Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Friends of George’s, Inc. (FOG), a theater organization that performs drag shows, challenged Tennessee’s Adult Entertainment Act (AEA), which criminalizes adult cabaret entertainment in public or where minors could view it. FOG argued that the AEA was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The district court agreed, declaring the AEA unconstitutional and permanently enjoining District Attorney General Steven Mulroy from enforcing it within Shelby County, Tennessee. Mulroy appealed, questioning FOG’s standing and the merits of the injunction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee initially granted FOG a temporary restraining order against the AEA. The court later ruled in favor of FOG, finding that the AEA violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined Mulroy from enforcing the statute within his jurisdiction. Mulroy appealed this decision, arguing that FOG lacked Article III standing and that the AEA was constitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that FOG did not meet its burden to show standing. The court held that FOG failed to demonstrate an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the AEA, as FOG’s performances were described as having artistic value suitable for minors. The court also found that FOG did not face a certainly impending threat of prosecution under the AEA. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Friends of George's, Inc. v. Mulroy" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Tennessee's policy of not allowing amendments to the sex listed on birth certificates based on gender identity. The plaintiffs, transgender individuals, argue that this policy violates their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They seek a procedure that permits changes to the sex designation on birth certificates based on self-reported gender identity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that Tennessee's policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it treated all individuals equally by requiring proof of an error to amend a birth certificate. The court also rejected the substantive due process claim, holding that there is no fundamental right to a birth certificate that reflects gender identity rather than biological sex.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Tennessee's policy does not discriminate based on sex or transgender status and is subject to rational basis review. The policy was found to be rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as maintaining accurate and consistent vital records. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a substantive due process right to amend their birth certificates to reflect their gender identity, as such a right is not deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition.The Sixth Circuit's main holding is that Tennessee's policy of not allowing amendments to the sex listed on birth certificates based on gender identity does not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court emphasized that the Constitution does not require states to adopt the plaintiffs' preferred policy and that such decisions are best left to the democratic process. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Gore v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Corey Neal, who was charged with federal gun possession after Shelby County officers, armed with a warrant, discovered three firearms at his residence. Neal challenged the validity of the search under the Fourth Amendment, but his plea was rejected, leading him to plead guilty to the charges. The case was then brought to appeal, where Neal reiterated his Fourth Amendment claim.The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee had previously denied Neal's motion to suppress the evidence found at his residence. The court agreed that the warrant lacked probable cause but invoked the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule from United States v. Leon, which allows evidence obtained in good faith reliance on a search warrant later found to be deficient. Neal pleaded guilty to the second count in the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the ruling, and was sentenced to 92 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the affidavit supporting the search warrant established a "minimally sufficient nexus" between the items sought and the place to be searched. The court reasoned that the affidavit provided more than a naked guess that contraband might be found at Neal's residence. It established recent drug trafficking by Neal and evidence of Neal's residency. The court concluded that the affidavit was not so bare bones as to necessitate the application of the exclusionary rule, thereby upholding the lower court's application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Neal" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Wendell Shane Mackey, a local resident, and Jeff Rising, a real-estate agent who served one term as a part-time City Commissioner for Adrian, Michigan. Mackey posted information about Rising on Facebook that Rising believed to be false. Rising responded by calling Mackey’s mother and allegedly threatened to “hurt” Mackey if he did not delete the post. Mackey sued, arguing that Rising’s threat of physical violence violated the First Amendment because Rising made it in his capacity as a Commissioner to stifle Mackey’s speech.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to Rising, concluding that he had acted as a private citizen when he made the alleged threats. Mackey appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Rising, as a legislator, did not have any “authority” to use (or threaten) physical force on behalf of the City of Adrian. His alleged “misuse” of the power, therefore, could not qualify as state action. The court also found that Rising’s acceptance of the City’s insurance for his defense did not conflict with his state-action defense on the merits, and thus, neither waiver nor judicial estoppel applied. View "Mackey v. Rising" on Justia Law

In 1987, Michael Kitchen, a seventeen-year-old, was sentenced to forty-two to sixty years in prison by a Michigan state court for his involvement in a home invasion. Under Michigan law, Kitchen is not eligible for parole until he completes his minimum sentence, which means he will not be considered for parole until he is nearly sixty. Kitchen filed a pro se § 1983 suit challenging the statute against Michigan’s governor, the Department of Corrections Director, and the chair of the Parole Board. He alleges that Michigan’s parole statute violates his Eighth Amendment rights because it effectively keeps him in prison for life without parole. The district court sided with Kitchen.The district court agreed with Kitchen and ruled against Defendants in an opinion and order on August 16, 2019. The court concluded that, despite the “legal and factual support” for Defendants’ position, “Kitchen is not required to bring his federal constitutional claims via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” and he could pursue them under § 1983. The district court thus rejected Defendants’ Heck argument. The Heck issue was not litigated any further.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that Kitchen's claim, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence. Therefore, his claim must be brought through habeas corpus, not § 1983. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kitchen v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

The case involves Dorian McMullen, who was found by police in a high-crime neighborhood, sitting in his car with his legs sticking out the open door. As police approached in an unmarked vehicle, they observed McMullen reaching for something on the car's floorboard, which they suspected to be a gun. McMullen exited his car and engaged in a brief conversation with the police, during which he allegedly admitted to having a gun and crack cocaine in his car. The police then searched the car, finding a loaded pistol and narcotics. McMullen was arrested and later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.McMullen moved to suppress the gun evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to temporarily stop and question McMullen, based on factors such as the high-crime neighborhood, proximity to a gang member's car, and McMullen's reaching motion towards the car's floorboard. The court also found that the police lawfully frisked McMullen and searched his car due to officer-safety concerns. McMullen pleaded guilty and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the police had a valid basis for initiating a Terry stop, considering the totality of the circumstances. The court also found that the police took reasonable protective measures during the stop, including searching McMullen's car, which did not violate his constitutional rights. The court rejected McMullen's argument that the gun in his car was not immediately accessible to him at the time of the search, stating that a weapon is not necessarily inaccessible just because it is temporarily behind a closed door. View "United States v. McMullen" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a protective order issued by the district court, barring Visser and Associates, PLLC (“Visser”) from communicating with potential class members in a putative class action. The case originated from a claim by Wayside Church that Van Buren County had violated the federal Constitution’s Takings Clause by foreclosing on its property to satisfy a tax debt and then selling the property for a higher amount without refunding the difference. The case was revived in federal court following the Supreme Court's overruling of a previous decision that required such claims to be pursued in state court.The district court preliminarily approved a proposed class action settlement between the plaintiffs and defendant counties. Around the same time, Visser began sending solicitation letters to property owners who it thought might have takings claims against counties in the Western District of Michigan. The district court issued a show-cause order, finding that Visser’s solicitation letters did not cross the line from permissible solicitation to misleading, improper communication with potential class members. However, the court was not satisfied with Visser’s explanation for why it had sent solicitation letters to named plaintiffs who were already represented by class counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's protective order. The court found that Visser had violated ethical rules by soliciting named plaintiffs and misleading the court. The court also found that Visser had continued to solicit potential class members after the district court had preliminarily approved the class settlement. The court concluded that Visser's conduct posed a serious threat to the fairness of the litigation process and the administration of justice generally. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order. View "Wayside Church v. Van Buren County" on Justia Law

The case involves Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC and five Michigan residents who sued Howell Township, Michigan, alleging that the township's zoning restrictions, which prevented Oakland Tactical from constructing and operating a commercial shooting range, violated the Second Amendment. The district court granted the township's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The district court's decision was made before the Supreme Court announced a new framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bruen, and the district court again granted judgment for the township.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that while the Second Amendment protects the right to engage in commercial firearms training as necessary to protect the right to effectively bear arms in case of confrontation, it does not extend to training in a particular location or at the extremely long distances Oakland Tactical seeks to provide. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' proposed conduct—commercial training in a particular location and long-distance commercial training—was not protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Therefore, the township's zoning restrictions did not violate the Second Amendment. View "Oakland Tactical Supply, LLC v. Howell Township" on Justia Law

Eight men convicted of sexual offenses between 1982 and 1994 challenged the constitutionality of the 2004 Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act (“the Act”) and its subsequent amendments. The Act required them to comply with various reporting requirements and geographical restrictions imposed on all sex offenders. The plaintiffs argued that the laws violated the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee agreed with the plaintiffs and issued an injunction prohibiting Governor Lee and Director Rausch from enforcing the entire Tennessee code against the plaintiffs. The court also issued a declaratory judgment against unnamed parties who might also enforce the Act.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's decision. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Governor Lee and ordered the lower court to dismiss him from the suit. The court also found that the district court's injunction was overly broad and unjustified. The appellate court reversed in part the district court’s judgment that the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and remanded the case with orders to vacate the declaratory judgment, dissolve the injunction against Governor Lee, dismiss Governor Lee from the suit based on a lack of standing, and to modify the injunction against Director Rausch consistent with its opinion. View "John Doe #1 v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves Tommy Kirtdoll, who was under investigation by a multijurisdictional task force in southwest Michigan for leading a drug-trafficking organization. After several undercover drug deals, the task force obtained a search warrant for Kirtdoll's house, which was described in detail in the warrant application. Upon executing the warrant, officers found drugs and distribution equipment, leading to Kirtdoll's indictment on multiple drug offenses.Kirtdoll challenged the validity of the search warrant, citing three errors: the address listed was not his, the tax identification number was incorrect, and the property owner's name was not his. He argued that these mistakes rendered the warrant unconstitutional due to lack of particularity, as required by the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Kirtdoll's motion, ruling that the warrant's other accurate descriptors were particular enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Kirtdoll pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the warrant's particularity de novo. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require perfection in search warrants, but rather enough detail for the executing officer to identify the intended place with reasonable effort. The court found that despite the errors, the warrant contained three descriptors that indisputably applied only to Kirtdoll's house and clearly identified it as the premises to be searched. These included the house's geographic location, a detailed description of the house, and a unique identifier - a red star affixed to its west side. The court concluded that the warrant for Kirtdoll's house was specific enough to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, and thus, the district court properly denied Kirtdoll's motion to suppress. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Kirtdoll" on Justia Law