Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1987, African‐Americans filed suit against Chicago Heights, alleging dilution of voting opportunity. The election practices at issue were found to violate the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10101. Appellants split from other class plaintiffs and objected to the first consent decree; they have been the main opposition to proposed remedies. In 2010, the district court entered a consent decree, establishing a seven‐ward, single aldermanic form of government; including a ward map that complied with constitutional requirements; and requiring the city to reapportion the wards as the population changed. The subsequent 2010 census showed that the wards’ populations had changed, requiring reapportionment. After public comment, the city approved its redrawn ward map and sought approval of that map. Appellants objected and sought leave to file their own map for implementation by the court. The court held that the Decree gave the city the exclusive right to reapportion the wards. The city’s map still contained seven wards, each with an individual population deviation of less than 10 percent. However, the overall deviation was 12.65%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the proposed map is constitutional. The city presented sufficient justification and made a good faith effort to reapportion the map with the smallest population deviations practicable, using legitimate and nondiscriminatory objectives, such as maintaining historical and natural boundary lines where possible, and easing voter confusion by redrawing unusual boundaries. View "McCoy v. Chicago Heights Election Commission" on Justia Law

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) requires states to permit "overseas voters" to vote by absentee ballot in federal elections, 52 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1). An “overseas voter” resides outside the U.S. and would otherwise be qualified to vote in the last place in which the person was domiciled in the U.S. Illinois law provides that “[a]ny non‐resident civilian citizen, otherwise qualified to vote," may vote by mail in a federal election. "Non‐resident civilian citizens" reside “outside the territorial limits" of the U.S. but previously maintained a residence in Illinois and are not registered to vote in any other state. Former Illinois residents, now residing in the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, challenged the laws as violating their equal protection rights and their right to travel protected by the Due Process Clause. The territories where the plaintiffs reside are considered part of the U.S. under the statutes, while other territories are not. The district court held that there was a rational basis for the inclusion of some territories but not others in the definition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the Illinois statute but concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the UOCAVA, which does not prevent Illinois from providing the plaintiffs absentee ballots and does not cause their injury. The plaintiffs are not entitled to ballots under state law. View "Segovia v. United States" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of rape, deviate sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping in 1983. As required by Illinois law, he registered as a sex offender for 10 years. In 2011, Illinois amended its Sex Offender Registration Act to define as a “sexual predator” a person who had been convicted of any felony offense after July 1, 2011, and had been required to register as a sex offender under a conviction that required registration for more than 10 years. When Johnson was convicted of felony theft in 2013, he became a “sexual predator,” required, for the rest of his life, to register in person several times a year and to give authorities his email address, any internet communications identity, any URL registered to him, and any new blogs or internet sites he maintains and to which he has posted. The district court dismissed Johnson’s challenge to the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a challenge to Johnson’s standing based on his move to Wisconsin. Johnson is free from most of the restrictions imposed by Illinois law, but the sexual predator classification imposed in Illinois continues to affect him even in Wisconsin. Rejecting an ex post facto challenge, the court stated that the Act does not apply retroactively; it does not change or increase the penalty for his 1983 rape conviction. View "Johnson v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Officers Garcia and Murphy observed Sanchez fail to stop his van as required at intersections and fail to maintain his lane; his sliding door was completely open. Garcia activated his siren and lights. Sanchez did not stop. Sanchez eventually stopped and exited his van, stumbling. Garcia noted that Sanchez, driving on a suspended license, smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and was mumbling vulgarities. Sanchez refused instructions and took a swing at Garcia. Garcia performed an emergency takedown. The officers found an open beer can and marijuana in the van. Sanchez claimed Garcia struck him unprovoked. At the police station, an officer observed Sanchez lying on the floor, smelling of alcohol and mumbling profanities, and requested medical assistance. Paramedic Ragusa detected the odor of alcohol, but found Sanchez able to answer questions. Ragusa made a notation ruling out battery as a cause of Sanchez’s injuries. After he declined treatment, Sanchez was returned to the jail. The lockup keeper noted that Sanchez did not appear visibly intoxicated. Sanchez was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction and denied post-conviction relief. In federal court, Sanchez claimed excessive force and that Garcia lacked probable cause for arrest. The court instructed the jury that it must take it as conclusively proven that Sanchez was driving under the influence and allowed introduction, without objection, of Murphy’s deposition testimony, with Murphy’s accounts of what Garcia said, and of Ragusa’s paramedic’s report. The court excluded the lockup report. The jury ruled in favor of Garcia. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that a new trial was not required. View "Sanchez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Baer admitted that he murdered a 24-year-old woman and her four‐year‐old daughter in their home. He did not know the victims. Convicted of two murders, robbery, theft, and attempted rape, he was sentenced to death. He filed a direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, asserting prosecutorial misconduct. His convictions and death sentence were affirmed. Baer filed unsuccessful state post‐conviction proceedings alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief on his convictions but granted relief with respect to the death penalty. The Indiana Supreme Court’s ruling was unreasonable under “Strickland.” Evidence of Baer’s mental health and drug use were the cornerstone of Baer’s defense, and defense counsel’s sole strategy for avoiding a death sentence was ensuring that the jury considered and gave effect to that evidence. Yet, Baer’s trial counsel failed to object to instructions that effectively blocked consideration of this crucial mitigating evidence. Counsel also deficiently failed to object to a pattern of prosecutorial prejudicial statements. “The record reflects that the trial judge missed numerous opportunities to stop or clarify the prosecutor’s statements and his absence was noticeable throughout trial.” View "Baer v. Neal" on Justia Law

Easterling, a Wisconsin inmate with convictions for sexually assaulting a minor and armed robbery, sued correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that they violated his constitutional rights to due process and freedom of association by denying him visits with his daughter in 2004 and 2013. Easterling, having inquired about visitation in 2013, was told that he would first have to complete a sex offender program that was not then available. Instead of filing a formal request, Easterling filed suit. The court dismissed the claims based on 2004 as time‐barred. With respect to the claims based on 2013, it entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that other defenses blocked that claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claims arising out of actions taken in 2004 were barred by the six-year statute of limitations. The remaining defendants permissibly denied him visits in 2013 because he did not use the correct procedure to request them. Easterling’s “information requests” in 2013 were not formal “denials” of visitation; the warden Haines and the probation officer were not liable for violating Easterling’s rights. View "Easterling v. Thurmer" on Justia Law

Williams was charged with two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a); bank robbery, section 2113(a), (d); and three counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of those crimes, section 924(c). On the firearm counts alone, he faced a statutory minimum of 57 years in prison. The government offered a plea deal that would reduce his sentencing exposure by more than 39 years. After sending the terms to Williams’s attorney, the prosecutor emailed the proposal to Judge McCuskey pursuant to the judge’s standard practice. The judge replied by email, stating that the deal was “exceedingly fair” and “[o]nly a fool would refuse.” Williams pleaded guilty. The judge sentenced him to 18 years in prison pursuant to the agreement. A year later Williams moved to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that the judge impermissibly participated in plea negotiations in violation of FRCP 11(c)(1) and the Due Process Clause. He alleged ineffective assistance based on his lawyer’s failure to raise that violation and request recusal. A new judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 11(c)(1) forbids any judicial participation in plea negotiations, but this violation was harmless. That Williams would not have taken the plea deal but for the judge’s email is “not remotely plausible.” The government’s case was rock solid and the plea deal substantially reduced Williams’s prison exposure. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

Owens, an Illinois prisoner, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that 43 prison employees and the Illinois Department of Corrections obstructed his access to courts in violation of the First Amendment. Owens alleges that at four different correctional facilities, over the course of seven years, he had insufficient access to the law library and his excess legal storage boxes, was unable to send mail required to prosecute his cases, and was denied supplies. The district judge dismissed several claims and defendants and later entered summary judgment for the remaining defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Owens’s strongest claim for relief, that prison officials declined to advance him funds for legal mail in 2006-2010. was untimely. The court noted that “Owens—no stranger to the courts in this circuit—again filed an omnibus complaint against unrelated defendants and with claims arising from alleged conduct at four different prisons. As we have told him before, this scattershot strategy is unacceptable under Rule 20(a)(2) … and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(b), (g).” View "Owens v. Evans" on Justia Law

Freeman, charged in Illinois state court with kidnapping and murder, moved to proceed pro se although the state had announced its intent to seek the death penalty. The judge denied his request, finding that he did not possess the necessary experience and abilities. Freeman proceeded to trial with the public defender and was convicted. While acknowledging that the right to self-representation cannot be denied based on limited education and legal abilities, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial, finding that Freeman's request was not unequivocal. The Seventh Circuit granted Freeman’s habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The state court holdings were contrary to and unreasonable applications of the Supreme Court’s 1975 holding, Faretta v. California. A judge’s inquiries into a defendant’s technical legal knowledge are not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to defend himself. Nothing in the record indicates Freeman took vacillating positions on his desire to represent himself. Neither a request to proceed pro se that is accompanied by a request to appoint standby counsel nor dissatisfaction with counsel makes a self-representation request equivocal. It was improper for the court to require Freeman to justify why he wished to proceed pro se beyond what he had explained in his motion. View "Freeman v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Fox was convicted of two Hobbs Act robberies. Because he used a firearm to commit the robberies, he was subject to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)’s mandatory sentencing add-on and was sentenced to 435 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Fox’s argument that he was entitled to a new trial because the district court denied him his right to be represented by counsel of his choice. The district court was within its discretion to deny Fox’s morning-of-trial motion for a continuance when there was no indication Fox was particularly close to retaining new counsel. The court rejected other arguments as foreclosed by controlling precedent but agreed that Fox is entitled to resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Dean v. United States, which permits district courts to take into account the sentencing add-on when fashioning a just sentence for the predicate robberies. View "United States v. Fox" on Justia Law