Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Three women allege that Memphis failed to submit for testing the sexual assault kits (SAKs) prepared after their sexual assaults. They allege that Memphis possessed over 15,000 SAKS that it failed to submit for testing, resulting in spoliation, and sought to certify a class of women whose kits Memphis failed to test. The district court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiffs’ claims except those under the Equal Protection Clause. Two years of discovery apparently cost Memphis over $1 million. Discovery revealed that the SAKs of two plaintiffs were tested soon after their assaults. The third plaintiff’s SAK was submitted for testing 10 years after her 2003 assault. The district court granted Memphis summary judgment as to two plaintiffs and struck the class allegations, finding that no amount of additional discovery would allow Plaintiffs to sufficiently demonstrate commonality. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs were moderately diligent in pursuing discovery, although somewhat blameworthy in relying on the city’s representations that discovery would be forthcoming. Memphis unreasonably delayed producing discovery material and additional discovery might have changed the outcome. Expenditures of time and money alone do not justify terminating discovery where a plaintiff has been diligent and may still discover information that could establish a genuine issue of material fact. View "Doe v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

Dennis committed several drug offenses, leading to a mandatory life sentence in 1997. In 2017, President Obama commuted his sentence to 30 years. Dennis filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition, arguing that he should have faced only a 20-year mandatory sentence because one of his Ohio convictions did not count as a felony under the recidivism enhancement. The district court held that it had no authority to question the commuted sentence and dismissed the petition as moot. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition on the merits, finding the Ohio conviction qualified for the enhancement; it was for a drug crime, and Ohio law allowed more than a year of punishment for that crime. Because the commutation did not alter the reality that Dennis continues to serve a sentence and could obtain a sentence of fewer than 30 years if he obtained the requested relief, the petition is not moot. Generally, a prisoner who receives a presidential commutation continues to be bound by a judicial sentence. The commutation changes only how the sentence is carried out by switching a greater punishment for a lesser one. The altered sentence does not become an executive sentence in full, free from judicial scrutiny with respect to mistakes the courts may have made. View "Dennis v. Terris" on Justia Law

Senn testified that he saw Winkler and Jenkins in his yard. Jenkins dropped a gasoline jug and ran into the woods with Winkler. Senn told his wife, Sherri, to call the police and fired shots into the woods. Senn smelled gasoline and saw that it had been poured on his porch, the side of his house, and on his cars. Sherri testified that her brother, Abercrombie, had a long-running feud with Winkler. Abercrombie lived approximately 100 yards from her house. Sherri testified that, days before the incident, her sister-in-law played for her a voicemail message from Winkler, stating: “You are going to die, you are going to burn.” Winkler unsuccessfully moved to impeach Senn with his previous felony conviction for reckless endangerment. Winkler unsuccessfully objected to Sherri’s testimony as inadmissible character evidence. Convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder and for attempted aggravated arson, Winkler appealed. His counsel filed the trial record, except for the transcript of his motion for a new trial. Without it, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the evidentiary issues for plain error, found none, and affirmed; that court also denied Winkler’s post-conviction petition, stating that counsel's failure to prepare an adequate appellate record does not, alone, amount to ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition, rejecting his argument that under Supreme Court precedent (Entsminger (1967)), failure to file a portion of the record entitled him to presumed prejudice in the ineffective-assistance analysis. View "Winkler v. Parris" on Justia Law

Michigan prisons allow Wiccan inmates to worship as a group for eight major holidays (Sabbats). Wiccans celebrate other holidays (Esbats) 12-13 times a year. Wiccans are not permitted to congregate on Esbats and permits Wiccan inmates to use candles and incense only in the prison’s chapel. Cavin asked the Department of Corrections to allow him and other Wiccans to celebrate Esbats together. Officials denied his request. He filed suit, requesting injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), and sought damages. At summary judgment, the court ruled that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred the damages claims against the Department of Corrections; that Chaplain Leach deserved qualified immunity; and that only Cavin’s RLUIPA claim for religious accommodation could proceed. After a bench trial, the court rejected Cavin’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief, concluding that the prison’s regulations implicate but do not burden Cavin’s exercise of religion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of qualified immunity and the denial of appointed counsel but vacated with respect to injunctive relief under RLUIPA, remanding for a determination of whether the Department’s policy survives scrutiny under RLUIPA. A policy substantially burdens religious exercise when it bars an inmate from worshipping with others and from using ritualistic items. View "Cavin v. Michigan Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

An average “dose” of methamphetamine weighs between one-tenth and one-quarter of a gram; there are 28.3 grams to an ounce. Potter confessed to selling 10 pounds. Potter, had been convicted of seven prior drug offenses. His prior statements about his drug sales supported his conviction for a different conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine that used similar methods, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. His prior drug offenses supported his mandatory life sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejecting an argument that the police elicited his statements after he invoked his “Miranda” right to an attorney and violated the Edwards v. Arizona bright-line rule to stop questioning. Potter initially told the agents he did not wish to speak to them. They honored his request; it was Potter who initiated the exchange with them the next day. Before that interrogation, Potter received Miranda warnings and signed a waiver. The court also rejected arguments that the Eighth Amendment prohibited his mandatory term of life because the child-focused logic of Miller v. Alabama should expand to cover adults who commit nonviolent offenses and that the court should have sustained his relevancy and prejudice objections because his statements discussed different actors (not charged in the indictment) and an earlier time, before the indictment’s start date. View "United States v. Potter" on Justia Law

Investigating robberies in Michigan and Ohio in 2010-2012, the government obtained court orders under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) to obtain Carpenter’s cell-site location information. Unlike other provisions of the SCA, the court-ordered production mechanism in section 2703(d) does not require law enforcement to get a warrant before acquiring such records. Carpenter’s wireless carriers were to provide “the locations of cell/site sector (physical addresses) for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls.” MetroPCS produced records spanning 127 days. Sprint produced two days of records covering the period when Carpenter’s phone was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio. The government used the records to establish his physical proximity to many of the robberies: Convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and related gun charges, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 1951(a), Carpenter was sentenced to more than 100 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search that requires a warrant supported by probable cause. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed. The unconstitutionality of the government’s search was not clear until after the Supreme Court ruling. The FBI agents who obtained Carpenter’s information acted in good faith, reasonably relying on the SCA. View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Fazica was arrested for drunk driving and taken to the Bloomfield County Police Department, and then to Oakland County Jail, which was alerted that she was intoxicated, yelling, and spitting. A Cell Extraction Team met Fazica upon her arrival. She alleges that they roughly removed her from the vehicle and immediately applied a spit hood that nearly entirely obscured her vision. The Team handcuffed her in a bent-over position, handled her forcefully, and threatened her with a taser. The entirely male team took Fazica to a room where she was made to lie on her stomach and was strip-searched. Her pants were torn off her; one officer placed his hands on her genitals and another groped her breasts. Fazica was then made to walk to a cell wearing only her bra and the hood. The hood prevented her from attributing certain specific acts to specific officers. Fazica sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that four officers used excessive force. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, arguing only that Fazica cannot show each officer’s personal involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional acts. The district court denied their motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, that each defendant either committed or observed and failed to stop the allegedly unconstitutional acts. View "Fazica v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services collects blood samples from nearly every newborn baby in Michigan, to test for diseases. After testing, the samples are transferred to the Michigan Neonatal Biobank and stored for future use by the state. Plaintiffs challenged the law, claiming that blood is drawn from newborns and retained without the consent or knowledge of the newborns’ parents. Plaintiffs allege that despite Defendants’ assurances that all blood samples are secure and not identifiable to the individuals from whom they were taken, some samples have been given up under court orders and some are being sold to researchers.The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of their complaint. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue claims for: damages based on alleged violations of the parents’ and the children’s substantive due process rights when the blood samples were collected and screened; damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief, based on alleged violations of the parents’ and children’s substantive due process rights by retention of the samples; damages based on alleged violations of the parents’ and children’s Fourth Amendment rights when the samples were collected and screened; injunctive and declaratory relief, based on alleged violations of the children’s Fourth Amendment rights by’ retention of their samples. Rights related to directing the medical care of children devolve upon their parents or guardians; the children’s rights were not violated when Defendants drew their blood, screened it, and stored it. State sovereign immunity and qualified immunity bar all claims alleging that the parents’ substantive due process rights were violated when Defendants drew their children’s blood and screened it. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ retention of the samples violates the parents’ fundamental rights. The court remanded that issue and Fourth Amendment claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for Defendants’ ongoing storage of the samples. View "Kanuszewski v. Michigan Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Based on a five-page-long search-warrant affidavit—which included evidence from a confidential informant and other sources, a controlled buy, direct police-officer surveillance, and Christian’s history of drug trafficking arrests—a magistrate determined that there was probable cause to search 618 Grandville Avenue, Christian’s home, for evidence of drug trafficking. That search uncovered a large amount of heroin, some cocaine and marijuana, and two loaded guns. Christian was convicted of various drug and firearm crimes. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed the district court's denial of Christian's motion to suppress evidence. On rehearing, the en banc court affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting Christian's "attempt to isolate and explain away each piece of evidence," and contradict the factual assertions of the officers who watched the house. Viewing the “totality of the circumstances,” through the “lens of common sense,” as the Supreme Court has instructed, the conclusion is inescapable: there was probable cause to believe that a search of 618 Grandville would uncover evidence of drug trafficking. “Most readers of the affidavit would have been surprised if it did not.” View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

An incumbent Kentucky state senator and an unsuccessful state candidate sued, alleging that Kentucky statutes violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. One (now defunct) campaign finance provision restricted the amount a candidate could loan to his campaign. The challenged ethics provisions prohibit a legislator, candidate for the legislature, or his campaign committee from accepting a campaign contribution from a lobbyist; prohibit a legislator, candidate, or his campaign committee from accepting a campaign contribution from an employer of a lobbyist or a political committee (PAC) during a regular session of the General Assembly; prohibit a legislator or his spouse from accepting “anything of value” from a lobbyist or his employer; and prohibit a lobbyist from serving as a campaign treasurer, and directly soliciting, controlling, or delivering a campaign contribution to a legislator or candidate. The district court dismissed the campaign finance claim as moot but found that the ethics laws burdened “core political speech” and curtailed freedom of association, requiring strict scrutiny. The court upheld the regular session contribution ban but found the other challenged ethics provisions unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the “regular session” ban but otherwise vacated and reversed. Kentucky’s legislature acted to protect itself and its citizens from corruption; these laws are closely drawn to further Kentucky’s anti-corruption interest and pass constitutional muster. View "Schickel v. Dilger" on Justia Law