to have purchased heroin from Edmond at 736 North Ridgeway. Frano had driven the informant past the building to confirm the location and showed the informant a photograph to confirm Edmond's identity. The complaint specified the date of the tip but not the date of the alleged drug sale. Frano attested that the informant had provided dependable information about narcotics activities for five years. The complaint did not mention that the informant was facing felony drug charges or that a state court had revoked his bail and issued an arrest warrant. Officers searched the Ridgeway apartment and recovered loaded handguns, heroin, and cocaine. Edmond was not present but was arrested later. Before trial, Edmond unsuccessfully moved to suppress his post-arrest statements, claiming that he did not waive voluntarily his Miranda rights. .He was convicted of firearm and heroin charges but acquitted of a cocaine charge. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal, citing "Anders."The district court denied his 28 U.S.C. 2255 pro se motion to set aside his conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Applying "Strickland," the court agreed that Edmond’s trial attorney performed below an objective standard of reasonableness; but, although the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Objectively reasonable police officers could have relied in good faith on the search warrant so Edmond was not prejudiced by his attorney’s deficient performance. View "Edmond v. United States" on Justia Law

Wheelchair-using detainees sued Cook County, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, based on purportedly inaccessible ramps and bathroom facilities at six county courthouses. The district court certified a class for purposes of injunctive relief. The named plaintiffs also sought damages individually for the same alleged violations. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the equitable claims and entered a permanent injunction, finding that the defendants had violated the ADA. Relying largely on the same findings, the court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on liability in their personal damage actions, then submitted the question of individual damage awards to a jury. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. The district court improperly relied on its own findings of fact when it granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their damage claims. When equitable and legal claims are joined in a single suit, common questions of fact should be tried first to a jury unless there are extraordinary circumstances or an unequivocal waiver by all parties of their jury trial rights. The court upheld the class certification. View "Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiffs purchased a 400-acre Barrington horse farm with Amcore financing. In 2009, Amcore filed for foreclosure in Illinois state court. Amcore failed and the FDIC became its receiver. BMO bought Amcore’s loan assets at a discount from the FDIC and took over the foreclosure action. To cut its losses on the loan, BMO assigned the note to the Forest Preserve for $14 million. The Forest Preserve made the (winning) credit bid of about $14.5 million at the foreclosure sale. The foreclosure court entered a deficiency judgment of $6 million. The Illinois Appellate Court later reversed the foreclosure judgments. There is apparently no current judgment in that action. The original owners have filed five lawsuits, in addition to raising affirmative defenses and counterclaims in the foreclosure action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their suit that alleged unconstitutional takings, fraud, and derivative claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting. The court rejected arguments that the Forest Preserve violated the takings clause by passing an ordinance converting the estate into a forest preserve; by buying the mortgage and taking over the foreclosure action; and by physically entering the estate and installing Forest Preserve signs at the estate entrances. Derivative conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting claims fall with the three theories. View "Squires-Cannon v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County" on Justia Law

Indiana requires that, at least 18 hours before a woman has an abortion, she must be given information provided by the state about the procedure, facts about the fetus and its development, and alternatives to abortion. That information is meant to advance the state’s asserted interest in promoting fetal life. The state also required that a woman have an ultrasound and hear the fetal heartbeat before an abortion although she may decline, as 75% of women did. Before July 1, 2016, women could, and generally did, have the ultrasound on the same day of the procedure. Almost all abortions in Indiana occur at four Planned Parenthood (PP) health centers; only those PP facilities have ultrasound equipment. House Enrolled Act 1337 requires women to undergo an ultrasound procedure at least 18 hours before the abortion. PP filed suit and sought preliminary relief. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court weighed the burdens, given the locations of the PP clinics, the populations served by those facilities, and how the new regulations impact finances, employment, child care, and the safety of women in abusive relationships, against the benefits the law confers and the state's legitimate interest in discouraging abortion, and concluded that the new law has “the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice” to have an abortion. View "Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Health" on Justia Law

Vasquez and Miguel, convicted child sex offenders, must register as sex offenders and comply with state restrictions on where they may live. A child sex offender may not knowingly live within 500 feet of a school, playground, or child-care center, 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3. A few years after their convictions, Illinois added child and group day-care homes to the 500-foot buffer zone. When the men updated their sex-offender registrations, the Chicago Police Department told them they had to move because child day-care homes had opened up within 500 feet of their residences and gave them 30 days to comply. The men sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the statutory amendment imposed retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause; that applying the amended statute to them constituted an unconstitutional taking of their property; and that the statute is enforced without a hearing for an individualized risk assessment and is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, in violation of their due process rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit on the pleadings. The amended statute is neither impermissibly retroactive nor punitive. The Takings Clause claim was unexhausted and the amendment was adopted before they acquired their homes, so it did not alter their property-rights expectations. The procedural due process claim fails because there is no right to a hearing to establish a fact irrelevant to the statute. The law “easily satisfies rational-basis review.” View "Vasquez v. Foxx" on Justia Law

Flatoff took hostages at a Neenah, Wisconsin motorcycle shop. After Flatoff threatened to start shooting, police unsuccessfully attempted an entry. Hostage Funk escaped out the back door of the shop and was shot and killed in the alleyway by two police officers, who mistakenly believed Funk was Flatoff. Funk’s wife filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the officers and the city, alleging that both officers used unreasonable and excessive force against Funk. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that the officers’ conduct was not objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that even if their conduct was unreasonable, they were shielded from liability by qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the qualified immunity issue dispositive. The court noted that at least one officer believed that the situation was an ambush and that when Funk appeared in the officers’ line‐of‐sight holding a gun, the officers, in a matter of seconds, concluded that Funk was one of the people inside the shop who had shot at them only minutes ago. View "Mason-Funk v. City of Neenah" on Justia Law