Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show. View "United States v. Richard Austin Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.
The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. View "Curt Russell Cannamela" on Justia Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission on January 20, 2021, MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s March 2020 invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience.MacIntosh sued, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. The district court denied his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional. The court rejected Clous’s argument that his display of the rifle was not an “adverse action” that would deter a “person of ordinary firmness” from exercising her First Amendment rights. View "MacIntosh v. Clous" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (amended in 2006 and 2011) imposed registration requirements, restrictions on living and working in a school zone, and reporting requirements. Michigan retroactively imposed these obligations, including those contained in the amendments, on offenders convicted before 2006 and 2011. In another suit, the Sixth Circuit held, in 2016, that the retroactive application of SORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. While an interim order was in effect, in another suit, Michigan passed a fourth version of SORA, effective on March 24, 2021, removing or modifying provisions that had been declared unconstitutional.In 2021, five Michigan sex offenders filed suit, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the Michigan State Police enforced unconstitutional provisions of SORA from 2006 onwards, including after the previous cases were decided. They alleged that state officials, whom they purported to sue “in their individual capacities,” knew that the invalidated provisions were unconstitutional, but failed to stop their subordinates from enforcing them, noting the governors’ duty under the Michigan Constitution to ensure the faithful execution of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. They do not plausibly allege that the defendants authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. View "Does 1-5 v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gaona fired a gun with the intent to kill a certain individual but accidentally shot and injured a bystander. Gaona pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to assault with intent to murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gaona was sentenced to two years for the firearm conviction, consecutive to a 17-to-50-year sentence for the assault conviction, based on a PSR which reported three prior misdemeanors, including one stemming from a 2009 incident, for which Gaona was (without the assistance of counsel) convicted of possession of marijuana via plea and sentenced to 30 days’ time served. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that state courts may not rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in enhancing a sentence if that conviction resulted in a sentence of actual imprisonment.The district court denied Gaona’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition on the same sentencing argument but stayed his petition so that he could exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court. The state courts rejected those claims. The federal court then rejected his ineffective assistance claims as he had not filed an amended habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that state courts may not, in enhancing a sentence, rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor that resulted in a sentence of time served. View "Gaona v. Brown" on Justia Law

Michigan State Police Officer Lay, stationed about 35 miles from the Indiana state line, noticed a vehicle driving northbound following closely behind another vehicle—a state law infraction. Lay began following the vehicle and ran its plate through a database, which noted that the car had been in Texas, one day before. Lay pulled the vehicle over and approached. Unprompted, the passenger handed over his driver’s license without making eye contact. The driver produced his driver’s license and a car rental agreement. Returning to her cruiser, Lay ran the information through databases and radioed for assistance. The driver’s name came up clean; the passenger was on probation for a prior crime. Meanwhile, Officer Bierema arrived with his drug-detection K-9. Approximately seven minutes into the stop, Lay exited her cruiser to speak with the passenger about his probation status; he was less than forthcoming. Lay requested consent to search the car, which the driver withheld. She then ordered him to stand back while Bierema’s K-9 conducted a sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, prompting the officers to search the car. In the back seat, they found two gym bags containing cocaine and methamphetamine.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motions to suppress, rejecting arguments that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally overlong and that the driver’s arrest was unsupported by probable cause. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officers raided 23 stores selling cannabidiol (CBD) products because they falsely believed that such products were illegal under state law. The charges were dropped; the products were legal under both state and federal law. The shop owners sued the responsible law enforcement agencies, asserting violations of their constitutional rights and conspiracy to violate those rights. All but one of the shop owners ultimately settled. The district court then granted summary judgment to the County and Sheriff Fitzhugh.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiff presented evidence to support a claim of 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil conspiracy. Fitzhugh’s alleged behavior reflects interdependent decision-making with the Smyrna Police Department (SPD) and the DA’s office through the planning and execution of the raids, calculated to achieve an unconstitutional outcome. Although SPD’s raid of the plaintiff’s business was the overt act that directly caused the plaintiff’s alleged injury, holding the county defendants liable for their alleged involvement in the overall plan that led to that raid is the kind of conspiratorial behavior at the heart of section 1983 civil conspiracy claims. A jury could reasonably conclude that there was a “single plan” in which Fitzhugh participated. View "Rieves v. Smyrna, Tennessee" on Justia Law

Nashville passed a “sidewalk ordinance.” To obtain a building permit, an owner must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere.In a challenge to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the landowner plaintiffs asked the court to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted in 1987 to assess conditions on building permits (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission). Nashville argued that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville argued in favor of the application of the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in “Penn Central” (1978). The district court granted Nashville summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the landowners. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. View "Knight v. e Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law