Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Torres sued his former employer, Precision, alleging that the company had fired him for seeking benefits under Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Precision argued that it had not retaliated against Torres and that, even if it had, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 preempted any remedy because Torres had not been authorized to work in the United States, 100 Stat. 3359. The district court granted Precision judgment on the preemption ground without making any factual findings as to the state law claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The court skipped past the question of whether state law had been violated in the first place. Under “well-established principles of constitutional avoidance,” the Sixth Circuit declined to address the hypothetical presented by the appeal. Judicial restraint principles apply as much to a question of preemption as to any other question of constitutional law. View "Torres v. Precision Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court held that petitioner could not prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because, even assuming that counsel provided deficient advice, petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have appealed had he received competent advice from counsel. In this case, not only was petitioner's likelihood of success on appeal quite low, but even if he were to succeed on appeal, he also would have likely faced a harsher sentence than he originally received. Therefore, these were strong indicators that petitioner would not have appealed had his counsel given him accurate information. View "Neill v. United States" on Justia Law

Bullard was charged with trafficking heroin and as a felon in possession of a firearm. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, then entered a plea agreement that recognized that Bullard could face 10 years to life in prison and that Bullard “may be classified as a career offender.” Bullard had a 2003 Arizona conviction for attempting to sell cocaine and a 2013 Ohio conviction for selling drugs. The court determined that Bullard qualified as a career offender, putting his Guidelines range at 292-365 months. Without the enhancement, Bullard’s range would have been 92-115 months. The court varied downward, sentencing Bullard to 140 months. Bullard had agreed that the convictions made him a career offender. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. Bullard then sought habeas relief, arguing that the court misclassified him as a career offender and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys failed to challenge this designation. Bullard argued that the Arizona statute criminalized drugs that are not federally controlled and conduct that falls outside the Guidelines’ definition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. If Bullard were sentenced today, he would not be a career offender but he is not on direct review. Bullard’s claim that the court misclassified him, resulting in a higher recommended sentence is not cognizable on section 2255 collateral review. While his ineffective assistance claim is cognizable, Bullard cannot satisfy the Strickland standard. View "Bullard v. United States" on Justia Law

The Detroit Police Department executed a search warrant on McGrew's home. She heard a bang at the door. When she investigated, Detroit Police Officers were standing in her living room, wearing all black. Masks concealed their faces. She could see only their eyes. One officer threw her to the ground, put his knee in her back and handcuffed her. McGrew stated the handcuffs were tight. The officer responded: “[S]hut up, b----, you shouldn’t be so fat.” When she complained again, he responded: “[I]f you don’t shut your f---ing mouth I can blow your head off and nothing can be done.” Officers seized a bag of marijuana and a pistol, which they documented on the search warrant return. They also allegedly seized but did not mention, another gun, diamond earrings, a tablet computer, and a new-in-the-box phone. Days later, McGrew went to the hospital and was diagnosed with musculoskeletal strain in her chest and bruising on her wrist. McGrew sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting excessive force and deliberate indifference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of motions based on qualified immunity and governmental immunity and summary judgment in favor of the Department and the officers on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. McGrew has created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the officers violated her right to be free from excessively tight handcuffing that causes physical injury. McGrew’s right was clearly established at the time. View "McGrew v. Sergeant Duncan" on Justia Law

In 1995, a Memphis restaurant manager was murdered during a closing-time robbery. Saulsberry worked at the restaurant and helped plan the robbery but was not there during the robbery. In his state trial, the judge forbade the jury from considering the murder counts together. Only if the jury found Saulsberry not guilty of premeditated murder could it “proceed to inquire whether [he is] guilty of [either count of felony murder].” The jury convicted Saulsberry of premeditated murder, robbery, and conspiracy. He received a life sentence. The jury did not return a verdict on the two felony murder counts. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Saulsberry’s robbery and conspiracy convictions but reversed the murder conviction. On remand, Saulsberry moved to dismiss the new prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, but the state courts rejected the argument. In 2010, a new jury convicted him of both counts of felony murder. Saulsberry’s direct appeal and applications for state post-conviction relief failed. In 2007, Saulsberry filed an uncounseled habeas petition while awaiting retrial in Tennessee, arguing double jeopardy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. Saulsberry’s jury had no chance to render a verdict on the felony murder counts. There was no mistrial here. That jeopardy can end by another means in another setting does not show an implied acquittal here. View "Saulsberry v. Lee" on Justia Law

Clayton was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for sexually exploiting minors. One minor, J.P. texted her father from Clayton’s house, saying she was being held against her will. Her father called Battle Creek Police. Police and J.P.’s father raced to Clayton’s house. Clayton’s roommate stated J.P. had left. J.P.’s father immediately received another text, alerting him that J.P. was in the house. Officers stormed inside. They found Clayton, loaded guns, brass knuckles, cocaine powder, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. J.P. was traumatized and hysterical. Clayton was arrested.Before questioning him, Detective Sutherland read Clayton his Miranda rights from the Department’s standard form: Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions. If you cannot afford to have a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. Do you understand your rights? Clayton: Yes. Sutherland failed to follow “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer” with “and to have him/her with you during questioning.”At his third interview, Clayton stated: “Hell yeah I want to f[***]ing talk,” then made a statement and provided the password to unlock his cellphone. Clayton’s DNA was found on J.P.’s body; officers found 37 videos of Clayton engaging in sex acts with minors; videos of him weighing cocaine and holding a firearm; and text messages discussing sex trafficking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The critical features of Miranda were conveyed to Clayton. Nothing in the words used indicated that counsel’s presence would be restricted during questioning. View "United States v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Shortly before his high school graduation, 18-year-old Kyle apparently experimented with LSD. The after-effects afflicted him for several days, resulting in his having to be removed from class because of behavioral issues. Kyle’s friend, Collin, checked in on him after school, then went to the police and told them that Kyle needed help and that Kyle was armed and upset with his mother. Four officers went to the house, not knowing that the mother was not actually home with Kyle. Without waiting for a warrant, the officers entered Kyle’s home. He appeared at the foot of the basement stairs, wielding a lawnmower blade. When the officers attempted to subdue Kyle with a taser, he came up the basement stairs swinging. The lawnmower blade struck an officer, who fell back, then shot and killed Kyle. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Calling the case “heart-rending, the court stated that given the circumstances and governing case law, the officers’ entry into Kyle’s home was justified under the exigent-circumstances exception and the use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officer had probable cause to believe that Kyle posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury. View "Baker v. City of Trenton" on Justia Law

Knight was charged with two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; assault and robbery of a person having control of mail matter, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a); possession of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2114(b); use of a firearm during assault and robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a); use of a firearm during kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); carjacking 18 U.S.C. 2119; use of a firearm during carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Knight pled guilty to bank fraud; a jury convicted him on all other counts. The district court sentenced Knight to a total term of 955 months of imprisonment. After exhausting his direct appeals, Knight filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), claiming that his convictions under 924(c) are invalid because the residual clause of the crime-of-violence definition in section 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of recent Supreme Court holdings. The government conceded that Knight’s kidnapping conviction was not a crime of violence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the related section 924(c) conviction but upheld Knight’s section 924(c) conviction for using a firearm during assault and robbery, which qualifies under the “elements clause” of the definition of a “crime of violence.” View "Knight v. United States" on Justia Law

Sensabaugh, the former head football coach at David Crockett High School in Washington County, Tennessee, made two Facebook posts expressing his concerns about the conditions and practices of schools within the District. The posts included pictures of students. Sensabaugh refused to comply with requests to remove the posts and became aggressive with his supervisors who noted other alleged misconduct, including his use of profane language with students and his requiring a student to practice while injured. He was fired after a guidance meeting where his conduct caused his supervisor to report her concern “that Sensabaugh posed a threat to the safety of the students and staff.” He sued, raising First Amendment retaliation and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no causal connection between Sensabaugh’s Facebook posts and his termination. A thorough independent investigation preceded Sensabaugh’s termination; that investigation concluded that the misconduct allegations were substantiated in full or in part and that the misconduct supported termination. View "Sensabaugh v. Halliburton" on Justia Law

Doe sued the University for violating his due-process rights during a disciplinary hearing. The Sixth Circuit remanded Doe’s case in light of a related ruling requiring live hearings and cross-examination in such proceedings. Upon remand, the district judge, frustrated with the University’s apparent foot-dragging, scheduled a settlement conference and required the University’s president to attend. The University requested that the president be allowed to attend by telephone but the district judge refused. The University then requested permission to send someone with both more knowledge about the sexual assault policy at issue and full settlement authority. The judge again refused, stating he wanted the president to be there even if someone else with full settlement authority attended, and “even if the parties [we]re able to resolve" the issue. The University planned for the president to attend. Two days before the settlement conference, the district judge decided that the conference (which he had assured the University would be private) should be a public event, stating that “the University’s public filing of a Motion to Dismiss . . . . The filing incited confusion amongst the media.” The Sixth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus, finding that the district judge acted beyond his power and abused his discretion. Neither Congress nor the Constitution granted the judge the power to order a specific state official to attend a public settlement conference. View "In re: University of Michigan" on Justia Law