Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Brittany, age 17, her mother, father, and sister, driving home from dinner, were stopped by Erlanger police because of an obstructed license plate. Mother, the driver, was arrested for obstructing a license plate, driving with no registration plates, driving with a suspended license, and possession of a forged instrument. Officers noticed that father's “tools, like screwdrivers and wrenches,” some of which were “sitting out” and others “in containers” and suspected that mother was engaged in drug activity. They sent for a drug dog, which found no drugs. The wait took about an hour. A female officer, Klare, escorted Brittany to the restroom with permission from father. Klare told Brittany that she “may have to search” her, then asked, “would you step over here.” Brittany answered “yes” and walked to the requested location. The snap securing Klare’s gun was unfastened; she placed her hand on the gun five times while talking to Brittany. Klare secured Brittany’s hands behind her back. Brittany claims that Klare placed her hands under Harris’s brassiere and pinched her breasts, causing bruising, stating a previous suspect had “stuffed needles in her bra” and that “[y]ou have the look of a junkie whore.” Klare found no drugs, paraphernalia, weapon, or other contraband. Brittany sued Klare under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment. A reasonable jury could find that Klare’s search of Brittany was unconstitutional and that Klare is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Harris v. Klare" on Justia Law

Wogenstahl was convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and was sentenced to death. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, in 1996, Wogenstahl sought post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and seeking to conduct DNA testing. Ohio courts denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Wogenstahl's 1999 petition for federal habeas relief. In 2014, Wogenstahl again sought a new trial, citing a 2013 Justice Department letter, stating that testimony by an FBI examiner, included “inappropriate” statements that “‘exceed[ed] the limits of the science’ of microscopic-hair-comparison analysis.” State courts denied relief. Wogenstahl sought to file another habeas petition in the district court, arguing that his petition, although second-in-time, was not second or successive.The Sixth Circuit granted permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Wogenstahl is attacking the same state court judgment of conviction and his claims were not unripe at the time of his initial petition. Wogenstahl’s claims fall under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B); he is raising new claims, relying on facts that he only recently discovered. That Wogenstahl did not previously obtain that evidence is not attributable to a lack of reasonable diligence. Wogenstahl has made prima facie showings that the evidence is impeaching; the state suppressed the material in the original police file and made inaccurate statements misrepresenting the hair analysis; and that he can establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty. View "In re Wogenstahl" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 census, Michigan’s Republican-controlled government enacted new legislative and congressional districting plans. Plaintiffs sued in December 2017, alleging the maps violate the Equal Protection Clause by diluting the voting power of Democratic voters and the First Amendment by marginalizing votes based on party affiliation. The state sought dismissal and asked the court to stay the case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in then-pending redistricting cases, Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone. In February, while that motion was pending, eight Republican Michigan Congressional representatives moved to intervene, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) (intervention by right), and permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They argued that they stood “to be irrevocably harmed by any redrawing of congressional districts” and asserted that none of the original parties adequately represented their interests. The court denied the motion to stay and the motion to intervene. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to permissive intervention, noting that the court did not explain how the “complex issues” would delay the case or prejudice Plaintiffs, how allowing the Congressmen to intervene would frustrate an expeditious resolution, or how the shared interests of the Congressmen and the citizens of Michigan were relevant to the delay-and-prejudice calculus. The Congressmen identify several interests they seek to protect, including “the relationship between constituent and representative.” Those interests differ from those of the Secretary of State and Michigan's citizens. View "League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Police arrested Bunkley for attempted murder. Although he was convicted, Bunkley was innocent. When the conviction was overturned, Bunkley sued Detroit on a Monell claim, Investigator Moses for malicious prosecution, and four officers for false arrest and failure to intervene to stop the wrongful arrest. The district court granted the city summary judgment but denied the individuals’ summary judgment motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers assumed that Bunkley and his father were the shooters, even though neither fit the description (other than being African-American and Bunkley’s wearing black clothing); and they did not even question Bunkley about this shooting before arresting him—stating that he was being arrested for a parole violation, which they knew was a lie. “Viewed objectively,” a jury could find that these officers under these circumstances had no reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest Bunkley. Moses knowingly withheld Bunkley’s Facebook alibi; withheld from the prosecutor that the victim had rejected a photo array; and made false statements. A jury could conclude that these facts undermine a reasonable belief that Moses had established probable cause to prosecute Bunkley or that the photo-array identification was alone sufficient. The duty of law enforcement officers to intervene to prevent an arrest not supported by probable cause was stated in precedent “clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish” this rule. View "Bunkley v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Mason, an African-American Ohio resident sued against all 88 Ohio county recorders for violating the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition against making, printing, or publishing “any . . . statement” indicating a racial preference, such as a racially restrictive covenant. Mason’s complaint included copies of land records, recorded in 1922-1957, that contain racially restrictive covenants. There is no allegation that such covenants have been enforced since the 1948 Supreme Court decision prohibiting enforcement of such covenants. Mason maintains that permitting documents with restrictive covenants in the chain of title to be recorded or maintained and making them available to the public violated the Act. Mason alleges that defendants “discouraged the Plaintiff and others from purchasing real estate ... by creating a feeling that they ... do not belong in certain neighborhoods” and that defendants’ actions “damage and cloud the title to property owned by property owners.” Mason’s counsel stated that Mason became aware of the covenants while looking to buy property, a fact not contained in the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Mason lacked standing. A plaintiff must show that he suffered a palpable economic injury distinct to himself; any alleged injury was not caused by the county recorders, who are required by Ohio statute to furnish the documents to the public; county recorders cannot redress the alleged harm, as they have no statutory authority to edit the documents. View "Mason v. Adams County Recorder" on Justia Law

In 2001, Davis pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Davis’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In 2016, Davis filed a petition for habeas corpus, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, which invalidated ACCA’s residual clause and arguing that his aggravated assault convictions were no longer ACCA predicate crimes. The district court agreed, noting that the Sixth Circuit had already concluded in 2011 (McMurray) that reckless aggravated assault did not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s use-of-force clause The court determined that Davis could have been sentenced only under ACCA’s residual clause and was entitled to “Johnson” relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Tennessee reckless aggravated assault, section 39-13-102(a)(1), under which Davis was convicted is a crime of violence under ACCA’s use-of-force clause. The court noted that in 2016 the Supreme Court (Voisine) overruled McMurray by holding that the ACCA’s use-of-force clause encompassed reckless conduct. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

Robinson and two cohorts sold the victim a large amount of crack cocaine on credit, beat the victim when he was unable to pay, and, extorted from the victim’s parents for roughly $1,000. A Michigan jury convicted Robinson of extortion, delivery of a controlled substance, unlawful imprisonment, and aggravated assault. Based on his Presentence Investigation Report, the sentencing court scored multiple variables that went beyond the elements of the offenses for which Robinson was convicted, including the number of victims and exploitation of a vulnerable victim, resulting in higher minimum-sentence ranges than would have been warranted without those judge-found facts. The judge imposed concurrent sentences, the longest being 38-480 months for the delivery-of-a-controlled-substance conviction. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit conditionally granted habeas relief, limited to Robinson’s sentence. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee to mean that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime . . . must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt,” Alleyne v. United States (2013). The Michigan court violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment right by using judge-found facts to score sentencing variables that increased his mandatory minimum sentence,“ which “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” View "Robinson v. Woods" on Justia Law

In January 2010, 15-year-old Robert arrived at a Detroit Police station wearing no shirt, no shoes, and a pair of shorts. Employees of Wayne County Department of Health Services (DHS) opened an investigation into his parents, the Brents, visited the Brents’ home, and allegedly took photographs without their consent. A petition to remove the five Brent children from their home detailed the poor conditions, concerns about lead-based paint on the walls, and that the Brents’ youngest child, age 10, appeared to have a severe speech impediment. The Brents claim that the petition contained falsehoods, that the judge did not actually sign the order, that officers used abusive tactics in removing the children, and that Robert became ill because he was given cough medicine that had expired while in a residential facility. Brents claim that officials threatened to and did interfere with their visitation with the children. The children were released to the Brents in June 2010 but remained under DHS supervision until September 2010. The Brents sued “seemingly every person or agency involved in the removal, custody, and care” of the children. The Sixth Circuit reinstated gross negligence claims against the state defendants but affirmed the rejection of those claims as to city defendants; affirmed summary judgment for city defendants on intentional infliction of emotional distress claims; rejected failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city; and rejected 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against police officers. View "Brent v. Wayne County Department of Human Services." on Justia Law

Ayers, an experienced Kentucky criminal-defense attorney, was indicted in 2008 on five counts of failing to file state tax returns. Ayers represented himself throughout the 21 months between his indictment and trial, but never formally elected to do so. He never waived his right to counsel on the record, filed a notice of appearance, or moved to be allowed to proceed pro se. The court allegedly failed to inform him at his arraignment that he had a right to counsel and never subsequently sought to determine whether Ayers’s self-representation was a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. When Ayers asked for a continuance a day before trial was scheduled to begin so that he could hire an attorney with whom he attested he was already in negotiations, the court denied his request and forced him to proceed pro se. Ayers was convicted. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The Kentucky Supreme Court acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it held that trial courts need not “obtain a waiver of counsel” before allowing “experienced criminal trial attorneys” to represent themselves. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that Ayers did not validly waive his right to counsel. View "Ayers v. Hall" on Justia Law

Lobbins was detained at the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center, awaiting trial on federal charges related to his gang membership. Another gang member, Churchwell, was awaiting trial on state charges of murdering a Vanderbilt professor. Churchwell boasted about committing the murder. Inmate Boyd relayed that information to a state prosecutor. Churchwell heard about Boyd’s cooperation and said that he was “going to have Maurice f***ed up.” Lobbins entered Boyd’s cell with a shank and repeatedly stabbed him. The government added a federal charge for witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(2)(A) and 1512(a)(2)(C). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lobbins’s convictions. Lobbins then unsuccessfully moved to vacate his witness tampering sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The “reasonable likelihood” standard applies to section 1512(a)(2)(C) but the district court instructed the jury to apply a lower standard: whether, absent the attack, Boyd “might” have spoken to a federal officer. The Vanderbilt murders were investigated and prosecuted by the state. Boyd spoke to a state prosecutor, not a federal one; there was no evidence that Boyd was reasonably likely to talk to a federal official. The statute requires the likelihood of “communication” to a federal official about “the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” That Lobbins and Boyd were federal detainees does not support any inference that Boyd was likely to talk to a federal official about Churchwell. Had the jury been properly instructed, it would have probably voted to acquit. A defense lawyer’s failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction that materially lightens the government’s burden of proof is typically deficient performance. View "Lobbins v. United States" on Justia Law