Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Saginaw uses a common parking enforcement practice known as “chalking.” City parking enforcement officers use chalk to mark the tires of parked vehicles to track how long they have been parked. Parking enforcement officers return to the car after the posted time for parking has passed, and if the chalk marks are still there—a sign that the vehicle has not moved—the officer issues a citation. Taylor, a frequent recipient of parking tickets, sued the city and its parking enforcement officer, Hoskins, alleging that chalking violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search. The district court dismissed , finding that, while chalking may have constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, the search was reasonable. The Sixth Circuit reversed, characterizing the practice as a regulatory exercise. The chalking involves a physical intrusion and is intended to gather information. While automobiles have a reduced expectation of privacy, the court concluded that the need to deter drivers from exceeding the time permitted for parking—before they have even done so—is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search under the community caretaker rationale. View "Taylor v. Saginaw" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction that had enjoined Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government from enforcing Ordinance 25-2017, which restricts the delivery of “unsolicited written materials” to six enumerated locations and provides for civil penalties for violations. On remand, further proceedings were taken in the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in concluding that Ordinance 25-2017 constitutes a valid time, place, and manner regulation of speech. View "Lexington H-L Services, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government" on Justia Law

On April 29, 2013, the government charged White with drug distribution and firearm crimes. On May 2, White was arrested. He made his initial appearance the next day and was released on bond. The parties filed a stipulation with the court on May 17, agreeing to adjourn White’s preliminary hearing and exclude the time between May 23 and June 7 from White’s Speedy Trial Act clock. Plea negotiations were unsuccessful. A grand jury indicted White on June 4. Including those days expressly excluded by the court, 33 days passed between White’s arrest and indictment. White moved to dismiss the indictment because the government failed to indict him within 30 days of his arrest in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, but substantively argued only his rights under the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause. The court denied the motion. A jury convicted White; the court sentenced him to 84 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed. While the Supreme Court’s intervening "Bloate" decision invalidated Sixth Circuit precedent, so that the continuance to engage in pre-indictment plea negotiations did not qualify for automatic exclusion under section 3161(h)(1), White cannot overcome plain-error review of his Bloate argument. Alternatively, the time for pre-indictment plea negotiations was properly excluded as an ends-of-justice continuance under Speedy Trial Act section 3161(h)(7). View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Kentucky’s “Ultrasound Informed Consent Act,” KRS 311.727, directs a doctor, before performing an abortion, to perform an ultrasound; display the ultrasound images for the patient; and explain, in the doctor’s own words, what is being depicted. There is no requirement that the patient view the images or listen to the description. The doctor also must auscultate the fetal heartbeat but may turn off the volume if the patient requests. The Act does not penalize a doctor if the patient requested that the heartbeat sound be turned off or chose not to look at the ultrasound images or if the doctor makes any other statement, including advising a patient that she need not listen to or view the disclosures, or that the patient should have an abortion. A doctor need not make any disclosures if an abortion is medically necessary or in a medical emergency. Doctors brought a First Amendment challenge. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision, National Institute of Family & Life Advocates, clarifying that no heightened First Amendment scrutiny should apply to abortion-informed-consent statutes. Even though an abortion-informed-consent law compels a doctor’s disclosure of certain information, it should be upheld so long as the disclosure is truthful, non-misleading, and relevant to abortion. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center P.S.C. v. Beshear" on Justia Law

In May 2017, Judge Benningfield issued an order offering a 30-day sentencing credit to White County, Tennessee inmates in exchange for submitting to sterilization. After public outcry, Judge Benningfield declared that inmates could no longer enroll in the program. A third order clarified which of the inmates who initially enrolled could still receive the credit. Within months, the Tennessee Legislature passed Senate Bill 2133, which made it illegal for courts to make sentencing determinations based on a defendant’s willingness to consent to sterilization. Three inmates who refused to submit to a vasectomy and were consequently denied the sentencing credit challenged Judge Benningfield’s orders under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court found that the claims were moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that none of those subsequent developments in the law ended the differential treatment that plaintiffs challenged. Plaintiffs alleged that awarding them the 30- day sentencing credit would affect other collateral consequences related to sentencing. Tennessee law permits non-violent offenders to petition for expungement five years after the sentence termination date so that retroactive application of the sentencing credit would allow them to pursue expungement 30 days sooner. View "Sullivan v. Benningfield" on Justia Law

Police raided plaintiffs’ Lansing, Michigan homes, with search warrants for drugs. The searches were aggressive: officers knocked in doors with rams, used flashbangs and, allegedly left the homes in complete disarray. During or immediately following a search, an officer called a housing code compliance officer to the scene. At each of the four homes, the inspector found code violations such as water heaters without inspection tags, bare electrical wiring, and non-working smoke detectors and declared the home unsafe for occupancy. Some of the plaintiffs were arrested; in each case, the charges were dismissed. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the validity of the search warrants. Claims concerning the execution of the search warrants were properly rejected. Plaintiffs failed to show that the named officers actively participated in the use of excessive force, supervised those who used excessive force, or owed the victims a duty of protection against the use of excessive force. Although the police had no authority to admit third parties, even state actors, who had no warrant and could provide no assistance to the warranted searches, invasion-of-privacy claims failed because there was little evidence that the named officers admitted the inspectors into the homes. The court also upheld the rejection of claims concerning false arrest and malicious prosecution. The court reversed with respect to certain due-process claims and pre-deprivation claims. View "Gardner v. Evans" on Justia Law

n 1975, Jackson, Ajamu, and Bridgeman were convicted of murder, based largely on the purported eyewitness testimony of Vernon, who then was 13 years old. In 2014, Vernon recanted, disclosing that police officers had coerced him into testifying falsely. Vernon’s recantation led to the overturning of their convictions. The exonerated men filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, along with state law claims for indemnification against Cleveland. The district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to the section 1983 claims based on conspiracy, but reversed judgment on the pleadings as to the indemnification claims; denial of motions to amend the complaints to substitute the administrator of the estates of the deceased officers as a party in their place; summary judgment as to section 1983 claims arising from violations of Brady v. Maryland, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution; and summary judgment as to “Monell” claims against Cleveland. The court noted evidence that officers may have been unaware of their “Brady” obligations, that Brady violations were common, and that officers intimidated Vernon. View "Jackson v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

In February 2002, Daniel, his brother, Peter, McGlown, and Neal, traveling in a van, pulled up alongside a car and shot Newsom. They mistook Newsom for Bradley (the intended target). Newsom was in an automobile owned by Newsom’s sister, Bradley’s girlfriend. Newsom died from gunshot wounds. Based on eyewitness testimony, officers stopped Daniel's vehicle. Retracing the route from the shooting, investigators recovered firearms and gloves that had been discarded on the roadway. Bullets from those firearms matched bullets found in Newsom’s body and in his sister’s vehicle. Daniel, Peter, and McGlown were tried together. Before trial, the Michigan judge ordered them to wear a Band-It electronic restraint concealed underneath clothing. Daniel’s counsel unsuccessfully objected, stating that the Band-It was “pretrial punishment” and Daniel had no history of acting out in the courtroom. They were convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and felon in possession of a firearm. Officers never activated or threatened to activate Daniel’s Band-It. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court denied an appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Daniel’s 28 U.S.C.2254 habeas petition, in which he alleged that he was denied due process, a fair trial, and access to counsel. Noting that Daniel had made threats, the court held that use of the restraint was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; there is no evidence that the Band-It hindered his communications with his attorney. View "Daniel v. Burton" on Justia Law

Asgari came to the U.S. for education, earning a doctorate in 1997. He returned to Iran and became a professor at Sharif University. His work involves transmission electron microscopy. Asgari traveled to the U.S. in 2011, stating on his visa application that he planned to visit New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Los Angeles. He traveled to Cleveland to see an Iranian-American friend at Case Western’s Swagelok Center. They began collaborating. Asgari returned to Iran and obtained another visa for “temp[orary] business[/]pleasure,” identifying his destination as his son’s New York address. He applied for a job at Swagelok. The FBI investigated. The Center’s director stated that Asgari was on a sabbatical from Sharif University; that the Center conducted Navy-funded research; and that an opening had emerged on the project. Agent Boggs obtained a warrant to search Asgari’s personal email account for evidence that Asgari made materially false statements in his visa application and that Asgari violated the prohibition on exporting “any goods, technology, or services to Iran.” Based on information uncovered from that 2013 search, the government obtained another warrant to search Asgari’s subsequent emails. Indicted on 13 counts of stealing trade secrets, wire fraud, and visa fraud, Asgari successfully moved to suppress the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The affidavit was not “so skimpy, so conclusory, that anyone ... would necessarily have known it failed to demonstrate probable cause.” The sanctions on Iran are broad; probable cause is a lenient standard. View "United States v. Asgari" on Justia Law

Officer Minard pulled over Cruise-Gulyas for speeding. He wrote her a ticket for a lesser, non-moving violation. As she drove away, she made a vulgar gesture at Minard, who then stopped her again and changed the ticket to a speeding offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Minard’s motion for dismissal of Cruise-Gulyas’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, in which she alleged unconstitutional seizure, restriction of her liberty, and retaliation. Cruise-Gulyas did not break any law that would justify the second stop and at most was exercising her free speech rights. Qualified immunity protects police from personal liability unless they violate a person’s clearly established constitutional or statutory rights; the rights asserted by Cruise-Gulyas meet that standard. Minard’s authority to seize her in connection with the driving infraction ended when the first stop concluded. Cruise-Gulyas’s crude gesture could not provide that new justification. Any reasonable officer would know that a citizen who raises her middle finger engages in speech protected by the First Amendment. An officer who seizes a person for Fourth Amendment purposes without proper justification and issues her a more severe ticket clearly commits an adverse action that would deter her from repeating that conduct in the future. View "Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard" on Justia Law