Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

For decades, Elkhart, Indiana’s Concord High School has held a “Christmas Spectacular” concert. In 2015, the Freedom From Religion Foundation wrote a letter expressing concerns about the religious nature of the Spectacular’s second half, which included religious songs interspersed with a narrator reading passages from the New Testament, and a student-performed nativity scene. The superintendent rejected the claim. Plaintiff sued under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. While the suit was pending, Concord volunteered to remove the scriptural reading and add songs representing Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. The judge concluded that the proposal was not adequate and granted a preliminary injunction forbidding the school from performing the proposed version. Concord actually performed a second half that spent about four and a half minutes each explaining and performing a song to represent Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. Images are projected onto screens with each song. For the remaining 20 minutes, students perform numerous religious Christmas songs and a two-minute nativity scene, with mannequins, not student actors. There are no New Testament readings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the 2015 show did not violate the Establishment Clause and a declaratory judgment that the 2014 and proposed versions were unconstitutional, with an award of $10 in nominal damages. Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction was denied. View "Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools" on Justia Law

Sarfraz was convicted of sexually assaulting I.N., an immigrant who, with her father, briefly lived with Sarfraz after arriving in this country. I.N. testified that Sarfraz forced his way into her apartment, strangled her, threatened her with a knife, and raped her. Abundant physical evidence corroborated her account. Sarfraz claimed that I.N. consented to sexual intercourse and sought to introduce evidence that he and I.N. had engaged in consensual sexual contact while she was living with him. The judge excluded the evidence under Wisconsin’s rape-shield law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the state’s interest in excluding the evidence outweighed Sarfraz’s interest in admitting it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Sarfraz’s federal habeas petition. The state supreme court noted but did not separately analyze Sarfraz’s federal constitutional claims so the Richter presumption required treatment of its decision as an adjudication on the merits and required deferential review. That decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law. The Supreme Court has held that the application of evidentiary rules limiting a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence may not be disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s balancing of interests was not an unreasonable application of that standard, particularly in light of the slim marginal value of the excluded evidence. View "Sarfraz v. Smith" on Justia Law

Sarfraz was convicted of sexually assaulting I.N., an immigrant who, with her father, briefly lived with Sarfraz after arriving in this country. I.N. testified that Sarfraz forced his way into her apartment, strangled her, threatened her with a knife, and raped her. Abundant physical evidence corroborated her account. Sarfraz claimed that I.N. consented to sexual intercourse and sought to introduce evidence that he and I.N. had engaged in consensual sexual contact while she was living with him. The judge excluded the evidence under Wisconsin’s rape-shield law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the state’s interest in excluding the evidence outweighed Sarfraz’s interest in admitting it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Sarfraz’s federal habeas petition. The state supreme court noted but did not separately analyze Sarfraz’s federal constitutional claims so the Richter presumption required treatment of its decision as an adjudication on the merits and required deferential review. That decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law. The Supreme Court has held that the application of evidentiary rules limiting a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence may not be disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s balancing of interests was not an unreasonable application of that standard, particularly in light of the slim marginal value of the excluded evidence. View "Sarfraz v. Smith" on Justia Law

Hampton, a convicted felon, robbed a post office at gunpoint. Weeks later, he was arrested after breaking into a business. When deputies searched Hampton’s home, they found three firearms; two were stolen. At the Sheriff’s Office, deputies informed Hampton that they were recording the conversation. Hampton interjected: “Actually, I want to change that. I haven’t even gotten a chance to get a lawyer or anything.” Deputies explained to Hampton why they wished to record the Miranda process, concluded that Hampton had not invoked his right to counsel, and, with the recorder off, advised Hampton of his rights. Hampton said: “Maybe I should have a lawyer,” but later said something the officers interpreted as permission to continue. Hampton does not contest that he agreed to proceed without counsel. Hampton signed a Miranda waiver and confirmed that he had not been threatened or received any promises. Hampton confessed to stealing scrap metal from empty buildings. After 90 minutes, Hampton confessed to the post office robbery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 132-month sentenced for robbing federal property, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(j), rejecting arguments that robbery of federal property is not a crime of violence since it can be accomplished by “intimidation” and that Hampton unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Hampton, a convicted felon, robbed a post office at gunpoint. Weeks later, he was arrested after breaking into a business. When deputies searched Hampton’s home, they found three firearms; two were stolen. At the Sheriff’s Office, deputies informed Hampton that they were recording the conversation. Hampton interjected: “Actually, I want to change that. I haven’t even gotten a chance to get a lawyer or anything.” Deputies explained to Hampton why they wished to record the Miranda process, concluded that Hampton had not invoked his right to counsel, and, with the recorder off, advised Hampton of his rights. Hampton said: “Maybe I should have a lawyer,” but later said something the officers interpreted as permission to continue. Hampton does not contest that he agreed to proceed without counsel. Hampton signed a Miranda waiver and confirmed that he had not been threatened or received any promises. Hampton confessed to stealing scrap metal from empty buildings. After 90 minutes, Hampton confessed to the post office robbery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 132-month sentenced for robbing federal property, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), being a felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(j), rejecting arguments that robbery of federal property is not a crime of violence since it can be accomplished by “intimidation” and that Hampton unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin John Doe proceeding is conducted by a judge, to collect evidence and determine whether probable cause exists to issue a criminal complaint. During the time at issue, a proceeding could subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath, and, issue search warrants; the proceeding could be conducted in secret so that the targets would be unaware of it. A Milwaukee judge commenced a proceeding to investigate alleged campaign‐finance violations and entered a secrecy order. The targets were not notified of the execution of search warrants for electronic records. Eventually a judge concluded that the targets of subpoenas had done nothing wrong--Wisconsin law did not prohibit coordination between campaign committees and outside groups to finance issue advocacy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed. The court ordered that the proceedings be closed; a modified order required that all original documents relating to the proceeding be filed with the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. All other copies were destroyed. MacIver filed suit on behalf of a putative class, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(a)–(c), 2711(3), arguing that the proceeding did not constitute a “court of competent jurisdiction.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Act's provision that “good faith reliance on … a court warrant or order … is a complete defense” and the defense of qualified immunity. MacIver’s interpretation of the Act was not “clearly established” at the time defendants’ warrants were issued. View "John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc. v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin John Doe proceeding is conducted by a judge, to collect evidence and determine whether probable cause exists to issue a criminal complaint. During the time at issue, a proceeding could subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath, and, issue search warrants; the proceeding could be conducted in secret so that the targets would be unaware of it. A Milwaukee judge commenced a proceeding to investigate alleged campaign‐finance violations and entered a secrecy order. The targets were not notified of the execution of search warrants for electronic records. Eventually a judge concluded that the targets of subpoenas had done nothing wrong--Wisconsin law did not prohibit coordination between campaign committees and outside groups to finance issue advocacy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed. The court ordered that the proceedings be closed; a modified order required that all original documents relating to the proceeding be filed with the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. All other copies were destroyed. MacIver filed suit on behalf of a putative class, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(a)–(c), 2711(3), arguing that the proceeding did not constitute a “court of competent jurisdiction.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Act's provision that “good faith reliance on … a court warrant or order … is a complete defense” and the defense of qualified immunity. MacIver’s interpretation of the Act was not “clearly established” at the time defendants’ warrants were issued. View "John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc. v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

In 2011, Faulkner, a high-ranking member of the Imperial Insane Vice Lords, was prosecuted for heroin distribution that occurred in 2007-2008, and for heroin found in his apartment. Following his arrest, Faulkner debriefed extensively with federal agents, explaining his role in the gang, their drug distribution activities, and the identities and roles of other gang members. He pled guilty to two counts of using a telephone to facilitate drug crimes. In 2013, while Faulkner was in prison, the government indicted him again, with 10 other defendants, including Sykes, for drug trafficking through the gang’s organization or within its territory. Sykes was not a member of the gang but a street-level seller. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants, Sykes’ 195-month sentence, and Faulkner’s 30-year sentence. The court rejected Faulkner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; his claim that he withdrew from the conspiracy as of the time of his arrest; his claim that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of hearsay statements from alleged co-conspirators; and his argument that his Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy was violated by the two prosecutions. The court found Sykes’ above-Guidelines sentence reasonable under the Section 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Cannici was a Melrose Park firefighter for 16 years before being terminated for violation of the Residency Ordinance. Cannici and his family lived in Melrose Park until 2008 when they bought a home in Orland Park while retaining ownership of their Melrose Park home. During the week, Cannici’s wife and children lived in Orland Park, while Cannici lived in Melrose Park, spending weekends together in one of the homes. In 2013, Cannici rented the Melrose Park home out, reserving part of the basement for his exclusive use. He kept belongings in the home, paid utilities and taxes, and received all of his mail at the Melrose Park address, but slept in Orland Park between June 2013 and June 2016. In May 2016, the Village requested an interview to inquire about his residency. The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners issued a written Statement of Charges, seeking to terminate his employment. Before his hearing, Cannici filed an unsuccessful motion challenging purported ex parte communications between the prosecuting attorney and the Board’s attorney. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cannici’s equal protection and due process claims. The Illinois statute does not provide full protection from termination; the Village afforded Cannici what the statute requires: written charges, a hearing, and the opportunity to present evidence. View "Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park" on Justia Law

Indianapolis police received a report that Koster was vomiting and having trouble breathing. Koster’s apartment-complex manager gave responders keys to Koster’s apartment in case Koster could not answer the door. Officer Murphy unlocked the door. Koster yelled: “Don’t come in!” and “I will shoot you." Koster was sitting in bed with a gun in his hand, swallowing pills. Murphy tried to convince him to put down the gun. SWAT members arrived. Koster asked to speak with his medical advocate, but the negotiator said that would be too dangerous while Koster held the gun. Koster asked for his brother, an Indianapolis officer. Someone left him a voicemail. Koster declared that he would “fire a warning shot” and pointed his gun at the officers. One officer fired a beanbag round. Officer Gray fired three bullets at Koster’s head; two hit him. Koster died at a trauma center. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the officers raised a qualified-immunity defense, The district judge granted summary judgment to Murphy but not Gray, reasoning that a reasonable officer would have believed that Koster’s immediate detention was necessary in order for him to receive medical attention and assistance, but that Gray used greater force than was reasonable because he did not take cover or wait for the less-lethal option. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Gray did not violate Koster’s Fourth Amendment right by defending himself and other officers once Koster pointed a gun. View "Sanzone v. Gray" on Justia Law