Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by Protect the Peninsula, Inc. to intervene as a matter of right in an action brought by a group of wineries and an association representing their interests (collectively, the Wineries) against a Michigan municipality over several zoning ordinances that regulate vineyards, holding that the district court erred.Protect the Peninsula, Inc., a local advocacy group, moved to intervene in this action brought against Peninsula Township challenging the zoning ordinances regulating the vineyards' activities as unconstitutional and in violation of state laws. Protect the Peninsula moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), but the district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Protect the Peninsula satisfied each of Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements. View "Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass'n v. Township of Peninsula, Michigan" on Justia Law

Jarvela drank several rum-and-cokes, then drove his Silverado to a Shell station to buy cigarettes. Afterward, the store clerk called the police to report that “a drunk guy" had just left driving a black Silverado. In a nearby police cruiser, Officer Trevino spotted the Silverado, speeding and drifting over the road’s center line. Trevino activated his lights and pursued the truck. Jarvela led Trevino on an extended chase. After about five minutes, the road turned to gravel and the Silverado struck a tree. Jarvela fled on foot into a darkened wooded area. Trevino called for backup. Deputy Houk and his service dog, Argo, arrived and began searching with Argo leashed. After about five minutes, Argo found clothing. Moments later Jarvela was visible in the weeds, wrestling with Argo, who was clinging to Jarvela’s arm. Jarvela tried to injure Argo. Houk delivered seven blows to Jarvela's back, yelling “Let go of the fucking dog.” Trevino shot his taser at Jarvela, who rolled onto his back. Trevino again deployed his taser.In Jarvela’s excessive force suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit held that Houk had no constitutional duty to shout out a warning to Jarvela before searching for him with the dog and was entitled to summary judgment. View "Jarvela v. Houk" on Justia Law

After a decade in state prison for gross sexual imposition and kidnapping, Sharp was released on parole with conditions that required him to refrain from unsupervised contact with minors; obtain his parole officer’s approval of any adult who might supervise his contact with minors; and submit to “warrantless search[es]” of his person and property “at any time.” Under Ohio law, a parole officer may search a parolee without a warrant if he has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the parolee has violated the law or a parole condition. During his parole, a woman told police that, 10 days earlier, Sharp had sexually assaulted her at his house while her children slept nearby and that Sharp had been assisting her children with transportation. Sharp’s parole officer concluded that Sharp had violated his parole. Nearly three weeks after the alleged assault, officers arrested Sharp, transported Sharp to his home, then conducted a warrantless search and found a loaded firearm.Sharp was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress the gun. Under the special-needs framework, a parolee search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances if it was supported by reasonable suspicion. Bailey reasonably suspected that he would find evidence of a parole violation at Sharp’s home. A parolee’s search conditions factor into the reasonableness balance. View "United States v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Myers, a Centerville Police Department detective sergeant, Myers reported to then-Lieutenant Brown and then-Police Chief Robertson, that Lieutenant Lavigne possessed and “possibl[y] disseminat[ed]” sexually explicit photos of minors that he obtained while investigating a “sexting" complaint at Centerville High School. Myers continued to pursue that allegation to no avail. Three years later, Myers sought whistleblower protection and met with City Manager Davis to report new allegations against Robertson, and to repeat the allegation against Lavigne, then met with an outside attorney appointed by Davis. After learning of the investigation, Robertson retired. Myers was interviewed but not hired for the vacant chief post, which went to Brown; the hiring panel included Lavigne. Myers was also passed over for two lieutenant positions. He was admitted to the FBI National Academy but Quantico rescinded that offer after its background investigator spoke to Lavigne. Myers was disciplined for writing a “character letter” for another city employee; the letter was critical of the city. He was later terminated for recording a meeting.Myers sued. alleging First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion claiming qualified immunity. The district court erred by failing to meaningfully analyze the assertions of immunity by Brown and Davis at the pleadings stage, but Myers plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation, and the defendants are not yet entitled to qualified or statutory immunity. View "Myers v. City of Centerville, Ohio" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, operators of bowling alleys and roller-skating rinks in Michigan, sued Michigan Governor Whitmer, former Michigan Department of Health and Human Services Director Gordon, and the Department alleging that various orders limiting the use of Plaintiffs’ properties early in the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article X of the Michigan Constitution.The district court found that the defendants were entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause does not abrogate sovereign immunity. To accept Plaintiffs’ argument that states waived their sovereign immunity in suits that invoke a right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment would destroy the protection the Eleventh Amendment was specifically ratified to provide; future plaintiffs could claim any right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment is no longer subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory damages, the ultra vires theory of skirting Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable. View "Skatemore, Inc. v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

The University of Kentucky investigated two dentistry professors for entering false data about whether they, or their students, had performed services for patients at a university clinic and who should be paid for those services. The professors had earned more for treating patients than they earned in salary; they had circumvented the University’s system for determining who performed services. While the investigation proceeded, the professors were barred from seeing patients in the clinic but performed their other duties. After the investigation, both professors left the University. The professors sued, alleging violations of their due process rights and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of summary judgment to the administrators on the due process claims involving the suspension of their clinical duties and one claim of constructive discharge. Because the administrators did not violate clearly established law, qualified immunity protects them. Even if the professors had a property interest in their clinical duties, the administrators did not violate any clearly established due process right when they suspended them from working in the clinic and allowed them to continue working in other roles. The court affirmed summary judgment for the administrators on a due process claim involving the early end to one professor’s appointment and on the professors’ First Amendment retaliation claims. View "Cunningham v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

To dispute a property tax assessment under Detroit ordinances and Michigan state law, taxpayers “make complaint on or before February 15th" before the Board of Assessors. Any person who has complained to the Board of Assessors may appeal to the Board of Review. For the Michigan Tax Tribunal to have jurisdiction over an assessment dispute, “the assessment must be protested before the board of review.” On February 14, 2017, Detroit mailed tax assessment notices to Detroit homeowners, including an “EXTENDED ASSESSORS REVIEW SCHEDULE” that would conclude on February 18, just four days later. At a City Council meeting on February 14, the city announced: “The Assessors Review process will end this year February the 28th.” News outlets reported the extension and that Detroit had waived the requirement of appearance before the Board of Assessors so residents could appeal directly to the Board of Review. Detroit did not distribute individualized mailings to so inform homeowners.Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violations of their due process rights; asserting that Michigan’s State Tax Commission assumed control of Detroit’s flawed property tax assessment process from 2014-2017 so that its officials were equally responsible for the violations; and claiming that Wayne County is “complicit” and has been unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act and the principle of comity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that a state remedy is uncertain. View "Howard v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Akron Police received an anonymous call that men were smoking marijuana in Whitney Park, "a high-crime area." Several officers, including Detective Elam, went to investigate. They arrived at the park in the early evening and saw a group of 10-15 men, including McCallister; they detected the odor of marijuana and began stopping people. Four men, including McCallister, tried to walk away. An officer instructed them to stop moving and place their hands on their heads. McCallister did so. Elam saw a “little bump out on his shirt,” which the detective concluded was a gun, and saw McCallister “turn[] his body in towards the huddle so no one would see.” Elam asked McCallister if he was carrying any weapons; McCallister did not respond. As McCallister raised his hands, his shirt lifted, and Elam saw a firearm magazine tucked into McCallister’s waistband. Elam retrieved the weapon.McCallister was indicted for illegal possession of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), and possessing an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion that all of the men were smoking marijuana, justifying the detention, and reasonable suspicion that McCallister was armed and dangerous, justifying the search. View "United States v. McCallister" on Justia Law

Freed created a Facebook profile, limited to his “friends.” Eventually, he exceeded Facebook’s 5,000-friend limit on profiles and converted his profile to a “page,” which has unlimited “followers.” His page was public, anyone could “follow” it; for the page category, Freed chose “public figure.” Freed was appointed Port Huron’s city manager. He updated his Facebook page to reflect that title. In the “About” section, he described himself as “Daddy ... Husband ... and City Manager, Chief Administrative Officer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.” Freed listed the Port Huron website as his page’s website, the city’s general email as his page’s contact information, and the City Hall address as his page’s address. Freed shared photos of family events, visits to local community events, and posts about administrative directives he issued as city manager. When the Covid-19 pandemic hit, he posted policies he initiated for Port Huron and news articles on public-health measures and statistics. Lindke responded with criticism. Freed deleted those comments and eventually “blocked” Lindke from the page.Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C 1983, arguing that Freed violated his First Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Freed. Freed’s Facebook activity was not state action. The page neither derives from the duties of his office nor depends on his state authority. View "Lindke v. Freed" on Justia Law

Alcoa Officers arrested an obviously inebriated Colson following a report that, while driving her SUV, she chased her 10-year-old son in a field and then crashed in a ditch, and transported her to a hospital. Colson then withdrew her consent. to a blood draw. Colson defied repeated orders to get back into the cruiser. During the struggle, an officer's knee touched Colson’s knee, followed by an audible “pop.” Colson started screaming “my fucking knee” but continued to resist. Once Colson was in the cruiser, officers called a supervisor, then took Colson to the jail where a nurse would perform the blood draw. Colson never asked for medical care. At the jail, Colson exited the vehicle and walked inside, with no indication that she was injured. As she was frisked, Colson fell to the ground and said “my fucking knee.” Jail nurse Russell asked Colson to perform various motions with the injured leg and compared Colson’s knees, commented “I don’t see no swelling,” and then left. A week later, Colson was diagnosed with a torn ACL, a strained LCL, and a small avulsion fracture of the fibular head. Colson pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, reckless endangerment, and DUI.Colson sued; only a claim for failure to provide medical care for her knee injury survived. The Sixth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Colson v. City of Alcoa" on Justia Law