Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Hudson was shot and killed; the gun was not recovered. Riley was charged with first-degree murder and being an armed habitual criminal. The judge severed the armed habitual criminal count and proceeded with the murder trial. In finding Riley not guilty of murder, the jury found that the prosecution had not proven “that during the commission of the offense of first-degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.” Three of the same witnesses testified at the armed habitual criminal trial before the same judge. The parties stipulated that Riley had two qualifying prior convictions, leaving the judge to decide only whether Riley possessed a gun. Defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in the stories of the state’s witnesses and noted that none of them could describe the gun allegedly possessed by Riley, despite identifying him as the shooter. The judge found Riley guilty. On direct appeal, the court ruled that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting Riley as an armed habitual criminal because whether he had possessed a gun was not decided at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting his collateral estoppel claim. View "Riley v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Hudson was shot and killed; the gun was not recovered. Riley was charged with first-degree murder and being an armed habitual criminal. The judge severed the armed habitual criminal count and proceeded with the murder trial. In finding Riley not guilty of murder, the jury found that the prosecution had not proven “that during the commission of the offense of first-degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.” Three of the same witnesses testified at the armed habitual criminal trial before the same judge. The parties stipulated that Riley had two qualifying prior convictions, leaving the judge to decide only whether Riley possessed a gun. Defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in the stories of the state’s witnesses and noted that none of them could describe the gun allegedly possessed by Riley, despite identifying him as the shooter. The judge found Riley guilty. On direct appeal, the court ruled that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting Riley as an armed habitual criminal because whether he had possessed a gun was not decided at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting his collateral estoppel claim. View "Riley v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Officers Bohlen and Rohde saw Avina near a Milwaukee high school with others, including known Mexican Posse street gang members. The assistant principal told the group to leave school property. They crossed the street. When school was dismissed, they began to harass pedestrians, yelling and flashing gang signs. The officers instructed them to leave the area. The group moved one block down, stood in front of a house that belonged to Avina’s cousin, and continued to harass pedestrians. After 15 minutes, the officers told them to disperse or be arrested. Most entered left. Avina rode his bike back to the school’s lawn. The officers decided to arrest him for trespassing. They could have issued a simple citation but believed that he would continue to loiter. They instructed Avina to get off his bike and put his hands behind his back. He cooperated. They escorted him to their squad car where Bohlen’s handling caused Avina’s arm to break. In Avina’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewed in the light most favorable to Avina, the record establishes that he was fully cooperative when Bohlen moved his arm with enough force to break it, which does not support the conclusion that Bohlen was placing Avina in handcuffs with objectively reasonable force. View "Avina v. Bohlen" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told Winnebago County Deputy Jones that he had purchased crack cocaine from “a larger black male” who was selling drugs from his house and agreed to participate in a controlled buy, stating that the suspect would drive to meet the CI to make the sale. Jones surveilled the address the CI had reported and, several times, saw a man fitting the description drive to meet different individuals in the car. Deputies positioned surveillance on the house and neighborhood and set up the controlled buy. Under continuous observation, the suspect drove and met the CI, then returned to the house. The CI returned with 0.7 grams of a white, rock-like substance that later tested positive for cocaine. In a warrant affidavit, Jones described the CI’s participation in the buy but said little about the CI himself, who did not appear. Executing the warrant, deputies found heroin, crack cocaine, marijuana, a loaded pistol, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Haynes admitted that everything seized was his, that he intended to distribute the drugs, and that he kept the gun for protection. Haynes was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence. The relevant factors support the CI’s reliability. Even without the CI’s tip, the controlled buy provided probable cause. View "United States v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Three Menard Correctional Center officers were preparing inmates to walk from the cell house to dinner when Wilborn rushed out of his cell and attacked Johnson. Bennett and Lloyd took Wilborn to the ground and ordered him to “cuff up” and claim that Wilborn violently resisted. The officers’ testimony was generally consistent; they denied striking Wilborn after they had restrained him. Wilborn testified that he was compliant and in handcuffs when Ealey used pepper spray and that the officers continued to beat him after restraining him. His former cellmate supported his story. Medical staff examined Wilborn but later that day Wilborn was transferred to Tamms Correctional Center. Tamms nurses evaluated Wilborn, recorded his cuts and bruises, gave him acetaminophen, and noted that Wilborn’s shoulder appeared abnormal and that he complained of dislocation. They scheduled Wilborn to see a doctor first thing the next day. Wilborn remained in the infirmary overnight, in pain. The next morning, the doctor sent Wilborn to a hospital, where another doctor reduced Wilborn’s dislocated shoulder about 24 hours after the fight. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Wilborn acted pro se. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the nurses because Wilborn failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court upheld findings that the officers were more credible than Wilborn and his witnesses and the entry of judgment in favor of all remaining defendants. View "Wilborn v. Ealey" on Justia Law

In this complaint brought by an Indiana prisoner, the Seventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court on Plaintiff’s complaint that two prison guards punched him, put him in a chokehold, and placed a plastic bag over his head, all in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district judge concluded that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997(e)(a). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that summary judgment on nonexhaustion grounds was improper because the record did not clearly show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Mason" on Justia Law

In this complaint brought by an Indiana prisoner, the Seventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court on Plaintiff’s complaint that two prison guards punched him, put him in a chokehold, and placed a plastic bag over his head, all in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The district judge concluded that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997(e)(a). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that summary judgment on nonexhaustion grounds was improper because the record did not clearly show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Mason" on Justia Law

Kane County Sheriff’s investigators discovered that an IP address was using specialized peer-to-peer software to share child pornography over the internet. They gave this information to the Department of Homeland Security, which identified Niggemann as the owner of the IP address. The agents executed a search warrant at Niggemann’s West Dundee, Illinois home, seizing a laptop and a desktop computer. Both contained child pornography. Niggemann was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (a)(5)(B). Because he had a prior conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, Niggemann faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a much longer term of 235-293 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 182 months, far below the guidelines range but slightly above the mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Niggemann’s argument that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he— rather than his wife—committed the crimes. Abundant forensic and other evidence links Niggemann to the child pornography. Niggemann’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence is squarely foreclosed by precedent. View "United States v. Niggemann" on Justia Law

Kane County Sheriff’s investigators discovered that an IP address was using specialized peer-to-peer software to share child pornography over the internet. They gave this information to the Department of Homeland Security, which identified Niggemann as the owner of the IP address. The agents executed a search warrant at Niggemann’s West Dundee, Illinois home, seizing a laptop and a desktop computer. Both contained child pornography. Niggemann was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (a)(5)(B). Because he had a prior conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, Niggemann faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a much longer term of 235-293 months. The judge imposed a sentence of 182 months, far below the guidelines range but slightly above the mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Niggemann’s argument that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he— rather than his wife—committed the crimes. Abundant forensic and other evidence links Niggemann to the child pornography. Niggemann’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence is squarely foreclosed by precedent. View "United States v. Niggemann" on Justia Law

While on the lookout for a serial bank robber, Chicago police officers misidentified Swanigan as the perpetrator, arrested him, and detained him for approximately 51 hours without a probable-cause hearing. He was released when the prosecutor decided not to press charges. Police later found the actual culprit. Swanigan sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and sued the city, raising Monell claims. The judge stayed the Monell suit to allow the suit against the officers to proceed separately. A jury found for Swanigan on a single claim—for unconstitutionally prolonging his detention—and awarded $60,000. The judge dismissed the suit against the city entirely. The Seventh Circuit vacated the dismissal as premature. Swanigan filed an amended complaint alleging constitutional injuries stemming from: a departmental “hold” policy by which the officers kept him in custody; a policy of requiring detainees to participate in lineups; and a policy regarding the contents of the closed case file that continued to label him as the bank robber. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Swanigan cannot recover twice for the prolonged detention. His other claims have no basis in federal law. The Constitution does not address unreliable police lineups that do not taint a trial nor reputational harm from misleading police reports. Swanigan lacks standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief because the challenged policies are unlikely to harm him in the future. View "Swanigan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law