Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A confidential source alerted Rock Island police that Watson was selling drugs from the home she shared with her husband, Leonard. Officers twice, one week apart, searched sealed trash bags left in a public alley outside the home. Both times the bags contained indicia of residency and tested positive for cannabis. Two days after the second positive test, officers obtained a state warrant to search the residence. Police executed the warrant the next day. The officer who had a copy of the warrant had to leave before Watson arrived home. When Watson asked to see the warrant, an officer had to return to the police station to get another copy. That copy apparently was not the correct one. Officers executed the warrant and, in addition to drugs, found a semi-automatic handgun. Leonard admitted he owned the gun. Because he had been convicted of a felony, he was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court denied Leonard’s motions to suppress the gun and to require disclosure of the tipster's identity. Leonard conditionally pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Officers are not required to wait until someone is home to conduct the search; warrant presentation is not required, so inadvertent presentation of the wrong warrant is not fatal. Regardless of the credibility of the tipster, the drugs contained in trash bags bearing sufficient indicia of residency established probable cause. View "United States v. Leonard" on Justia Law

A 2000 “John Doe” complaint charged an unknown individual with sexually assaulting five women in 1994-1995. Although the defendant’s identity was unknown, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory had evidence of his genetic code from semen samples taken from the victims’ bodies and clothing. An arrest warrant describing John Doe #5 with reference to his DNA was issued. In 2007, the Lab matched Washington’s DNA to the John Doe #5 DNA. The state amended its complaint, naming Washington and describing his DNA profile as a series of “alleles” at several genetic locations. Before trial, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and sought to represent himself. During a colloquy, the judge stated: the court doesn’t believe that you’re competent … because of the DNA … very few people ... know how that works … also problematic … since this is a sexual assault case for you to ... cross‐examine the witnesses. The judge denied Washington’s request. Washington was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Washington’s petition for federal habeas relief, finding the state courts’ denial of his request to proceed pro se inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1975 "Faretta" holding. The court rejected claims that the complaint was insufficient under Wisconsin law to toll the statute of limitations and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. View "Washington v. Boughton" on Justia Law

A 2000 “John Doe” complaint charged an unknown individual with sexually assaulting five women in 1994-1995. Although the defendant’s identity was unknown, the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory had evidence of his genetic code from semen samples taken from the victims’ bodies and clothing. An arrest warrant describing John Doe #5 with reference to his DNA was issued. In 2007, the Lab matched Washington’s DNA to the John Doe #5 DNA. The state amended its complaint, naming Washington and describing his DNA profile as a series of “alleles” at several genetic locations. Before trial, Washington expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and sought to represent himself. During a colloquy, the judge stated: the court doesn’t believe that you’re competent … because of the DNA … very few people ... know how that works … also problematic … since this is a sexual assault case for you to ... cross‐examine the witnesses. The judge denied Washington’s request. Washington was convicted and sentenced to 100 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Washington’s petition for federal habeas relief, finding the state courts’ denial of his request to proceed pro se inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 1975 "Faretta" holding. The court rejected claims that the complaint was insufficient under Wisconsin law to toll the statute of limitations and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on that ground. View "Washington v. Boughton" on Justia Law

Jansen pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. Before sentencing, Jansen’s third attorney (Steinback) withdrew. His new attorney, Beaumont, requested Rule 16 discovery and obtained 42,700 documents. Jansen filed a pro se motion to continue his sentencing proceedings because none of his prior attorneys had requested or reviewed those documents. Weeks later, Beaumont withdrew, citing irreconcilable differences; he was replaced by Richards. Jansen indicated to the court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea as not “knowing and voluntary” because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Richards also withdrew. The court permitted Jansen to proceed pro se but denied his motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced Jansen to 70 months’ imprisonment with a restitution payment of $269,978 to the IRS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, remanding the issue of restitution to allow the district court to clarify that its imposition of restitution is a condition of supervised release rather than a criminal penalty. The district court made the sound factual finding that Jansen hired Steinback “to negotiate the best possible plea agreement,” not to go to trial. Steinback formulated a “four-fold” “tactical strategy” that included forgoing investigation and discovery so that such a strategy was objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Jansen" on Justia Law

Jansen pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. Before sentencing, Jansen’s third attorney (Steinback) withdrew. His new attorney, Beaumont, requested Rule 16 discovery and obtained 42,700 documents. Jansen filed a pro se motion to continue his sentencing proceedings because none of his prior attorneys had requested or reviewed those documents. Weeks later, Beaumont withdrew, citing irreconcilable differences; he was replaced by Richards. Jansen indicated to the court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea as not “knowing and voluntary” because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Richards also withdrew. The court permitted Jansen to proceed pro se but denied his motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced Jansen to 70 months’ imprisonment with a restitution payment of $269,978 to the IRS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, remanding the issue of restitution to allow the district court to clarify that its imposition of restitution is a condition of supervised release rather than a criminal penalty. The district court made the sound factual finding that Jansen hired Steinback “to negotiate the best possible plea agreement,” not to go to trial. Steinback formulated a “four-fold” “tactical strategy” that included forgoing investigation and discovery so that such a strategy was objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Jansen" on Justia Law

Illinois State Trooper Patterson observed a car abruptly switch lanes in front of a truck without using a signal on I-70. A dashboard camera recorded the traffic stop. Patterson reviewed documents from Moran, the driver, and Rodriguez, her fiance, who is from Mexico, and questioned them about their travel plans. They gave inconsistent answers. Eight minutes into the stop, Patterson discovered that Moran’s California driver’s license was suspended. After Patterson had everything he needed to issue citations and release them, Patterson called for a narcotics-detection dog, which was occupied with another traffic stop. Patterson took 22 minutes to issue three routine citations. The K-9 unit arrived 33 minutes after the stop. Despite an initial negative dog sniff, Patterson continued to question Moran, stating that he wanted to “make sure there is nothing illegal, is that all right? Moran nodded yes. Patterson searched Moran’s vehicle. Her trunk contained 7.5 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in luggage; Moran's purse contained $28,000 in cash. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order suppressing the evidence. A seizure that is “lawful at its inception” can violate the Fourth Amendment if “prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete” the initial purpose. When Patterson requested the dog, he only knew that the couple was coming from Los Angeles; that Moran had air fresheners in her car; that the couple did not have concrete travel arrangements; and that Rodriguez did not look up when Patterson approached the vehicle. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Escalera" on Justia Law

In 2010, Kirklin drove Jones and McCallister to rob a bank and gave Jones firearms. The two left with stolen money but were arrested near the scene. Kirklin was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence. His 171-month sentence included an 84‐month consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); such sentences vary based on whether the defendant was responsible for merely carrying or using the weapon, or for brandishing it, or for discharging it. Video evidence showed that Jones and McCallister had brandished weapons. The court did not instruct the jury to make a specific finding as to whether the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Kirklin was responsible for the brandishing but made that determination at sentencing. The Supreme Court's 2002 Harris decision held that whether a firearm was brandished was a sentencing factor, not an element of the offense, and need not be submitted to the jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Three months after Kirklin’s sentencing, the Court granted certiorari in Alleyne, eventually holding that juries must make factual determinations that increase mandatory minimum sentences and that brandishing is an element of the conduct criminalized by the seven‐year mandatory minimum and must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Kirklin’s sentence and later upheld a denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Kirkland's attorney’s performance was not objectively unreasonable for failing to anticipate the overruling of Harris and failing to object to having the court make the factual finding. Given the strength of the evidence against Kirklin, even after certiorari was granted in Alleyne, a defense lawyer might have made a reasonable strategic decision not to challenge the brandishing issue. View "Kirklin v. United States" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Michael, age 16, and three other young men attempted to rob a Rockford pizzeria at gunpoint. Pobjecky, an off‐duty police officer waiting for a pizza, shot and killed Michael. Video recordings captured part of the incident, which involved a struggle for a gun. Michael’s participation in the struggle was disputed. He was apparently crawling when Pobjecky shot him. Wounds showing that three bullets entered Michael’s back contradict Pobjecky’s claim that he shot as Michael advanced toward Pobjecky. All three surviving assailants were convicted of felony murder. The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims by Michael’s estate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Pobjecky’s use of deadly force was reasonable and justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pobjecky did not know that Michael was unarmed; he was in close quarters with multiple, moving, potentially armed assailants, who forced him to make split‐second, life‐or‐death decisions. The incident lasted only about 45 seconds from the moment the first assailant entered the pizzeria to the moment Pobjecky locked the door. It was objectively reasonable for Pobjecky to stay inside the locked pizzeria awaiting help. It would be objectively unreasonable to demand that he venture into the night with an empty gun, risking further onslaught, to administer treatment to Michael. View "Horton v. Pobjecky" on Justia Law

Before a Milwaukee-area Verizon store was robbed, witnesses in the store noticed a Mercedes sitting in the parking lot for an extended time. Just before the robber entered through the rear door, the Mercedes drove to the back of the store. As the robber fled, the Mercedes sped away at a high speed. Investigating officers thought the Mercedes was a “decoy,” intended to distract from the actual getaway car. Police stopped the Mercedes, which contained no evidence of involvement in the robbery. During a five-hour interrogation, the car’s occupants named King as the robber. King was arrested and admitted to the Verizon robbery and other robberies. A search of his home uncovered evidence of King’s involvement in several robberies. Charged with unlawfully taking and attempting to take wireless phones in interstate commerce by means of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury, 18 U.S.C. 1951, 1952, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), King moved to suppress evidence obtained after his arrest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, stating that the Mercedes’s conduct cannot be confused with innocent behavior and that the police were not merely acting on a hunch. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law