Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Norton was part of a cocaine and heroin distribution conspiracy, driving to Chicago and Akron to move drugs and proceeds, and distributing drugs at his Indiana home. Law enforcement recruited a conspiracy member to record conversations; the informant stated that Norton planned to move $400,000 of drug proceeds. Federal officers contacted Indiana State Police Officer Shultz for a traffic stop. Federal officers trailed Norton for 20 miles, identified Norton’s vehicle to Shultz, told Shultz that Norton was driving 72 mph in a 55 mph construction zone, and instructed Shultz to make the stop. Shultz testified that he used radar to confirm Norton's speed. Shultz pulled Norton over. Norton allowed Shultz to search his car. Shultz found an unusual wire near the gas pedal and a shell casing. His drug-sniffing dog signaled to the vehicle. Shultz did not arrest Norton, but impounded the vehicle. After obtaining a warrant, officers conducted a thorough search, discovering $400,000 in cash. Months later, officers arrested Norton in a house near the Mexican border, where they found $179,000 in cash. At a hearing on Norton’s motion to suppress evidence collected from his vehicle, an Indiana Department of Transportation employee testified that the speed limit in the construction zone was 70 mph at the time of the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Norton’s conviction and sentence to a mandatory life term of imprisonment, upholding the denial of his motion to suppress and the admission of recorded statements made by the confidential informant. View "United States v. Norton" on Justia Law

Milliman, then a McHenry County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD) deputy, gave a deposition in which he accused Sheriff Nygren of corruption, bribery, securing fraudulent loans, trafficking illegal aliens, and soliciting two murders. Nygren and his subordinates referred Milliman to a psychologist to evaluate whether he was fit for duty. The psychologist determined that Milliman suffered from cognitive and psychological problems from a previous brain tumor that rendered him unfit to perform his duties. MCSD terminated Milliman based upon the results of that examination, the false allegations against Nygren, and violations of MCSD General Orders. Milliman sued Nygren, Nygren’s subordinates, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for protected speech. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the fitness‐for‐ duty examination provided an independent, non‐retaliatory, non‐pretextual basis for Milliman’s termination. The court rejected Milliman’s argument that a jury could question whether Milliman’s fitness examination was ordered in good faith because he received a “standard” rating in his last annual performance review, citing the importance of such precautionary measures in the law enforcement context due to “the risks posed by an officer who is not well enough to work.” View "Milliman v. Prim" on Justia Law

The University fired Carmody, an information technology manager, after printed copies of a professor’s privileged emails suspiciously ended up in Carmody’s home newspaper box. The emails allegedly exposed inconsistencies in the professor’s testimony in Carmody's separate lawsuit against a different professor. The University learned about the mysterious delivery because Carmody’s lawyer filed the emails with the court. The University concluded that it was “more probable than not” that Carmody improperly obtained the emails himself. Carmody sued the board of trustees and officials alleging that he was fired without due process of law both and that his firing violated an Illinois whistleblower statute. The district court dismissed the case. In an earlier appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Carmody had pleaded a plausible claim that he was fired without pre-termination due process, but that his decision to withdraw from the post-termination hearing foreclosed his due process claim based on the post-termination procedures and affirmed the dismissal of the state-law claim. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for some defendants and Carmody lost at trial on his claim against three remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Carmody did not establish that the individual defendants bore responsibility for his alleged deprivations. The Eleventh Amendment bars the claims against the board and 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not authorize such claims. View "Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois" on Justia Law

1997 Wisconsin Act 292, designed to address the effects of prenatal substance abuse, brings unborn children and their mothers within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts if the mothers exhibit a habitual lack of self‐control with respect to alcohol or drugs that raises a substantial health risk for their unborn children. Loertscher sought treatment at a county health facility. Her caregivers determined that she was pregnant and that she had tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, and tetrahydrocannabinol. The court ordered Loertscher to report to an alcohol and drug abuse treatment center for assessment and possible treatment. When she failed to comply, the court found her in contempt and placed her in county detention. She eventually agreed to participate in the program. Loertscher filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the constitutionality of Act 292, then moved out of Wisconsin. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, concluded that Act 292 was void for vagueness and granted injunctive relief against the state defendants but determined that the county defendants were not personally liable. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Loertscher’s case is moot. She has moved out of Wisconsin and has no plans to return. It is not reasonably likely that she will again be subject to the Act. View "Loertscher v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Weaver was arrested for the murder of Sanders. The court disqualified Weaver’s attorney because he represented a potential state witness. Callico testified that he and Sanders sold drugs together and that on April 4, 2002, Weaver fired the fatal shots into Sanders’s car. Over Weaver's objection, Officer Pinal testified that on September 9, 2002, Pinal and another officer saw Weaver place a gun in his waistband and approached Weaver, identifying themselves as police. Weaver drew the gun and fled, eventually tossing the gun. A firearms expert testified that shots fired from the pistol Pinal recovered matched casings and bullets recovered from the Sanders scene. Callico admitted that he had an extensive criminal background and had initially stated that he did not know the shooter. Pinal acknowledged that he never had the gun or magazine tested for fingerprints and that, during the chase, he lost sight of Weaver for 30 seconds. Weaver’s counsel emphasized the time gap between Sanders’s murder and the recovery of the pistol and that Callico’s unreliable testimony was the only direct evidence. Weaver was convicted of first-degree murder. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the trial court denied him the right to his counsel of choice; his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call several witnesses and properly cross‐examine Callico; the state violated his due process rights by using Callico’s coerced and perjured testimony; and the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting evidence of other crimes related to the September 2002 incident. View "Weaver v. Nicholson" on Justia Law

Jones, a Calumet City alderman, wants to be mayor. His supporter, Grant, tried to prevent the incumbent, Qualkinbush, from running for reelection in 2017 by circulating a referendum to set a three-term limit on the mayor. Grant gathered enough signatures but the city proposed three referenda for that election, which were certified before Grant’s. Illinois law limits to three the number of referenda on any ballot. One of the city’s proposals passed: it prevents the election as mayor of anyone who has served four or more consecutive terms as either mayor or alderman, barring Jones. Jones was removed from the ballot. Qualkinbush was reelected. Jones lost a state suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Jones’s challenges. The Rule of Three allows a city observing a signature-gathering campaign in progress to get its own proposals on the ballot first but a ballot is not a public forum. Nothing in the Constitution guarantees direct democracy. The Rule does not distinguish by content and is rationally related to a legitimate state objective in simplifying the ballot to promote a well-considered outcome. Rejecting Jones’s claim that this referendum was aimed at him and treated him as a prohibited class of one, the court noted that three aldermen were affected and the referendum prevents Qualkinbush from running for reelection in 2021. “Politics is a rough-and-tumble game,” and the right response is political. View "Jones v. Qualkinbush" on Justia Law

When the district court sentenced Cross (2000) and Davis (1992), the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines prescribed an elevated sentence for career offenders. A defendant qualified as a career offender upon his third felony conviction for either a crime of violence or a drug offense. The guidelines defined “crime of violence” in three ways: an elements approach, an enumerated offense approach, and the residual clause, which covered any offense that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Both Cross and Davis were sentenced under the residual clause. Neither objected at trial. The Supreme Court jettisoned the mandatory nature of the guidelines in 2005 (Booker). In its 2015 “Johnson” holding, the Supreme Court found identical residual language in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), unconstitutionally vague; in 2017 the Court held (Beckles) that Johnson does not extend to the advisory guidelines, including the career-offender guideline. The Seventh Circuit granted Cross and Davis relief from their sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Beckles applies only to advisory guidelines, not to mandatory sentencing rules. Under Johnson, the guidelines residual clause is unconstitutionally vague insofar as it determined mandatory sentencing ranges for pre-Booker defendants. Cross and Davis are entitled to be resentenced. View "De'Angelo Cross v. United States" on Justia Law

When the district court sentenced Cross (2000) and Davis (1992), the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines prescribed an elevated sentence for career offenders. A defendant qualified as a career offender upon his third felony conviction for either a crime of violence or a drug offense. The guidelines defined “crime of violence” in three ways: an elements approach, an enumerated offense approach, and the residual clause, which covered any offense that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Both Cross and Davis were sentenced under the residual clause. Neither objected at trial. The Supreme Court jettisoned the mandatory nature of the guidelines in 2005 (Booker). In its 2015 “Johnson” holding, the Supreme Court found identical residual language in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), unconstitutionally vague; in 2017 the Court held (Beckles) that Johnson does not extend to the advisory guidelines, including the career-offender guideline. The Seventh Circuit granted Cross and Davis relief from their sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Beckles applies only to advisory guidelines, not to mandatory sentencing rules. Under Johnson, the guidelines residual clause is unconstitutionally vague insofar as it determined mandatory sentencing ranges for pre-Booker defendants. Cross and Davis are entitled to be resentenced. View "De'Angelo Cross v. United States" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told Officer Hronopoulos that Wheeler had guns in his Chicago apartment. This informant had previously given good information, so Hronopoulos drove the informant by Wheeler’s apartment to confirm the address and took the informant before a judge to testify in support of warrant applications. The judge issued warrants. That night, police executed the warrants and found guns, ammunition, and heroin. Wheeler was acquitted because the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband was his. Wheeler sued the city and the officers, raising a Fourth Amendment claim for an unlawful search and arrest (42 U.S.C. 1983) and a state‐law claim for malicious prosecution. The court rejected Wheeler’s argument that the warrant was defective because the informant’s tip was hearsay, reasoning the tip was not offered to prove the truth of the matter it asserted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There was probable cause for the search, arrest, and prosecution via the informant’s tip. The court rejected Wheeler’s “irrational argument” that there was a disputed fact as to whether the informant existed or gave the tip at all, as waived for not having been raised below, as was Wheeler’s supposed Brady claim concerning officers’ failure to procure fingerprint evidence. View "Wheeler v. Hronopoulos" on Justia Law

Mayle, an adherent of “non-theistic Satanism,” sued to enjoin the printing of the national motto, “In God We Trust,” on U.S. currency. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint, rejecting claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses. The Supreme Court has observed that the motto “In God We Trust” merely acknowledges a part of our nation’s heritage (albeit a religious part) and does not “pose a real danger of establishment of a state church.” Mayle has not been coerced into participating in Christianity; “no one walking down the street who saw Mayle would have the faintest idea what Mayle had in his pocket—currency or plastic payment cards or perhaps just a smartphone.” The motto’s placement on currency has the secular purpose of recognizing the religious component of our nation’s history and does not affect current religious practices. The motto is generally applicable and no reasonable person would believe that using currency has religious significance. Mayle has not suffered a financial burden because of his religious beliefs, nor has he altered his behavior to avoid violating his religious beliefs. View "Mayle v. United States" on Justia Law