Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Williams filed a purported class action against Cleveland, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that intake procedures at its House of Corrections (HOC), consisting of strip searches and mandatory delousing, violated the Fourth Amendment. On remand, after extensive discovery, the court granted Williams summary judgment in part and permanently enjoined the city from reinstituting its previous delousing method and from conducting group strip searches without installation of privacy partitions to obstruct the view of other inmates. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Williams did not have standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief; she was not in custody when she filed suit and it must be assumed that she will not return to the HOC. The fact that Williams returned to the HOC three times after filing the complaint does not confer standing because the relevant inquiry is whether she had a live, actionable claim for relief at the time she filed suit. Cleveland had discontinued its delousing policy by 2011, when Williams returned to the HOC. Allowing strip searches to be conducted in groups of two or three during busy periods, such as Williams’s time of intake, was reasonably related to Cleveland's legitimate penological interest of expediting the intake procedure; delousing detainees with a fine mist was reasonably related to its interest in maintaining the HOC's cleanliness and habitability. The need for delousing outweighed the admittedly substantial invasion of personal rights. View "Williams v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 1984, a Tennessee jury convicted Zagorski of two first-degree murders and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence; state courts denied post-conviction relief. Zagorski sought federal habeas corpus relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate an alternative suspect, that the court erred by improperly instructing the jury on the meaning of mitigating circumstances, and that the jury could not constitutionally impose the death penalty because prosecutors originally offered a plea deal for two life sentences. Finding all three arguments procedurally defaulted, the district court denied relief, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Supreme Court subsequently decided "Martinez," permitting ineffective assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings to establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of an ineffective assistance claim at trial. Zagorski sought post-judgment relief under FRCP 60(b)(6), which grants courts equitable power to vacate judgments “to achieve substantial justice” in the most “unusual and extreme situations.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, “giving due deference to the district court’s discretion in balancing the equities” and noting that, given the overwhelming evidence, a more thorough investigation of another suspect would not have reasonably been likely to affect the outcome. View "Zagorski v. Mays" on Justia Law

After federal agents arrested Robert Doggart for plotting to attack an Islamic community at the foothills of the Catskill Mountains, he attempted to plead guilty to making a threat in interstate commerce, a crime carrying a sentence of no more than five years. But the district court found that he had not made a cognizable threat and rejected his plea under Criminal Rule 11. After that and after the government added some charges, a jury convicted Doggart of solicitation to damage religious property and solicitation to commit arson, leaving him with a sentence of almost 20 years. Because the district court wrongly rejected the plea agreement, the Sixth Circuit reversed its decision to reject the agreement, left in place the later convictions, and remanded for it to reconsider the agreement under the correct law. View "United States v. Doggart" on Justia Law

Officer Joseph Danzy responded to a call about two suspicious men in an Akron neighborhood. He found Rauphael Thomas and Jesse Gray standing on the sidewalk. One thing (a Terry frisk) led to another (a tussle on the ground), which led to another (the discharge of Thomas’s concealed pistol). Thomas sprinted away, and Danzy shot him. Thomas died. His mother and estate administrator, Sherry Wilkerson, filed constitutional and state-tort claims against the officers, the City of Akron, and its police department. The district court denied Danzy summary judgment on one claim, which Danzy appealed. Wilkerson cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on the other claims. The Sixth Circuit agreed Danzy was not entitled to summary judgment on the Terry stop-and-frisk; the Court agreed Wilkerson was not entitled to judgment in her favor on the other claims raised. View "Wilkerson v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

In 2006, a federal jury convicted Victor Castano of drug and firearms crimes. At a subsequent trial in 2015, Castano was convicted of suborning perjury and obstructing justice regarding the 2006 trial, among other crimes. His sentence could be enhanced due to his 2006 felony convictions. Fearing such enhancement, Castano petitioned the district court for a writ of coram nobis to challenge his 2006 firearms conviction. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding Castano’s petition ultimately failed because he did not show fundamental error that would justify this extraordinary remedy, and he lacked sound reasons for failing to seek earlier appropriate relief. View "United States v. Castano" on Justia Law

In 2016, commercial air pilot Sean Fitzgerald showed up for work "rip-roaring drunk." He was set to fly in the morning, so he readied the jet for take-off: he conducted a walk-around safety check before entering the cockpit, where he calibrated the altimeter, programmed the flight-management system, turned on the auxiliary power unit, and requested flight clearance from air- traffic control. Before passengers boarded, Fitzgerald’s co-pilot recognized his inebriation and alerted airline executives, who in turn notified local law enforcement. Fitzgerald was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. 342, which makes it a crime to operate a common carrier while intoxicated. A jury convicted Fitzgerald, and the district court sentenced him to one year and one day in prison and to three years of supervised release. On appeal, Fitzgerald contended that the actions he performed were not enough to operate the aircraft within the meaning of section 342, that the jury was wrongly instructed, and that the district court erred at his sentencing. Finding no reversible error, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Fitzgerald's conviction. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Frank Richardson appealed his conviction for aiding and abetting he use of a firearm during a crime of violence. On his first appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence in full. But while that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that part of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a violent felony was unconstitutionally vague. Although Richardson was not convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act, he petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that Johnson nonetheless called part of his conviction into question. Richardson contends that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) was unconstitutional because its definition of the term, "crime of violence," was similar to the language at issue in Johnson. The Court granted Richardson’s petition, vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment, and remanded. In turn, the Sixth Circuit vacated Richardson’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Richardson’s original sentence should stand in light of Johnson. Without determining whether section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Richardson’s conviction under 924(c)’s force clause, which supplied a separate definition of "crime of violence." The Court also concluded its remand limited the district court’s inquiry to Johnson-related issues and that the district court properly refrained from considering Richardson’s other arguments about alleged deficiencies in the indictment and the trial court’s jury instructions - arguments that he could have raised in his first appeal but did not. Finally, the Sixth Circuit held Richardson’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The district court granted Stephen Mitchell habeas relief and gave him a sentence of time-served with three years of supervised release. Both Mitchell and the United States appealed. Since those appeals were filed, the Sixth Circuit decided substantially-similar cases. At the time of his sentencing, Mitchell’s three prior convictions qualified as “violent” felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), meaning Mitchell was subject to the ACCA’s enhanced sentencing. Applying the ACCA, the trial judge sentenced Mitchell to 250 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. But after the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s so-called residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, and then applied that holding retroactively, Mitchell filed for habeas relief. Mitchell argued that without the ACCA’s residual clause, his prior felonies no longer qualified as “violent” under the ACCA. Therefore, he said his 250-month, ACCA-enhanced sentence was invalid. Without the ACCA, the maximum sentence Mitchell could have served for his felon-in-possession conviction was ten years. But Mitchell had already served seventeen years by the end of his habeas proceeding. So the district court decided to release Mitchell from custody and correct his sentence to “time- served.” The district court also re-imposed Mitchell’s original three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's habeas relief insofar as it held that Mitchell’s burglary conviction was not a “violent” felony under the ACCA. The district court’s judgment as it related to Mitchell’s sentence was vacated and remanded for a determination of whether: (1) a time-served sentence that is equivalent to a term-of-months sentence above the statutory maximum is invalid; and (2) a district court has the discretion to select appropriate proceedings for correcting a sentence—so long as the corrected sentence complies with substantive and procedural reasonableness. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Evendale property owners who wanted to rent their properties had to obtain a permit by allowing the building commissioner to inspect the property or sign a sworn affirmation that the property complied with the code. The commissioner also could inspect structures if he suspected a violation. If the building was occupied, the commissioner was to present credentials and request entry. For unoccupied structures, the commissioner was to make a reasonable effort to locate the owner and ask to inspect. Should someone refuse entry, the commissioner could use “remedies provided by law.” Vonderhaar owns 13 rental properties, over half of Evendale's rental homes. Vonderhaar filed a purported class action under the Fourth Amendment, claiming the code authorized warrantless searches, and the Fifth Amendment, claiming the code required permit applicants to attest to compliance. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the inspection procedures facially violated the Fourth Amendment. Evendale subsequently amended its code to allow owners applying for rental permits to “[p]rovide a written certification” from an architect or engineer attesting that a building meets Village standards and adding that when a commissioner suspects a violation, the commissioner may “seek a search warrant based on probable cause.” The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction for lack of standing. The Village never relied on the code to conduct a warrantless search and the plaintiffs have no risk of impending injury. View "Vonderhaar v. Village of Evendale" on Justia Law

Rodriguez-Penton moved from Cuba to the U.S. when he was 15. He is a lawful permanent resident. Rodriguez-Penton was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess Oxycodone, retained counsel Butler, and initially cooperated but stopped because he feared for his family’s safety. The government offered Rodriguez-Penton plea deals but he entered an open guilty plea. Rodriguez-Penton’s Cuban citizenship arose during the hearing: the court stated that there was no need to review the civil rights one forfeits by pleading guilty; inquired whether, due to Rodriguez-Penton’s citizenship, there would be an early sentencing; and asked about an Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer, but did not advise Rodriguez-Penton that pleading guilty might have adverse immigration consequences and sentenced him to a 121-month prison term. Rodriguez-Penton alleges that he learned of the deportation risk after sentencing, during a meeting with his prison counselor. Rodriguez-Penton appealed, represented by Butler, arguing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. After hearing testimony from Butler and an interpreter, a magistrate concluded that Butler merely told Rodriguez-Penton that he did not have to worry about deportation. Rodriguez-Penton testified unequivocally that he “would not have gone to trial, even if he could not have negotiated a better plea arrangement.” The district court dismissed his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims has changed in the context of non-citizens faced with criminal charges. Rodriguez-Penton asserted that his decision-making process would have been different if he had been properly advised; the government has not offered any countervailing evidence that Rodriguez-Penton could not have secured a more favorable plea. View "Rodriguez-Penton v. United States" on Justia Law