Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
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Marc Susselman received a traffic ticket from a Washtenaw County Sheriff’s deputy for failing to yield to a police cruiser with flashing lights. This ticket was later dismissed, but Susselman received another citation for failing to obey a police officer directing traffic. The Michigan circuit court ultimately dismissed the second ticket as well. Susselman then filed a federal lawsuit asserting constitutional and state law claims against Washtenaw County, the Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Office, the sheriff’s deputy, and Superior Township, Michigan.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all claims. Susselman appealed the decision. The district court had found that the Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Office could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Susselman had waived certain state-law claims. The court also dismissed Susselman’s federal claims, including First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution, as well as state-law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Susselman failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation or behavior by the deputy that would support his claims. Specifically, the court found that the issuance of the second ticket did not constitute a violation of substantive due process or First Amendment rights. Additionally, the court determined that Susselman did not establish a civil conspiracy or meet the requirements for his state-law claims. The court also concluded that Susselman did not identify any municipal policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional violation, thus dismissing his claims against Washtenaw County and Superior Township. View "Susselman v. Washtenaw County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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A group of parents, represented by Parents Defending Education (PDE), challenged the Olentangy Local School District's policies that prohibit harassment based on gender identity, including the intentional use of non-preferred pronouns. PDE argued that these policies violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. The policies in question include the Anti-Harassment Policy, the Personal Communication Devices (PCD) Policy, and the Code of Conduct, all of which aim to prevent harassment and bullying within the school district.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied PDE's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of these policies. The court found that PDE had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claims. Specifically, the court held that the policies did not unconstitutionally compel speech, did not constitute viewpoint discrimination, and were not overbroad. The court also determined that PDE had not shown that the policies would likely cause irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that PDE had not met the burden of showing a clear likelihood of success on the merits. The court found that the school district's policies were consistent with the standard for regulating student speech established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which allows schools to regulate speech that could substantially disrupt school activities or invade the rights of others. The court also held that the policies did not unconstitutionally compel speech, as students could use first names instead of pronouns, and that the policies were not overbroad. The court concluded that PDE had not demonstrated that the balance of equities or the public interest favored granting a preliminary injunction. View "Parents Defending Education v. Olentangy Local School District" on Justia Law

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In September 2018, Bryana Baker was arrested and taken to Butler County Jail, where she began experiencing drug withdrawal symptoms. After attempting to escape, she was placed in disciplinary isolation. Despite multiple mental health assessments indicating she was not suicidal, Baker was placed on suicide watch due to erratic behavior. On September 24, she was removed from suicide watch but was not cleared for single-celling. The next day, after a series of altercations with her cellmate, Officer April Riahi closed Baker’s cell door. Shortly thereafter, Baker was found hanging in her cell and later died.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the defendants, including Officer Riahi, Sheriff Richard Jones, and Butler County. The court found no evidence of deliberate indifference or constitutional violations by the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Officer Riahi was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law indicated her actions were unconstitutional. The court also found that Sheriff Jones could not be held liable under supervisory liability since there was no underlying constitutional violation by Riahi. Additionally, the court ruled that Butler County was not liable under municipal liability theories because there was no deliberate indifference to a clearly established right. Lastly, the court determined that Riahi and Jones were entitled to Ohio statutory immunity on the state-law claims, as their actions did not amount to recklessness under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, granting summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. View "Campbell v. Riahi" on Justia Law

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Friends of George’s, Inc. (FOG), a theater organization that performs drag shows, challenged Tennessee’s Adult Entertainment Act (AEA), which criminalizes adult cabaret entertainment in public or where minors could view it. FOG argued that the AEA was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The district court agreed, declaring the AEA unconstitutional and permanently enjoining District Attorney General Steven Mulroy from enforcing it within Shelby County, Tennessee. Mulroy appealed, questioning FOG’s standing and the merits of the injunction.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee initially granted FOG a temporary restraining order against the AEA. The court later ruled in favor of FOG, finding that the AEA violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined Mulroy from enforcing the statute within his jurisdiction. Mulroy appealed this decision, arguing that FOG lacked Article III standing and that the AEA was constitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that FOG did not meet its burden to show standing. The court held that FOG failed to demonstrate an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by the AEA, as FOG’s performances were described as having artistic value suitable for minors. The court also found that FOG did not face a certainly impending threat of prosecution under the AEA. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Friends of George's, Inc. v. Mulroy" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to Tennessee's policy of not allowing amendments to the sex listed on birth certificates based on gender identity. The plaintiffs, transgender individuals, argue that this policy violates their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. They seek a procedure that permits changes to the sex designation on birth certificates based on self-reported gender identity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that Tennessee's policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it treated all individuals equally by requiring proof of an error to amend a birth certificate. The court also rejected the substantive due process claim, holding that there is no fundamental right to a birth certificate that reflects gender identity rather than biological sex.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Tennessee's policy does not discriminate based on sex or transgender status and is subject to rational basis review. The policy was found to be rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as maintaining accurate and consistent vital records. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a substantive due process right to amend their birth certificates to reflect their gender identity, as such a right is not deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition.The Sixth Circuit's main holding is that Tennessee's policy of not allowing amendments to the sex listed on birth certificates based on gender identity does not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court emphasized that the Constitution does not require states to adopt the plaintiffs' preferred policy and that such decisions are best left to the democratic process. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Gore v. Lee" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Corey Neal, who was charged with federal gun possession after Shelby County officers, armed with a warrant, discovered three firearms at his residence. Neal challenged the validity of the search under the Fourth Amendment, but his plea was rejected, leading him to plead guilty to the charges. The case was then brought to appeal, where Neal reiterated his Fourth Amendment claim.The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee had previously denied Neal's motion to suppress the evidence found at his residence. The court agreed that the warrant lacked probable cause but invoked the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule from United States v. Leon, which allows evidence obtained in good faith reliance on a search warrant later found to be deficient. Neal pleaded guilty to the second count in the indictment, reserving his right to appeal the ruling, and was sentenced to 92 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the affidavit supporting the search warrant established a "minimally sufficient nexus" between the items sought and the place to be searched. The court reasoned that the affidavit provided more than a naked guess that contraband might be found at Neal's residence. It established recent drug trafficking by Neal and evidence of Neal's residency. The court concluded that the affidavit was not so bare bones as to necessitate the application of the exclusionary rule, thereby upholding the lower court's application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Neal" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between Wendell Shane Mackey, a local resident, and Jeff Rising, a real-estate agent who served one term as a part-time City Commissioner for Adrian, Michigan. Mackey posted information about Rising on Facebook that Rising believed to be false. Rising responded by calling Mackey’s mother and allegedly threatened to “hurt” Mackey if he did not delete the post. Mackey sued, arguing that Rising’s threat of physical violence violated the First Amendment because Rising made it in his capacity as a Commissioner to stifle Mackey’s speech.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to Rising, concluding that he had acted as a private citizen when he made the alleged threats. Mackey appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Rising, as a legislator, did not have any “authority” to use (or threaten) physical force on behalf of the City of Adrian. His alleged “misuse” of the power, therefore, could not qualify as state action. The court also found that Rising’s acceptance of the City’s insurance for his defense did not conflict with his state-action defense on the merits, and thus, neither waiver nor judicial estoppel applied. View "Mackey v. Rising" on Justia Law

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In 1987, Michael Kitchen, a seventeen-year-old, was sentenced to forty-two to sixty years in prison by a Michigan state court for his involvement in a home invasion. Under Michigan law, Kitchen is not eligible for parole until he completes his minimum sentence, which means he will not be considered for parole until he is nearly sixty. Kitchen filed a pro se § 1983 suit challenging the statute against Michigan’s governor, the Department of Corrections Director, and the chair of the Parole Board. He alleges that Michigan’s parole statute violates his Eighth Amendment rights because it effectively keeps him in prison for life without parole. The district court sided with Kitchen.The district court agreed with Kitchen and ruled against Defendants in an opinion and order on August 16, 2019. The court concluded that, despite the “legal and factual support” for Defendants’ position, “Kitchen is not required to bring his federal constitutional claims via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,” and he could pursue them under § 1983. The district court thus rejected Defendants’ Heck argument. The Heck issue was not litigated any further.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that Kitchen's claim, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence. Therefore, his claim must be brought through habeas corpus, not § 1983. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kitchen v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

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The case involves Dorian McMullen, who was found by police in a high-crime neighborhood, sitting in his car with his legs sticking out the open door. As police approached in an unmarked vehicle, they observed McMullen reaching for something on the car's floorboard, which they suspected to be a gun. McMullen exited his car and engaged in a brief conversation with the police, during which he allegedly admitted to having a gun and crack cocaine in his car. The police then searched the car, finding a loaded pistol and narcotics. McMullen was arrested and later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.McMullen moved to suppress the gun evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to temporarily stop and question McMullen, based on factors such as the high-crime neighborhood, proximity to a gang member's car, and McMullen's reaching motion towards the car's floorboard. The court also found that the police lawfully frisked McMullen and searched his car due to officer-safety concerns. McMullen pleaded guilty and appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the police had a valid basis for initiating a Terry stop, considering the totality of the circumstances. The court also found that the police took reasonable protective measures during the stop, including searching McMullen's car, which did not violate his constitutional rights. The court rejected McMullen's argument that the gun in his car was not immediately accessible to him at the time of the search, stating that a weapon is not necessarily inaccessible just because it is temporarily behind a closed door. View "United States v. McMullen" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over a protective order issued by the district court, barring Visser and Associates, PLLC (“Visser”) from communicating with potential class members in a putative class action. The case originated from a claim by Wayside Church that Van Buren County had violated the federal Constitution’s Takings Clause by foreclosing on its property to satisfy a tax debt and then selling the property for a higher amount without refunding the difference. The case was revived in federal court following the Supreme Court's overruling of a previous decision that required such claims to be pursued in state court.The district court preliminarily approved a proposed class action settlement between the plaintiffs and defendant counties. Around the same time, Visser began sending solicitation letters to property owners who it thought might have takings claims against counties in the Western District of Michigan. The district court issued a show-cause order, finding that Visser’s solicitation letters did not cross the line from permissible solicitation to misleading, improper communication with potential class members. However, the court was not satisfied with Visser’s explanation for why it had sent solicitation letters to named plaintiffs who were already represented by class counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's protective order. The court found that Visser had violated ethical rules by soliciting named plaintiffs and misleading the court. The court also found that Visser had continued to solicit potential class members after the district court had preliminarily approved the class settlement. The court concluded that Visser's conduct posed a serious threat to the fairness of the litigation process and the administration of justice generally. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order. View "Wayside Church v. Van Buren County" on Justia Law